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Abstract 
In Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them Sainsbury and Tye defend a version 
of originalism, the view that concepts are to be individuated by way of their origins. A 
consequence of their account is that concepts that are semantically distinct may 
nonetheless be of the same type (and vice versa). In this thesis I argue that a result of 
this commitment is that their account fails as a general theory of concepts and thoughts. 
I show by appeal to a thought experiment that Sainsbury and Tye’s originalism cannot 
provide a general account of the cognitive role of concepts and thoughts: the theory fails 
to explain certain cases of rationality. Further, I show that originalism fails at the 
specific task of solving three classical puzzles within the philosophy of mind and 
language; puzzles the solution of which is the raison d'être of originalism. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Thoughts are central to our reasoning and action. For instance, yesterday I went to the store in 
order to buy milk. I did this because I had a desire for milk and because I believed that going 
to the store would result in me getting milk. When desiring milk I formed the thought I want 
milk. I also formed the thought going to the store will result in me getting milk. From this I 
concluded that going to the store would get me what I wanted. I was rational in doing so, 
because it follows from my desire and belief that, if they are true, going to the store will result 
in me getting what I want. This piece of practical reasoning then resulted in me going to the 
store. A central feature of the two thoughts seems to be that they are directed towards the 
same thing, namely milk. Had I desired milk and thought that going to the store would result 
in me getting juice, I would not be rational in going to the store on the basis of these thoughts 
alone. Further, if I had the desire that produced the thought I want milk and the belief going to 
the store will result in me getting white liquid produced by the mammary glands of cows I 
would only conclude that going to the store would get me what I want if I also had the belief 
that milk is white liquid produced by the mammary glands of cows. If I did not have this 
belief, I would not be rational in concluding from my desire and belief alone that going to the 
store would get me what I want. Even though the two thoughts are directed towards the same 
object, milk, they seem to play different roles in my cognition: I may think I want milk and at 
the same time think that I do not want white liquid produced by the mammary glands of cows, 
if I lack the belief that the two thoughts are about the same object. Then it seems that what is 
important for the cognitive significance of thoughts, and hence my being rational, is not the 
object itself but rather how I relate to the object in question. What does this tell us about the 
nature of thoughts? It seems that a general theory of thoughts must be able to explain why I 
acted the way I did when going out to buy milk, and also why I was rational in doing so. What 
view about the metaphysics of thoughts do we need for this explanatory task? What is a 
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thought, and what makes a thought the type of thought that it is instead of some other 
thought? In virtue of what does a thought have its specific content?  
In this thesis I will discuss one of the most recent theories suggesting an answer to these 
questions; originalism. The theory attempts to answer the questions by giving an account of 
concepts, which, according to a widely held view, are the constituents of thoughts. Given that 
thoughts are composed of concepts, one must understand the nature of concepts in order to 
understand the nature of thoughts. In Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An 
Originalist Theory of Concepts (2012) (henceforth Seven Puzzles of Thought), Mark 
Sainsbury and Michael Tye take concepts deployed in thought to be analogous to words in a 
language. They point to what they take to be central properties of words: Words are vehicles 
of meaning - they express, but are not themselves linguistic meaning. Further, two words that 
express the same meaning (i.e. true synonyms) may nonetheless be of distinct types, if they 
have different etymological history. Also, two words that differ in meaning may be of the 
same type if they share etymological history. Hence, according to Sainsbury and Tye, words 
are to be individuated historically. Now, originalists take concepts to share these central 
properties of words: concepts are vehicles of content; concepts express contents but they are 
not themselves content. Further, two concept tokens may be of distinct types even if they 
express the same content, if they have different historical origins. Also, two concept tokens 
may be of the same type even if the express distinct contents, if they have the same historical 
origin.1 Hence, Sainsbury and Tye take concepts to be individuated by way of their origins: 
Two concepts are of the same type if and only if they have the same origin. This is the key 
originalist claim. Now since concepts are the constituents of thoughts, the individuation of 
thoughts also depends on the origins of concepts. Understanding thoughts this way, Sainsbury 
and Tye claim, will help us answer the central questions above. 
The main motivation behind originalism is that it allegedly solves seven of the main puzzles 
within the philosophy of mind. These are puzzles concerning the cognitive significance of 
thoughts – what role a given thought plays in cognition - which any theory of thoughts and 
concepts must account for. If a theory can in fact give a satisfactory solution to all of these 
puzzles at once, we have reason to think that the theory is true. I will, however, argue that 
Sainsbury and Tye fail to give a satisfactory explanation of three of the seven puzzles they set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  will	  give	  several	  examples	  of	  these	  possibilities	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	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out to solve. If I am right that their formulation of originalism fails to solve certain of the 
puzzles, it seems that their account cannot provide a general theory of thoughts and concepts. 
As mentioned, a general theory of thoughts must provide an explanation of cognitive 
significance. What role thoughts play in mind is essential for understanding rationality. 
According to originalism, cognitive significance depends on the vehicles of content. Since the 
thoughts I want milk and I want white liquid produced by the mammary glands of cows 
contain distinct concepts, they play different roles in cognition, even though the thoughts refer 
to the same object. This explains why I may be rational in holding one of them to be true, 
while rejecting the other. As we shall see, however, a consequence of originalism as stated in 
Seven Puzzles of Thought is that an individual may come to use the same concept to express 
distinct and contradictory contents. I will put forth a thought experiment that shows that if one 
takes cognitive significance to depend on vehicles of content and at the same time allows for 
concept tokens of the same type to have contradictory content, this threatens one’s ability to 
explain rationality. Since Sainsbury and Tye’s (2012) main concern is with the seven puzzles, 
they give no explicit indication of what a general theory of cognitive significance would look 
like on their account – they only offer solutions to the specific problem cases. I therefore offer 
suggested routes on their behalf. The thought experiment I put forth comes in two versions, in 
order to show that the two routes available to Sainsbury and Tye both fail to explain certain 
cases of rationality. If Sainsbury and Tye’s account of cognitive significance fails to explain 
rationality, we have further reasons to reject their originalist theory as a general theory of 
concepts and thoughts.  
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to show that Sainsbury and Tye’s formulation of originalism fails as a 
general theory of concepts and thoughts.2 Sainsbury and Tye hold that the key claims of 
originalism are compatible with various views about different aspects of mental content.3 
They do, however, present what they take to be the correct view of such matters. It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Since	   originalism	   is	   a	   relatively	   recent	   theory	   (2011	   &	   2012),	   it	   has	   not	   been	   much	   discussed.	   The	  current	  literature	  on	  originalism	  includes	  Millikan	  (2011),	  Recanati	  (2012,	  244-­‐45),	  Horwich	  (2014),	  and	  Hedger	  (forthcoming).	  3	  For	  instance,	  they	  take	  their	  claims	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  both	  externalism	  and	  internalism	  about	  mental	  content.	  I	  shall	  return	  to	  this.	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Sainsbury and Tye’s specific formulation of originalism with these commitments included 
that I will consider in this thesis. The structure of the thesis is this: I start by laying out some 
preliminaries to originalism. Despite being a new theory of how to individuate concepts and 
thoughts, originalism, as defended by Sainsbury and Tye, adopts many features of classical 
theories in philosophy of mind and language. A brief introduction to earlier theories will thus 
be helpful in understanding originalism. In chapter 2, I give a detailed overview of 
originalism as stated in Seven Puzzles of Thought. I will point to those features of originalism 
that are familiar from classical theories within philosophy of mind and philosophy of 
language and also those aspects of originalism that set the view apart from earlier theories. I 
will offer minor critical comments along the way, but the main discussion I leave for chapter 
4 and 5. In chapter 3 I present the seven puzzles of thought and the originalist solution to 
these puzzles given in Seven Puzzles of Thought. In chapter 4, I will argue that Sainsbury and 
Tye fail to solve three of the puzzles their theory is advanced to solve. The reason given for 
believing originalism to be true is that it solves the seven puzzles; if it fails to do so, we have 
little reason to think that originalism can provide a general theory of concepts and thoughts. In 
chapter 5 I challenge Sainsbury and Tye’s account further. Here, I set out a thought 
experiment that shows that originalism fails to account for cognitive significance and - as a 
consequence of this - rationality. A central explanatory role of thoughts is to account for 
rationality; a theory of thoughts that fails to account for this explanatory role of cannot 
provide a full understanding of the nature of such entities. In chapter 6 I consider possible 
solutions to my thought experiment on behalf of the originalists. I argue that these solutions 
are unsuccessful and that originalism, as stated in Seven Puzzles of Thought, thus fails to 
provide an answer to my criticism. In chapter 7, I briefly present an alternative to originalism; 
François Recanati’s theory of mental files (2012). Recanati agrees with Sainsbury and Tye 
that the role of thoughts in cognition depends on the vehicles of content. He disagrees with 
originalism that the vehicles of content are to be individuated in terms of their origin; 
Recanati takes such vehicles to be individuated by their function. I will show that the mental 
file framework of Recanati is better suited to solve the seven puzzles of thought than 
Sainsbury and Tye’s originalism (and in particular the problems I offered in Chapter 4). This 
framework also avoids the problems posed for Sainsbury and Tye by my thought experiment. 
Hence it seems that if one wants to hold that cognitive significance relies on the vehicles of 
content, Recanati’s theory is favourable to Sainsbury and Tye’s originalism, since Recanati’s 
account avoids the problems posed for originalism in this thesis. The purpose of comparing 
originalism to Recanati’s theory is not to give a general argument in favour of the latter – the 
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focus of this thesis is on originalism – but rather to show what is wrong with the originalist 
framework advocated by Sainsbury and Tye, and also to show that some of the compelling 
features of originalism can be maintained when cast within another framework. There might 
of course be other features of Recanati’s theory worthy of criticism, but validating Recanati’s 
theory as a whole is beyond the scope of this thesis; I will only discuss to what extent 
Recanati’s theory can solve the specific problems posed for Sainsbury and Tye’s originalism. 
Finally, in chapter 8, I conclude by saying that Sainsbury and Tye’s theory fails to provide a 
general account of cognitive significance and rationality. The reason is that the theory fails to 
explain the puzzles it sets out to solve, and that it encounters further problems – problems that 
do not rise for Recanati’s theory of mental files – when explaining certain cases of rationality. 
The upshot is that, at least on the basis of the cases discussed in this thesis, originalism should 
be abandoned in favour of competing theories of concepts and thoughts. 
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Chapter 1 
Preliminaries 
 
 
A common view is that thoughts are like sentences in the language of thought. On this view, 
thoughts consist of concepts governed by syntax. Hence, in order to understand the nature of 
thoughts one must understand the nature of concepts. Consider the thought penguins are 
birds; this thought consists of the concepts penguin and bird structured in a certain way. In 
addition to having a syntactic structure, thoughts also have semantic features; they express a 
meaning or content. Thoughts have truth conditions; for instance, the thought penguins are 
birds is true just in case penguins are birds. In this way, thoughts can be said to represent the 
world to be in one way or another. Central questions within philosophy of mind are these: 
What is the nature of the content of thoughts and concepts? How do the syntactic features of 
thoughts and concepts relate to the semantic features of such entities, and how are we to 
understand the relation between thoughts and their referents? In this chapter I will give a brief 
overview of some of the main camps in the debate about the individuation of concepts and 
thoughts: direct reference theories and descriptivism.4 Such theories give rise to many 
features of originalism and hence, getting an overview of earlier theories will be helpful in 
understanding originalism.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Many	  of	  the	  puzzles	  occupying	  philosophers	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  thoughts,	  were	  originally	  introduced	  as	  puzzles	  about	  language.	  It	  has,	  however,	  become	  common	  to	  transpose	  classical	  problems	  in	  philosophy	  of	  language	  to	  philosophy	  of	  mind.	  Since	  this	  thesis	  concerns	  thoughts	  rather	  than	  language	  I	  offer	  simple	  modifications	  of	  the	  classical	  views	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  them	  to	  thoughts.	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1.1 Classical Theories of Concepts and Thoughts 
A traditional approach to the nature of concepts is to hold that such entities must be 
understood in terms of their contents. There are two central questions regarding the content of 
concepts: (1) What is the content of concepts, and (2) in virtue of what does a concept have its 
reference (if any). In answering the first question, a common view is that the content of 
concepts simply is their reference. For instance, the content of the concept Aristotle is 
Aristotle himself. This view dates back to John Stuart Mill’s (1843) theory of meaning of 
proper names. Theories adopting a Millian framework for concepts hold that the syntactic 
features of concepts are just names for objects or groups of objects, and the relation between 
the syntax and referent is direct, and not mediated by an object’s properties. Such theories are 
often labelled direct reference theories.  
One problem for direct reference theories, such as Millianism, is that some concepts such as 
Pegasus and Vulcan lack referents. Even so, the concepts seem to contribute to the content of 
thoughts. The thought Pegasus is a winged horse seems to play a different role in cognition 
than the thought Vulcan is a winged horse: It is one thing to believe that Pegasus is a winged 
horse, another to believe that Vulcan is a winged horse. How can this difference in cognitive 
significance be accommodated within a direct reference framework? It seems that one cannot 
explain empty concepts contributing to the content of thoughts on a Millian framework, 
according to which the content just is the objects referred to, given that there are no such 
objects in these cases. 
Millianism is further challenged by Frege’s observation that co-referential concepts can play 
different roles in cognition (Frege 1892). Consider the following: The Ancient Babylonians 
used the concept Hesperus to pick out the brightest star visible in the night sky and 
Phosphorus to pick out the brightest star visible in the morning. Unbeknownst to the Ancient 
Babylonians, Hesperus and Phosphorus actually refer to the same heavenly body, namely the 
planet Venus. According to classic Millianism, then, the concepts Hesperus and Phosphorus 
should have the same content, since they refer to the same object. However, the Ancient 
Babylonians had the belief that Hesperus is Hesperus, but they did not believe that Hesperus 
is Phosphorus. In the evening they believed that Hesperus was visible, but did not think that 
Phosphorus was visible. Hence, it seems like Hesperus and Phosphorus play distinct roles in 
cognition. In both cases the thought believed has the same content as the thought denied, on a 
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classical Millian framework, and classical Millians have no further resources to account for 
the difference in cognitive significance.  
Further, the thought Hesperus is Hesperus is trivial, in that is does not add anything to our 
knowledge. The thought Hesperus is Phosphorus, on the other hand, is informative, in that it 
potentially adds something to our knowledge about the world. Since the two thoughts differ in 
the level of informativeness they must differ in cognitive significance. When the Ancient 
Babylonians discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus they did not simply make a cognitive 
discovery – they did not just discover that their terms had the same meaning – according to 
Frege (1892, 56), they also made an empirical discovery. Furthermore, the knowledge that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus allows one to make inferences about the world that one would not be 
rational in making if one only knows that Hesperus is Hesperus. For instance, after making 
the discovery, the Ancient Babylonians concluded that the same heavenly body is visible 
twice a day. They were justified in making this inference since they knew that (i) Hesperus is 
visible in the evening, (ii) Phosphorus is visible in the morning, and (iii) Hesperus is 
Phosphorus. Without the knowledge of (iii), the conclusion that the same heavenly body is 
visible twice a day would not be justified, since the conclusion does not follow from (i) and 
(ii) alone. The question raised for direct reference theories, then, is how we can explain the 
difference in level of informativeness in the thought Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is 
Phosphorus, when Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same content on such views. A full 
account of the nature of thoughts must account for this, since, as we have seen, it is part of the 
explanatory role of thoughts to account for rationality. 
An alternative to direct reference theories that emerged from Frege’s observations is 
descriptivism. This is the view that we can only be related in thought to objects through their 
instantiated properties. According to descriptivists, our knowledge of objects is mediated by 
our knowledge of their properties.5 On this view, the relation between the syntactic features of 
concepts and their referents is not direct, in the way Millians hold. Instead, the content of 
concepts is determined by way of a set of associated descriptions. Take for instance the 
concept Aristotle: typically the associated descriptions are something like ‘the teacher of 
Alexander the Great’, ‘Greek philosopher’ etc. According to descriptivism, such descriptions 
determine the referent of concepts. The referent of Aristotle is whatever x satisfies all the 
associated descriptions, namely Aristotle himself. Hence, descriptivism provides an answer to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Other	  proponents	  of	  various	  versions	  of	  the	  descriptivist	  theory	  include	  Russell	  (e.g.	  1911),	  Searle	  (e.g.	  1958,	  1983),	  and	  Strawson	  (e.g.	  1959).	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both question (1) about what the content of concepts is, and also question (2) about in virtue 
of what a concept has its reference: as Kallestrup explains, according to descriptivism 
“meaning is fully determined by competent speakers’ [or thinker’s] mental associations. On 
this view, meaning is firmly in the mind of competent speakers [or thinkers]. But 
descriptivism is also a theory of reference in that descriptive content is what determines 
reference: a particular object is the referent of a referring term if and only if that object 
satisfies all the associated description” (Kallestrup 2012, 14).6 
Although this is controversial, Frege is often taken to be one of the first descriptivists7. Frege 
introduces the notion of sense as part of an expression’s semantic value, in addition to 
reference. While classical Millianism has a single levelled semantics, Frege advocates a two-
levelled semantics consisting of reference and sense.  A sense expresses a mode of 
presentation.8 On one reading of Frege, senses are sets of associated descriptions.9 Hence, the 
semantic value of modes of presentation depends on how individuals conceive the object 
referred to.10 This framework explains why co-referential terms, such as Hesperus and 
Phosphorus, can play different roles in cognition: 
If the sign ‘a’ is distinguished from the sign ‘b’ only as object (here, by means of its 
shape), not as sign (i.e. not by the manner in which it designates something), the 
cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of a=b, provided a=b is true. A 
difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in 
the mode of presentation of that which is designated (Frege 1892, 57). 
In the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus, the expressions refer to the same object but they 
express different ways of conceiving the planet Venus. The sense of Hesperus is something 
like ‘the evening star’, while the sense of Phosphorus is something like ‘the morning star’. 
The difference in sense explains the two concepts playing different roles in cognition: the 
propositions expressed by thoughts employing them differ, contrary to the Millian view. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Since,	  on	  this	  view,	  the	  content	  of	  concepts	  is	  a	  thinker’s	  associated	  descriptions,	  the	  content	  of	  concepts	  and	  thoughts	  depend	  on	  intrinsic	  features	  of	  the	  thinker	  alone.	  This	  is	  often	  labelled	  internalism.	  I	  return	  to	  this	  view	  in	  3.2.	  7	  Cf.	  Burge	  2005.	  8	  Even	  though	  Frege	  says	   that	  senses	  express	  modes	  of	  presentations,	   I	  will	   follow	  the	   tradition	  of	  using	  
sense	  and	  mode	  of	  presentation	  interchangeably	  when	  laying	  out	  the	  descriptivist	  position.	  	  9	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  Frege	  would	  also	  allow	  non-­‐descriptive	  senses	  (Burge	  1979a).	  But	  for	  simplicity	  (it	  is	  not	  relevant	   for	  the	  debate	  about	  originalism),	   I	  will	   follow	  Kripke	  (1980)	  and	  assume	  that	  Frege	  was	  a	  descriptivist.	  10	  Frege	  distinguishes	  sense	  from	   idea.	  Sense	  is	  objective	  in	  a	  way	  that	  ideas	  are	  not:	  ”The	  reference	  of	  a	  proper	  name	  is	  the	  object	  itself	  which	  we	  designate	  by	  its	  means;	  the	  idea,	  which	  we	  have	  in	  that	  case,	  is	  wholly	  subjective;	  in	  between	  lies	  the	  sense,	  which	  is	  indeed	  no	  longer	  subjective	  like	  the	  idea,	  but	  is	  yet	  not	   the	   object	   itself”	   (Frege	   1892,	   59).	   While	   ideas	   are	   individual,	   and	   often	   coloured	   by	   personal	  idiosyncrasies,	  senses	  can	  be	  shared	  amongst	  different	  individuals.	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also explains the difference in the level of informativeness in the two identity statements 
Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus: the knowledge that the morning star is the 
morning star is trivial whereas learning that the morning star is the evening star is an 
important empirical discovery. Also, when knowing that the morning star is the same as the 
evening star we can make inferences about the world that we would not be justified in making 
when only knowing that the morning star is the same as the morning star. This explains why 
the Ancient Babylonians were only justified in concluding that the same heavenly body is 
visible twice a day after making the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus: the thought 
Hesperus is Hesperus has a different content than Hesperus is Phosphorus even though the 
thoughts contain co-referential concepts, since Hesperus and Phosphorus have different 
senses. 
The descriptivist framework can also explain how empty concepts can play an interesting 
cognitive role. Even thought lacking a referent, the concept Pegasus has a sense/mode of 
presentation (i.e. winged horse). The mode of presentation accounts for the cognitive 
significance of empty expressions. To Frege a thought just is sense (1892, 62). Hence, in the 
case of empty thoughts, a thought is the same as it would be if it actually had a referent. 
Further, since Pegasus and Vulcan have distinct modes of presentation, they play different 
roles in cognition. For instance, on the one hand, when a person has the belief that Pegasus is 
a planet she stands in a relation to a proposition containing a mode of presentation of Pegasus, 
i.e. a set of descriptions she associates with the concept, where the property of being a planet 
is predicated on whatever satisfies the descriptions. On the other, when the person believes 
that Vulcan is a planet she stands in a relation to a proposition containing her mode of 
presentation of Vulcan, i.e. her associated descriptions, where the property of being a planet is 
predicated on whatever satisfies the descriptions. Since she associates different descriptions 
with the two concepts, the beliefs express different propositions. This explains why the beliefs 
have different truth conditions and how Pegasus and Vulcan can play distinct cognitive roles 
despite both being empty terms.   
Even though descriptivism seemingly provides compelling solutions to the problems 
encountered by direct reference theories, the view faces problems of its own. According to 
descriptivism, if the only thing associated with the concept Aristotle is the property of being 
the teacher of Alexander the Great, when using the concept one refers to every x that satisfies 
that description. However, as Kripke (1980) points out, Aristotle might not have been the 
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teacher of Alexander the Great. That is, there are possible worlds in which someone else than 
Aristotle had the role of being Alexander’s teacher. Hence, the description ‘the teacher of 
Alexander the Great’ might have failed to pick out Aristotle. Kripke introduces the notion of 
rigid designators. A rigid designator is a term that picks out the same object in all possible 
world in which that object exists, and fails to pick out anything in those worlds where the 
object does not exist: ”Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it 
designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that is not the case” (Kripke 
1980, 48). Transposed to concepts, the reference of concepts is modally stable; the concept 
Aristotle picks out Aristotle in every possible world, including those in which Aristotle has a 
different name. Consequently, the thought Aristotle might not have been Aristotle is false. 
However, ’the teacher of Alexander the Great’ is nonrigid, since the description applies to 
someone else than Aristotle in possible worlds in which Aristotle was not the teacher of 
Alexander the Great. Hence, the thought Aristotle might not have been the teacher of 
Alexander the Great is true. But if the sense of Aristotle just is ‘the teacher of Alexander the 
Great’ the two thoughts have the same sense. Hence, the thoughts should play the same role in 
cognition according to descriptivists, since they hold that cognitive significance is determined 
by the set of associated descriptions. This cannot be the case, however, since one is true while 
the other is false. Hence, descriptivists face problems when accounting for the cognitive 
difference of thoughts expressing the same mode of presentation.11 
If one takes this criticism of descriptivism to be successful, and one concludes with Millians 
that concepts do not have senses,12 one is left with the task of explaining question (2); what 
determines the reference of a concept, if not some sort of mode of presentation? According to 
one view, the reference of concepts is determined through causal chains. This kind of view 
originated with Kripke’s (1980) causal theory of reference: According to this view, the 
reference of a name is established through an initial baptism and then becomes a rigid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  There	  are	  further	  problems	  raised	  for	  descriptivism.	  Consider	  for	  instance	  this	  case,	  also	  due	  to	  Kripke:	  Tim	  knows	  Kurt	  Gödel	  only	  as	  the	  person	  who	  proved	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  arithmetic.	  If	  descriptivism	  is	  true,	  Tim	  refers	  to	  Gödel	  via	  this	  description.	  But	  suppose	  Gödel	  was	  not	  really	  the	  one	  who	  proved	  the	  incompleteness	   of	   arithmetic,	   but	   that	   he	   stole	   the	   proof	   from	   his	   friend	   Schmidt.	   In	   this	   case,	   since	  Schmidt	  –	  and	  not	  Gödel	  –	  is	  the	  one	  who	  satisfies	  the	  associated	  description,	  it	  seems	  that	  Tim’s	  concept	  
Gödel	   actually	   refers	   to	   Schmidt.	   But	   this	   result	   is	   counterintuitive,	   and	   hence	   poses	   problems	   for	  descriptivists	  (Kripke	  1980).	  There	  are	  further	  problems	  posed	  for	  descriptivism	  (see	  Kallestrup	  2012,	  ch.	  2	  for	  an	  overview),	  but	  I	  will	  not	  go	  into	  more	  detail	  about	  this.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  current	  presentation	  is	  simply	  to	  point	  to	  some	  of	  the	  central	  problems	  confronting	  classical	  theories	  of	  concepts.	  12	  ‘Sense’	  understood	  as	  a	  set	  of	  associated	  descriptions.	  The	  viability	  of	  a	  Fregean	  approach	  (via	  modes	  of	  presentation)	   does	   not	   stand	   or	   fall	  with	   the	   viability	   of	   descriptivism,	   since	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   hold	   that	  modes	   of	   presentation	   is	   not	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   associated	   descriptions	   (see	   Burge	   2005,	   41.	   For	   an	  account	  of	  modes	  of	  presentation	  understood	  in	  a	  non-­‐semantic	  way	  see	  Recanati	  2012).	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designator. The initial baptism typically involves giving a particular name to a phenomenon, 
typically accompanied by gestures such as pointing to the relevant object. For instance, 
Aristotle acquired his name through such a baptism, and this explains why he is the referent 
of Aristotle. When we use the concept Aristotle today, we successfully pick out the same 
individual as did the people being present at his baptism, despite not having been at 
Aristotle’s baptism ourselves. Following Kripke, this is to be explained by us standing in an 
appropriate causal chain to Aristotle and the people witnessing his baptism. We intend to use 
Aristotle the same way as people used the concept before us. This act of intending to use a 
term the same way as others is often called deference. On this view, when I use a concept, the 
content of this concept is determined through previous uses of the concept by the people I’m 
deferring to. Kripke says the following: “In general our reference depends not just on what we 
think ourselves, but on other people in the community, the history of how the name reached 
one, and things like that. It is by following such a history that one gets to the reference” 
(Kripke 1980, 211). Philosophers holding a causal theory of reference about concepts think an 
analogous mechanism accounts for the content of such entities. A consequence of this view is 
that one can use concepts without having any descriptions associated with them, as long as 
one is deferring to others in one’s language community. Since, on this picture, the content of 
concepts are determined by public use, rather than a thinker’s own associated descriptions, 
features external to thinkers are essential for ascribing the appropriate content of concepts and 
thought to them.13 
A problem for causal theories of reference is that concepts sometimes seem to change 
reference. According to Gareth Evans (1973), it seems plausible that Madagascar is an 
instance of a concept changing its reference: Marco Polo intended to use Madagascar the 
same way the locals in Mogadishu used the concept.14 The locals used the concept to pick out 
the town on the mainland. Polo, however, made an error and thought the concept was used to 
pick out the island we now know by that name. Polo’s use became standardized, and today we 
use the concept to refer to the island Polo had in mind. Hence, there seems to be a change in 
reference of the concept Madagascar. This change in reference was due to Polo making a 
mistake about the referent of an already existing concept. However, Polo intended to use the 
concept the same way as the locals did. If intending to use a concept the same way others in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Views	  according	  to	  which	  mental	  content	  does	  not	  depend	  solely	  on	  intrinsic	  features	  of	  individuals	  are	  often	  labelled	  externalist	  theories	  about	  mental	  content.	  I’ll	  return	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  externalism	  in	  3.2.	  14	  Note	  that	  Evans’	  original	  account	  is	  a	  criticism	  of	  Kripke,	  and	  thus	  formulated	  with	  respect	  to	  language	  rather	  than	  thoughts.	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language community use it ensures the conservation of reference, how can an individual 
making an error cause a change in reference? The problem posed for causal theories of 
reference is this: There seems to be a change in reference despite Polo intending to use the 
concept the same way the locals did, but on a causal theory of reference this should not be 
possible.15 
A further problem for the causal theory of reference is that it cannot by itself explain Frege’s 
initial worries regarding theories holding that the relation between syntactic features of a 
concept and its referent is direct. The difference between the thought Hesperus is Hesperus 
and Hesperus is Phosphorus that accounts for the thoughts playing cognitive roles remains 
unexplained. As already mentioned, if one cannot explain how Hesperus and Phosphorus can 
play different roles in cognition – and hence why we are rational in making inferences after 
learning that Hesperus is Phosphorus that we were not justified in making before the 
discovery – one fails to account for one of the main explanatory tasks of thoughts; the 
explanation of rationality. One is then left with two views that both face serious problems. Is 
it possible to offer a theory that tackles both sets of problems? Originalism, which I present in 
the next chapter, purports to be just such a theory.16 
 
1.2 Chapter Summary 
A central question within philosophy of mind concerns the nature of thoughts and concepts. 
Philosophers adopting a Millian framework for concepts hold that the content of such entities 
just is their referent; the relation between syntactic features of a concept and its referent is 
direct. This theory faces problems when explaining how co-referential concepts can play 
different roles in cognition. In order to explain this, descriptivists introduce a second layer of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  For	   an	  alternative	  version	  of	   the	   causal	   theory	  of	   reference,	   see	  Devitt	   (1981).	   See	  McKay	   (1984)	   for	  criticism	  of	  Devitt’s	  account.	  16	  This	   presentation	   of	   the	   debate	   between	   descriptivism	   and	   direct	   reference	   theories	   is,	   of	   course,	  simplified.	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  most	  famous	  theories	  within	  this	  debate,	  but	  there	  are	  various	  different	  views	  within	   each	   general	   camp.	   Consider,	   for	   instance	   the	   hidden	   indexical	   theory	   of	   Schiffer	   (1992):	  According	  to	  this	  theory	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  make	  justice	  to	  the	  Fregean	  data	  within	  a	  Millian	  framework.	  He	  thinks	  there	  is	  a	  (semantic)	  mode	  of	  presentation	  in	  addition	  to	  direct	  reference.	  Originalists	  (along	  with	  Recanati’s	   theory	  of	  mental	   files,	  which	   I	  will	  present	   in	  chapter	  7)	  also	  set	  out	   to	  explain	  Fregean	  data	  within	   a	   Millian	   framework,	   but	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   they	   hold	   that	   this	   can	   be	   done	   without	   appeal	   to	  semantics	  beyond	  reference.	  There	  are	  also	  philosophers	  who	  advocate	  updated	  versions	  of	  descriptivism	  (See	  for	  instance	  David	  Chalmers’	  theory	  of	  two-­‐dimensional	  semantics	  (e.g.	  his	  2004	  and	  2006)).	  I	  shall	  not	  consider	  these	  alternatives	  in	  this	  thesis. 
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semantics to the content of concepts: in addition to having reference, concepts also have a 
mode of presentation. The mode of presentation is, according to descriptivists, associated 
descriptions. On this view, the mode of presentation determines the reference in that a concept 
refers to whatever object satisfies the set of associated descriptions. A problem for this view is 
that thoughts that share modes of presentation may differ in semantic value; one might be true 
while the other is false. If rejecting the view that concepts have modes of presentations, one is 
left with the task of explaining why concepts have their specific reference. On a causal theory 
of reference the reference of concepts is fixed by an initial baptism, and is then maintained 
through deference to earlier uses. A problem then is that some concepts, such as Madagascar 
seem to have had a change in reference. How can a change happen despite every user 
intending to use the concept the same way others use it, if deference ensures the preservation 
of reference? Further, the causal theory of reference does not explain how co-referential 
concepts can play different cognitive roles, which was the original problem posed for 
Millianism.  
It seems that we are left with several problems regarding the nature of concepts and thoughts. 
How should these problems be solved? Sainsbury and Tye’s originalist theory provides 
possible solutions to these and other puzzles rising from this debate. Originalism combines 
features of the classical theories outlined, but introduces and stresses the importance of the 
notion of vehicles of content to the solutions to the puzzles, so that the result is something 
quite new. The theories presented in this chapter take the content of concepts to be essential in 
understanding the nature of concepts; Millians take reference to be essential for the type 
individuation of concepts while descriptivists hold that concepts are to be typed by way of 
associated descriptions (to Frege a thought just is sense). Originalists reject the view that 
semantic features are essential for the type individuation of concepts and thoughts. Instead, 
they hold that concepts are to be understood as vehicles of content, and must be individuated 
by way of the origins of their syntactic features. In the next chapter I will give a general 
introduction to originalism as stated in Seven Puzzles of Thought, and point to differences and 
similarities between originalism and the classical theories presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Originalism: A General Introduction to the Theory 
 
 
 
In chapter 1 we saw that classical theories of how to individuate concepts and thoughts hold 
that such entities are to be typed by their semantic properties: A concept or a thought is the 
concept or thought that it is in virtue of its content. Originalism contrasts with such theories in 
holding that the essential property of concepts is their historical origin – a property that is not 
semantic. Concepts are non-eternal abstract objects: They come into existence at particular 
points in history and they may go out of existence at later points. The point at which a concept 
comes into existence is the originating use of that concept. One of the key originalist claims is 
that for every concept there is just one originating use and that every originating use of a 
concept is the origin of one concept only (Sainsbury & Tye 2011, 3). Originalists hold that 
concepts are vehicles of content and that these are to be individuated in terms of their origins. 
While being a completely new theory of how to individuate concepts, originalism as 
advocated by Sainsbury and Tye adopt many features of classical theories. They use a Millian 
framework to account for the content of concepts, according to which the content of a concept 
just is their reference. They agree with Frege that classical Millianism is not sufficient for 
explaining cognitive significance, but do not agree that one need to introduce further layers of 
semantics in order to explain the Fregean data. Instead, they hold that the syntactic features of 
concepts can perform the task of explaining cognitive significance. They agree with Kripke 
that a concept has a given content in virtue of deference, while agreeing with Evans that 
concepts may sometimes change reference through time. In this chapter I will give an 
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overview of originalism as presented in Seven Puzzles of Thought; the originalist view on how 
to individuate concepts and thoughts; how to understand the relation between these two 
entities; what it takes for a use of a concept to be an originating use; and how concepts and 
thoughts relate to the contents they express.  
 
2.1 Concepts 
In originalist terminology, concepts are vehicles of content that express representational 
content. On this view concepts have contents, but are not themselves contents: “Concepts are 
vehicles of representation, tools for thinking” (Sainsbury and Tye 2011, 1). Hence, when 
giving an account of how to individuate concepts, originalism proposes a way to individuate 
vehicles of content and not the content expressed by such entities. This contrasts with the 
terminology of classical theories that usually take concepts to, at least partly, consist of 
semantic content.17 The originalist framework for concepts is modeled on words, which seem 
to be individuated in terms of their historical properties, rather than their meaning. 
Analogously, originalists take concepts to be individuated in terms of their origin rather than 
their content. The central originalist claim is that two concept tokens are of the same type if 
and only if they have the same origin: “Concept C1 = concept C2 iff the originating use of C1 
= the originating use of C2” (Ibid., 4). Since concepts are to be individuated by their origins 
alone, it may be that two concept tokens that are semantically or epistemically the same may 
nonetheless be distinct concepts if they have distinct origins.18 Likewise, two concept tokens 
that are semantically or epistemically distinct are of the same type if they have the same 
origin. 
One of the main motivations behind originalism is to explain Fregean data within a Millian 
framework. As we saw in chapter 1, Fregean data is the observation that identity statements 
may be informative. It’s one thing to think that Hesperus is Hesperus and another to think that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus; one thing to think that Hesperus is visible, another to think that 
Phosphorus is visible. We saw that classical Millianists, according to whom the meaning of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Henceforth	  I	  will	  use	  ‘concept’,	  ‘vehicle	  of	  content’	  and	  ‘vehicle’	  interchangeably	  when	  discussing	  originalism.	  18	  Concepts	   that	   are	   semantically	   the	   same	   have	   the	   same	   content.	   Concepts	   that	   are	   epistemically	   the	  same	  appear	  to	  the	  thinker,	  in	  some	  way	  or	  another,	  to	  be	  the	  same.	  Originalists	  hold	  that	  the	  content	  of	  thoughts	  and	  the	  type	  of	  concept	  a	  thinker	  takes	  concepts	  to	  be,	   is	  not	  essential	   for	  the	   individuation	  of	  concepts.	  I	  return	  to	  this	  later	  on.	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concept just is its reference, cannot explain this data, since Hesperus and Phosphorus pick out 
the same object. Sainsbury and Tye agree that we need something more than a theory of direct 
reference in order to explain Fregean data, but unlike Frege, they do not think that this must 
be a layer of semantics. Instead, originalists hold that cognitive significance is to be explained 
in terms of the vehicles of content: “Cognitive processing depends not directly on content but 
on the vehicles of content: concepts and thoughts” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 57). Since 
cognitive significance depends on vehicles of content rather than representational content, 
originalists can allow that “distinct thoughts, even if they are referentially isomorphic, can 
play different cognitive roles” (Sainsbury and Tye 2011, 1-2). The claim that cognitive 
significance depends on syntactic features of concepts and thoughts is not a new claim (see 
for instance Fodor (2008)19); what is a new contribution is that the concepts figuring in 
thought are to be individuated in terms of their origins. Even though Hesperus and 
Phosphorus are referentially isomorphic, they are distinct concepts in virtue of having 
originated at distinct points in the history (one in the morning, the other at dawn). The 
concepts being distinct is sufficient for explaining the different roles Hesperus and 
Phosphorus play in cognition since originalists allow for the vehicles of content being a 
separate source of explanation of cognitive significance. I return to this in 3.1. 
A further problem for classical Millianism, recall, was that some proper names lack referents. 
For instance, Pegasus does not pick out any object in the world. If the content of a proper 
name just is its referent, then what should be said about empty concepts such as Pegasus? 
How can we explain the concept Pegasus playing an interesting cognitive role if there is 
nothing more to our theory than a one level Millian view of reference? Also, Pegasus and 
Vulcan are both empty concepts, since they lack referents, so how can it be that the two 
concepts play different roles in cognition? By allowing that cognitive features can be 
explained by appeal to meaning vehicles rather than content, originalists can give an account 
of how empty concepts can be cognitively significant: “Some concepts fail to refer, but this 
does not prevent them having a role in thought” (Sainsbury and Tye 2011, 1). For instance, 
when Leverrier first introduced the concept Vulcan he intended the concept to pick out what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Fodor	  agrees	  with	  the	  originalist	  view	  that	  Frege	  cases	  can	  be	  explained	  without	  appeal	  to	  semantics	  that	  go	  beyond	  reference.	  However,	  the	  two	  theories	  disagree	  on	  several	  matters.	  One	  such	  matter	  is	  this:	  While	   originalists	   take	   concepts	   to	   be	   individuated	   historically,	   Fodor	   thinks	   that	   such	   entities	   are	   of	  different	  types	  “when	  they	  differ	  in	  the	  (presumably	  physical)	  properties	  to	  which	  mental	  processes	  are	  sensitive”	   (Fodor	   2008,	   79).	   On	   this	   view,	   subjects	   cannot	   be	  mistaken	   about	   the	   type	   and	   number	   of	  concepts	   deployed	   in	   thought.	   In	   3.4	   we’ll	   see	   that	   originalists	   disagree;	   they	   deny	   that	   concepts	   are	  transparent	  to	  the	  thinker.	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he took to be the planet orbiting between Mercury and the Sun. According to originalists, 
what is essential for the individuation of the concept Vulcan is the point in history at which it 
was used intentionally for the first time. Since cognitive significance turns on the vehicles of 
content, according to originalism, what explains the role Vulcan plays in thought is the origin 
of the concept and not the content of the (empty) concept. Whether a concept refers to an 
object, or fails to do so, is not essential for the cognitive role of the concept, according to 
originalism. This also explains why Pegasus and Vulcan play distinct cognitive roles. The 
concepts, understood simply as vehicles – solely as syntactic symbols in the language of 
thought, have distinct origins and hence they play different roles in cognition. Vehicles seem 
to play the same role as semantic modes of presentation do in Fregean theories. I return to this 
in 3.6. 
According to Sainsbury and Tye most concepts are public, and hence “concepts are typically 
sharable” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 59).20 Individuals have their concepts in virtue of being 
part of a language community, and the participants in the language community share 
concepts. Young children may come to form their own individual concepts when interacting 
with the world. For instance they may form a specific concept when interacting with cats. 
However, the individual concepts children acquire at a young age will typically be replaced 
by public concepts when the children interact with others in their language community. 
Sainsbury and Tye take children’s willingness to accept correction to be an indication that 
children replace their individual concepts with public concepts at some point in early 
development (Ibid., 60). On the originalist account, the concept a child has for picking out 
cats, introduced independently of other participants in her language community, is distinct 
from the concept cat she use after having acquired the public concept. This is because the 
individual concept and the public concept were introduced at distinct occasions (I shall 
discuss the introduction of concepts in a moment). When the child acquires a public concept 
she will stop using the equivalent individual concept and only use the public concept. It is not 
up to individuals to decide the nature or content of public concepts: The nature of a public 
concept is determined by its origin, and the content of such concepts is determined through 
deference to earlier uses (I return to this in 2.2). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Originalism	  coincides	  with	  Ruth	  Millikan’s	  theory	  of	  concepts	  in	  that	  Millikan	  agrees	  with	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	   that	   Fregean	   data	   are	   to	   be	   explained	   by	   appeal	   to	   sameness	   and	   difference	   in	   vehicles	   of	   content	  rather	  than	  the	  content	  expressed	  by	  such	  entities.	  They	  also	  agree	  that	  concepts	  are	  to	  be	  individuated	  by	  way	  of	  their	  historical	  properties.	  However,	  while	  originalists	  take	  concepts	  to	  be	  public,	  Millikan	  thinks	  concepts	   are	   individual	   and	   not	   sharable:	   “I	   have	   concepts	   and	   you	   have	   completely	   other	   concepts,	  though	  many	  of	  them	  may	  be	  concepts	  be	  of	  the	  same	  thing”	  (Millikan	  2011,	  6).	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Some concepts used within a language community, however, are not public, according to 
Sainsbury and Tye. Such concepts include indexical concepts: “It’s a feature of indexical 
concepts that a speaker can introduce them for himself, independently of other thinkers. This 
contrasts with public concepts acquired by immersion, like the concept Paderewski” 
(Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 52). For instance, your concept I is a different concept than my 
concept I since the concepts where introduced at distinct points in history. Your tokens of I 
are of the same type and my tokens of I are of the same type, but they are not the same type as 
each other. Even though our concepts are distinct there is one feature of indexical concepts 
that is shared amongst participants in a language community; this is what they call a concept-
template. Such concept-templates are not themselves concepts, but rather rules for forming 
certain concepts (Ibid., 51). In the case of the concept I, the rule given by the content-template 
is something along the lines of ‘I refers to the person using the concept’. Analogous principles 
apply to all indexical concept. This explains why individuals within a language community 
follow the same rules when forming indexical concepts, even though they do not use 
indexical concepts of the same type. Sainsbury and Tye take public concepts as a starting 
point and model their theory of indexical concepts on this.21 
 
2.2 Originating Use and Deference 
The most common way for a concept to come into existence is by way of someone using it 
intentionally to pick out a phenomenon for the first time. Let me illustrate: In 1963 Murray 
Gell-Mann introduced the concept quark.22 Before this point in history, no such concept 
existed.23 When others in Gell-Mann’s community were told about his discovery they also 
acquired the concept quark. When they used the concept they intended to use the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  For	  someone	  taking	  the	  other	  direction	  –	  taking	  indexical	  expressions	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  and	  modelling	  a	  theory	  of	  lexical	  expressions	  on	  this	  –	  see	  Recanati	  (2012).	  I	  will	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  Recanati’s	  view	  in	  chapter	  7,	  where	  I	  present	  his	  theory	  as	  an	  alterative	  to	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye’s	  originalism.	  22	  A	   consequence	   of	   this	   story	   is	   that	   one	   must	   allow	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   object	   coming	   before	   a	  thinker’s	   mind	   as	   an	   intentional	   object	   without	   the	   subject	   already	   possessing	   the	   concepts	   being	  originated.	   Gell-­‐Mann	  must	   have	   been	   in	   an	   intentional	   relation	   to	   quarks	   before	   he	   used	   the	   concept	  
quark	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  I	  shall	  not	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  plausibility	  of	  this	  view.	  23	  Of	   course,	   the	   same	   linguistic	   symbol	   can	  be	  used	  as	  a	   term	   for	  distinct	   concepts.	   In	   the	   case	  of	  Gell-­‐Mann,	   it	   is	   know	   that	  he	  borrowed	   the	  word	  quark	   from	   James	   Joyce’s	  Finnegans	  Wake,	   in	  which	   Joyce	  used	  the	  word	  as	  a	  term	  for	  a	  different	  concept	  than	  Gell-­‐Mann	  did.	  Gell-­‐Mann	  did	  not	  intend	  his	  concept	  
quark	   in	   any	   way	   to	   be	   the	   same	   as	   Joyce’s	   concept.	   The	   origin	   of	   our	   concept	   quark	   is	   Gell-­‐Mann’s	  introducing	   the	   concept	   –	   and	   not	   Joyce’s	   –	   and	   our	   concept	   is	   therefore	   to	   be	   individuated	   by	   this	  historical	  event	  according	  to	  originalism.	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concept in the same way Gell-Mann did. The intention of using a concept the same way as 
others in one’s language community is what Sainsbury and Tye call deference (Sainsbury and 
Tye 2012, 70). Originalists take deference to be crucial for a concept’s existence through 
time. When someone uses quark today, this is a result of them having accumulated 
information about the concept from others in their language community. Further, using the 
concept quark today involves deference to earlier uses by the same subject or other people in 
one’s language community. For instance, non-scientists using the concept quark intend to use 
the same concept as the scientists do. The scientists intend to use the same concept, as did 
scientists before them. This chain of deference goes all the way back to Gell-Mann’s 
introduction of the concept. Gell-Mann, however, did not defer to any other uses of the 
concept when he first introduced it. Hence, Gell-Mann’s first intentional use of the concept 
quark is the origin of that concept. For every atomic concept it is the case that the chain of 
deference started at some point in past history. The point in history that is the starting point 
for a certain chain of deference marks the origin of all later concept tokens in that chain. 
Originalists hold that the origin of the chain of deference a concept token belongs to 
determines what type it is. All concept tokens that belong to chains of deference with the 
same origin are of the same type. Now, we need certain conditions for distinguishing between 
originating uses, which introduce new concepts, and non-originating uses, which simply make 
use of already existing concepts. 
According to Sainsbury and Tye, there are two sufficient conditions for a use of a concept 
being non-originating:  
1) The use involves deference to other uses, by the same subject or other subjects. 
2) The use involves informational accumulation from other uses, by the same subject 
or other subjects (Sainsbury & Tye 2011, 2). 
If a concept token belongs to a chain of deference and is not itself the starting point of such a 
chain, the use is a non-originating use. That is, if an individual intends to use a concept the 
same way as others in her language community, her use is a non-originating use. According to 
Sainsbury and Tye, knowledge of the content of concepts is not necessary for someone 
possessing and using a given concept: “Concept possession is consistent with all sorts of 
mistakes and misunderstandings about the concept’s subject matter” (Sainsbury and Tye 
	   21	  
2012, 55).24 The intention to use the concept in accordance with earlier uses is sufficient for 
an individual counting as using a given concept. Hence, one cannot use a concept wrongly, 
according to originalism: “we have no room for a notion of the “correct” use of a concept […] 
for originalism there is simply the question whether a subject uses or does not use a concept 
on an occasion. If it is used at all, then it is used “correctly”” (Ibid., 85). This is a causal 
theory of the vehicles of content, according to which the history of deference is essential for 
the type individuation of concepts. In 2.4 we shall see that Sainsbury and Tye adopt a similar 
account of reference.  
 
2.3 Fusion and Fission 
A complication for the originalist theory is that some concepts often are taken to have more 
than one originating use. In the case of the concept quark, a standard view is that George 
Zweig introduced the same concept independently of Gell-Mann. If this is correct, it seems as 
though the chain of deference of our concept quark has two distinct starting points. But, 
according to originalism, a concept may only have one origin. In order to explain such 
phenomena Sainsbury and Tye introduce the notion of conceptual fusion. In the case of 
conceptual fusion, two (or more) concepts fuse into one concept. At the time of a conceptual 
fusion the concepts that fuse together go out of existence and a new concept comes into being. 
The new concept originates at the point of fusion. This allows Sainsbury and Tye to make 
sense of the case of Gell-Mann and Zweig within an originalist framework. The concepts 
introduced by Gell-Mann and Zweig were distinct. At some point, however, Gell-Mann and 
Zweig’s concepts fused into one concept quark. The new concept that came out of the fusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Sainsbury	   and	   Tye	   thus	   deny	   Russell’s	   claim	   that	   ”it	   is	   scarcely	   conceivable	   that	   we	   can	   make	   a	  judgment	   or	   entertain	   a	   supposition	   without	   knowing	   what	   it	   is	   we	   are	   judging	   or	   supposing	   about”	  (Russell	  1912,	  58).	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is the concept we use today.25 On this picture we defer to neither Gell-Mann’s concept nor 
Zweig’s, but instead we defer to the concept being introduced by the fusion. It is important 
that “the chain of deference must not run back beyond the point of fusion” (Sainsbury & Tye 
2012, 68). This is because the origin of our concept is at the point of fusion. The original 
concepts give rise to some of the features in the new concept, but the new concept is of a 
different type than the original concepts. 
Another complication for originalism is that two or more concepts often are taken to have the 
same origin. For instance, the concepts relativistic mass and inertial mass are often taken to 
have the same origin, namely Newton’s concept mass. This story violates key assumptions 
made by originalism, according to which every originating use of a concept is the origin of 
one concept only. In order to explain such cases, Sainsbury and Tye introduce the notion of 
conceptual fission. In the case of a conceptual fission, one concept fissions into two (or more) 
concepts. In this case, the original concept is of a different type than the new concepts that 
come into being. The new concepts that come out of the fission have their origin in the first 
intentional use of each of the concepts introduced by the fission. This allows Sainsbury and 
Tye to give an originalist account of distinct concepts that are standardly taken to have the 
same origin, such as relativistic mass and inertial mass: “Features of the concepts relativistic 
mass and inertial mass were shaped by the predecessor undifferentiated concept mass; but 
there are three concepts in this story, and three originating uses” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 67). 
Thus, when using the concepts relativistic mass and inertial mass the chains of deference do 
not go all the way back Newton’s introducing the concept mass. Instead, the two chains of 
deference have distinct starting points: In the case of relativistic mass the chain started when 
someone used this very concept intentionally for the first time, while the deferential chain of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  use	  the	  Gell-­‐Mann/Zweig	  case	  to	   illustrate	   their	  notion	  of	   fusion	  of	  concepts.	  They	  do,	   however,	   note	   that	   it	  might	   be	  more	  historically	   correct	   that	   our	   concept	  quark	  today	   goes	  directly	  back	   to	   Gell-­‐Mann	   (Sainsbury	   and	   Tye	   2012,	   68).	   Even	   though	   Zweig	   came	   up	   with	   a	   similar	   concept	  (which	  he	  named	  ”aces”)	  it	  was	  Gell-­‐Mann’s	  concept	  that	  won	  through.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  the	  origin	  of	  our	  concept	  quark	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  fusion	  between	  Gell-­‐Mann	  and	  Zweig’s	  concepts,	  but	  instead	  it	  goes	  all	  the	  way	   back	   to	   Gell-­‐Mann’s	   first	   intentional	   use	   of	   the	   concept.	   Please	   note	   here	   that	   the	   originalist	  individuation	  of	  concepts	  depends	  upon	  historical	  events,	  knowledge	  of	  which	  we	  might	  not	  have	  (and	  in	  most	  cases	  seem	  not	  to	  have). 	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inertial mass started when someone used that concept intentionally for the first time.26 
Sainsbury and Tye don’t give a detailed account of fusion and fission, but since in the case of 
both fusion and fission new concepts come into existence, it is clear that they must be kinds of 
originating uses. This means that fusion and fission of concepts cannot involve deference to 
earlier uses, since deference is sufficient for a use being non-originating, according to 
Sainsbury and Tye. This will be relevant for the discussion in chapter 6, where I propose 
possible solutions to my thought experiment on behalf of the originalists. 
 
2.4 Content and Deference 
According to originalism, concepts are just meaning vehicles. Concepts do, however, express 
contents. As noted earlier, the question about the content of concepts can be divided into two: 
(1) What is the content of a concept and (2) in virtue of what does a concept come to have the 
content it has. Originalism in its simplest form is not a theory of how to individuate content, 
but rather a theory of how to individuate the meaning vehicle expressing such contents. Even 
so, Sainsbury and Tye’s specific formulation of originalism provide an answer to both of 
these questions. I have already addressed the answer given to the first question: In Seven 
Puzzles of Thought Millianism, which initially was a theory of language and proper names, is 
transposed to apply to thoughts and atomic concepts.27 Sainsbury and Tye hold that the 
content of atomic concepts just is their reference. Atomic concepts that agree in reference 
agree in content. When giving an account of what it is that makes a concept have a certain 
content Sainsbury and Tye adopt a causal theory of reference similar to that of Kripke in 
Naming and Necessity (1980). On a simple originalist account of content, concepts acquire 
their content at their origin, and then maintain that content through time: “the reference of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  hold	   that	   in	   the	  case	  of	  conceptual	   fusion	   the	  original	  concept	  go	  out	  of	  existence:	  “one	  can	  […]	  describe	  the	  fusion	  of	  a	  and	  b	  into	  c	  as	  involving	  three	  distinct	  things,	  two	  of	  which	  (a	  and	  b)	  go	   out	   of	   existence	   as	   the	   third	   comes	   into	   existence”	   Sainsbury	   and	  Tye	  2012,	   68).	  However,	   it	   seems	  plausible	  that	  the	  original	  concepts	  don’t	  necessarily	  cease	  to	  exist.	  In	  general,	  when	  we	  use	  the	  concept	  
quark	   today,	  we	  use	   the	   concept	   introduced	  by	   the	   fusion.	  However,	  when	   thinking	  about	   the	   concepts	  used	  by	  Gell-­‐Mann	  and	  Zweig,	  we	  use	  the	  original	  concepts,	  since	  we	  intend	  to	  use	  the	  concepts	  the	  same	  way	  they	  did.	  An	  analogous	  comment	  can	  be	  made	  about	   the	  case	  of	  conceptual	   fission:	  We	  can	  use	  the	  original	  concept	  after	  the	  point	  of	  fission	  if	  we	  defer	  to	  uses	  of	  that	  concept.	  I	  don’t	  take	  this	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  objection	  to	  the	  theory:	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  why	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  could	  not	  agree	  with	  this.	  27	  Originalism,	  does,	  however,	  differ	   from	  classic	  Millianism	   in	   that	  originalists	  hold	   that	   there	  exists	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  propositions.	  According	  to	  originalism,	  thinking	  doesn’t	  involve	  standing	  in	  a	  relation	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  content.	  I	  return	  to	  this	  in	  2.5.	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concept is fixed at its origin and then preserved by the same mechanism that preserve the 
identity of the concept” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 69). This mechanism is deference. When 
someone intends to use a concept the same way as others in her language community, she 
intends to refer to the same phenomena as they do. This ensures sameness in use amongst all 
participants in a language community; individuals do not settle anything about the nature or 
semantic features of public concepts. Hence, reference is to be explained in terms of the 
history of use rather than in terms of descriptions associated with a given concept.  
However, as we saw in chapter 1, this story is not always sufficient; concepts sometimes seem 
to change their reference through time. Sainsbury and Tye agree with Evans’ (1973) 
observation and say that a concept may change its reference and still remain the same 
concept. This explains how two concept tokens that are semantically or epistemically distinct 
may nonetheless be of the same type if they have the same origin. Sainsbury and Tye take the 
history of the concept meat to be an instance of a concept staying the same while the content 
changes: Originally meat referred to anything edible. Due to a slow and gradual drift, the 
content of meat changed. Although everybody who used the concept meat deferred to earlier 
uses, small unnoticeable errors regarding the reference of the concept was made at several 
occasions during the history. Today we no longer use meat to pick out anything edible, but 
instead we use the concept to pick out animal flesh only. Instead of saying that our concept 
meat is a different concept than the one originally introduced by that word, Sainsbury and Tye 
hold that our concept and the original concept are of the same type, but with different 
contents. This, they say, is because “it is a case of gradual drift, with no event that seems a 
good candidate for the introduction of a new concept” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 46). Hence, 
the content of a concept may change radically through time and still remain the same concept 
if the development happens gradually and without any intentional deviation of standard use. 
Since, in the case of meat, the concept remains the same it is an instance of neither fission nor 
fusion; such mechanisms, recall, essentially involve new concepts coming into existence. 
Their portrayal of the case of meat as an instance of a concept changing its content will be 
important for my thought experiment in chapter 5. 
In order to illustrate the difference between a change in concept and a change in the 
conceptual content, Sainsbury and Tye compare the history of the concept meat with a 
possible history of the concept Madagascar - the latter being an instance of change in 
concepts. The story goes as follows:  
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When Marco Polo visited Mogadishu he wrote about the town in his notebook, using 
the term ”Madeigascar”. Even thought Mogadishu is on the African mainland, Polo 
described Madeigascar as being an island of great wealth. When some map-makers later 
came upon Polo’s notebook they gave the name ”Madagascar” to the island we now 
know by that name, on the basis that Polo seemed clear about it being an island, and that 
there was only one good candidate for being the island they thought he had had in mind.  
Sainsbury and Tye think that this illustrates a change in concepts: “In this case, it seems best 
to treat either Marco Polo or the map-makers as having introduced a new concept with 
Madagascar as its referent” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 71).  The case of Madagascar differs 
from the history of the concept meat in that Marco Polo did not try to acquire or preserve the 
reference of an existing concept. There is no such case of manifest discontinuity in the history 
of meat, and thus it is not to be treated as a change of concept, according to Sainsbury and 
Tye. To make the distinction even clearer, one can portray the historical development of the 
concept Madagascar in a different way:  
When visiting Mogadishu, Marco Polo heard some locals use the word “Madagascar” 
and was thereby introduced to the concept. Polo wanted to use the concept the same 
way the locals did; when using the concept he intended to defer to the locals’ use. 
However, Polo made a mistake regarding the referent of the concepts: While the locals 
used it to refer to Mogadishu, the town on the mainland, Polo thought they used it to 
refer to the island we now know by the name “Madagascar”. Polo’s mistaken use later 
became standardized and the locals’ use was forgotten. 
Sainsbury and Tye suggest that this alternative story of how our concepts Madagascar 
originated is to be understood as a change in reference rather than a change in concept. The 
crucial difference between the first and the latter story of how Madagascar came into being is 
that in the latter case Polo, although making an error regarding the concept’s referent, 
intended to defer to earlier uses of the concept, whereas in the first case neither Polo nor the 
map-makers intended to acquire and preserve an already existing concept. Note that the latter 
portrayal of the case of Madagascar differs from the history of meat in that the story of 
Madagascar does not involve a smooth history where different individuals through the history 
made several small mistakes about the reference. In the story of Madagascar, Marco Polo was 
the only one who made a reference-changing mistake, but the concept still remained the same, 
according to originalism. When explaining the change of reference of meat Sainsbury and Tye 
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explicitly say that the concept’s remaining the same is due to the smooth history of change in 
reference, but in the case of Madagascar there is no such smooth history. Hence, despite of 
first appearance, it seems that a gradual drift is not necessary for a change in content of 
concepts in general, on Sainsbury and Tye’s account. 
Let me make a few critical remarks about this, since this will be relevant for later discussions. 
It is striking that Sainsbury and Tye agree with Evans’ observations about the change in 
reference of concepts but maintain a causal theory of reference without explaining how this 
can be the case. Sainsbury and Tye agree with Kripke that the content of concepts are fixed at 
their origins and then maintained through time through deference. They hold that the content 
of concepts essentially depend on the user’s intention to use a concept the same way others 
do. However, the very problem posed by Evans is that in the case of Madagascar the reference 
changes despite Polo intending to use it the same way as others did before him. The fact that 
Polo successfully uses the same concept as the locals should ensure the sameness in content 
of Polo’s use and the use of the locals to whom he defers, but somehow it fails to do so. If the 
content of a concept is determined by the public use, as Sainsbury and Tye would have it, 
how can the content change when a user defers to the public use? Sainsbury and Tye hold that 
“deference can be modeled (rather over-intellectually) as the recognition that others already 
use a concept, together with the desire to use the very concept they use, with the very 
reference it has in their uses” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 70). Here it seems that deference is a 
single desire; that is, it seems not to be the case that someone has two separate desires; one to 
use the same concept vehicle as others and one to use the concept to express the same content. 
However, since allowing that a concept may change its reference, originalists must have what 
one could call a two-dimensional view on deference. The type of the vehicles of content is 
preserved through deference and the content expressed by concepts is also preserved through 
deference, but these different aspects of deference can come apart; one may succeed in using 
the same concept as others and at the same time fail to express the same content expressed by 
other uses of the same concept. This is what happened in the case of meat. But how can the 
originalist account for the deference being successful at one level and fail at the other? 
Might it be that while intending to use the same concept as others, people use the concepts 
slightly different due to having different conceptions of the subject matter? Sainsbury and Tye 
would disagree; they hold that concepts must be distinguished from conceptions.  A 
conception resembles Fregean sense, understood as a set of associated descriptions: “Call a 
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“conception” of X a collection of significant beliefs concerning X” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 
67). According to Sainsbury and Tye, conceptions determine neither concepts nor the 
representational content expressed by concepts. That is to say, originalists recognize that 
individuals may conceive of some subject matter in different ways, but they hold that this is 
irrelevant to thinking. On this view, whenever someone uses a certain concept, the type and 
content is decided by the public use of that concept regardless of the user’s own conception. 
Whenever someone used the concept meat through its history, they intended to use the 
concept the same way as others did before them. If everyone defers to earlier users of the 
concept, and the chain of deference goes all the way back to the point in history at which meat 
was first used to pick out anything edible, how can the representational content change if the 
representational content is determined by deference exclusively?  
To illustrate further, consider the following case addressed by Sainsbury and Tye: A 
philosophy student, Rachel, overhears a conversation at her local café. One person utters the 
sentence “John Locke was shot”. Being an enthusiastic follower of the TV show “Lost”, 
Rachel says to herself “yes, John Locke was indeed shot” because she takes John Locke to 
refer to the fictional character. As it happens, the conversation was really about the character 
in the TV program, so Rachel’s utterance is true. Later on, when at the university, she hears 
someone else utter “John Locke was shot”. Due to her current location, Rachel takes the 
statement to be about the philosopher John Locke. Knowing that the philosopher John Locke 
was not shot, Rachel mutters to herself “no, John Locke was certainly not shot”. As it 
happens, the people at the university were also talking about the fictional character named 
John Locke. Even though Rachel intended the two tokens of John Locke to refer to distinct 
individuals, Sainsbury and Tye take her statements to be about the same individual, due to her 
deferring to the other people’s uses. Her last sentence, then, would be false, and also a 
contradiction of her first utterance: “In these circumstances, the two utterances (sentence 
tokens uttered) are contradictory; the one denies what the other asserts” (Sainsbury and Tye 
2012, 99). The reason for her sentences being contradictory even though she intended them to 
be about distinct individuals, is that in both cases she defers to the other users when using the 
concept John Locke. Since the people being deferred to were referring to the same individual, 
so was Rachel. Hence, the content of Rachel’s thoughts are not individuated by way of her 
own conceptions or what she takes to be the referents of her concepts, but rather by way of 
the public use of each of the constituent concepts, according to Sainsbury and Tye. Now, let’s 
say one of the small deviations in the history of meat consisted in someone using the concept 
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so as to pick out anything edible but white sesame seeds. That is, if asked whether white 
sesame seeds are in fact meat, this individual would respond negatively. Since the mechanism 
of deference ensured that Rachel’s concept token John Locke referred to the fictional 
character (even if she thought she was referring to John Locke the philosopher), we should 
expect the content of someone wrongly taking meat to pick out anything edible but white 
sesame seeds to include white sesame seeds since white sesame seeds, at the time, were part 
of the public content of meat. It seems then that it shouldn’t be possible for a concept to have 
a change in reference on Sainsbury and Tye’s view, but even so they allow for this.  
As noted, Sainsbury and Tye provide no explanation of how the change in reference is 
supposed to take place, and there seems to be no obvious answer to give on behalf of the 
originalist. I return to this point in chapter 5, where I argue that Sainsbury and Tye’s account 
fails to explain certain cases of rationality, and hence that it fails as a general theory of 
concepts and thoughts. Let us now turn to the originalist theory of thoughts. 
 
2.5 Thoughts 
The notion of concepts that is relevant to originalism is one according to which concepts are 
representational constituents of thoughts. A thought is a well-formed structure of concepts.  
Hence, the originalist theory of concepts also provides a new way of individuating thoughts. 
A thought is to be individuated by way of its constituent concepts; the individuation of 
thoughts depends on the origins of the constituent concepts. Two thought tokens are of the 
same type if and only if all the concepts figuring in one also figures in the same structure in 
the other. It is clear that originalism endorses a form of compositionalism: the type of 
thoughts is determined by the constituent concepts and how these are structured. Originalism 
is, however, incompatible with traditional compositionalism, according to which the content 
of the constituent concepts determines the content of more complex structures such as 
thoughts. The reason why originalists must abandon classical compositionalism is that 
classical compositionalism leads to an unrestricted substitution principle, the principle that 
concepts that agree in content can be substituted without restriction. For instance, the belief 
the thought that Greeks are Greeks is exactly as informative as the thought that Greeks are 
Greeks is true. However, the belief the thought that Greeks are Greeks is exactly as 
informative as the thought that Greeks are Hellenes is not true. But, according to an 
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unrestricted substitutional principle, the two beliefs agree in content, and one should therefore 
be able to substitute one with the other (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 74). Sainsbury and Tye hold 
that the content of a thought is a “(possibly empty) set of possible worlds, namely the set in 
which the relevant conceptual structure is true” (Ibid., 111). Thoughts that share a set of 
possible worlds in which they are true, agree in content. Thoughts that do not share such a set 
of possible worlds differ in their representational content. Since the two beliefs about the 
informativeness of thoughts involving the concepts Greeks and Hellenes do not share a set of 
possible worlds in which they are true, they have distinct contents, according to Sainsbury and 
Tye. Hence, originalism is incompatible with an unrestricted substitutional principle, and 
must therefore abandon traditional compositionalism. Nonetheless, compositionality is 
maintained at the level of vehicles. 
The content expressed by a thought is not, according to originalism, essential for a thought 
being a certain type. In fact, originalists hold that thinking does not involve standing in a 
relation to any kind of content: “we deny that thinking (believing, etc.) consists in bearing an 
appropriate psychological relation to any sort of content. […] Our position is that the content 
of the thought is not to be identified with what is thought” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 110). 
That is, thinkers do not stand in a direct relation to the content of thoughts (sets of possible 
worlds) but rather they “relate to sets of worlds via thoughts” (Sainsbury and Tye 2011, 115). 
This involves giving up the traditional idea that thinking involves standing in a relation to a 
proposition (be it Fregean – that is, consisting of modes of presentations – or Russellian – that 
is, consisting of objects – in nature). Rather, thinking involves standing in an appropriate 
psychological relation to a conceptual structure (meaning vehicles, that is), according to 
Sainsbury and Tye.28 This sets them apart from similar theories, such as Fodor’s (1975, 2008) 
according to which thinking involves the thought token (individuated functionally) standing 
in a semantically appropriate relation to a proposition. To illustrate: On Fodor’s view, for a 
thinker to believe that penguins are birds involves a triadic relation between the thinker, a 
mental representation in her head (a sentence in the language of thought composed of the 
syntactic elements penguin and bird arranged in a certain way), and the proposition that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Sainsbury	   and	   Tye	   agree	  with	   David	   Lewis	   (1986)	   that	   the	   content	   of	   thoughts	   are	   sets	   of	   possible	  worlds.	   The	   theories	   differ,	   however,	   on	  how	   to	   characterize	   such	   contents:	   Lewis	   takes	   the	   content	   of	  thoughts	  to	  be	  propositions,	  for	  on	  his	  account	  propositions	  simply	  are	  sets	  of	  possible	  worlds,	  whereas	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  do	  not	  characterize	  the	  content	  of	  thoughts	  as	  propositions,	  since	  they	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  share	  Lewis’	  view.	  This	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  deny	  that	  thinking	  involves	  standing	  in	  a	  relation	  to	  propositions	   (propositional	   content	   is	   traditionally	   taken	   to	   be	   what	   one	   stands	   in	   a	   relation	   to	   when	  thinking).	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   how	   Sainsbury	   and	   Tye’s	   account	   differs	   from	   Lewis’	   –	   perhaps	   it	   is	   a	  terminological	  dispute.	  I	  shall	  not	  go	  into	  this.	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penguins are birds. On the originalist view, however, for a thinker to believe that penguins are 
birds involves only a relation between the thinker and the vehicle (which is a structure 
consisting of the concepts penguin and bird arranged in a certain way). The vehicle expresses 
a representational content – which is not to be understood as the proposition that penguins are 
birds, but as the set of worlds in which the thought (i.e. vehicle) penguins are birds is true – 
but the thinker does not stand in a direct relation to such a content.  
Just as concepts can be of the same type even if semantically distinct, two thoughts of the 
same type may also differ in content: “Given that thoughts are structures of concepts, 
allowing that a concept can change its reference entails allowing that a thought can change its 
truth condition” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 72). Sainsbury and Tye adopt what they call a 
minimal representationalist framework, according to which thoughts that differ in truth 
conditions differ in representational content. For instance, the first users of the concept meat 
may have formed thoughts like squash is meat. This thought would be true at the time when 
meat referred to anything edible. If someone was to form the same thought today, given that 
the concept meat remains the same, her thought would be structurally and conceptually the 
same as that of the early users, but her thought would be false, since today meat only picks 
out animal flesh. Since the two thought tokens differ in truth value they have different 
representational content.  According to originalism, then, two thought tokens may be of the 
same type even if they differ in representational content.  
Further, it is not just the type of thoughts that is to be determined by way of their constituent 
concepts; the consistency of thoughts also depends directly on the concepts figuring in the 
thoughts and how these are structured: “Inconsistent thoughts are contradictory iff one 
consists of the other embedded in a concept for negation. If one thought contains a nominal 
concept, a contradiction must contain the same nominal concept at the corresponding position 
in the structure” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 135). Consider for instance the thoughts the cat is on 
the mat and the cat is not on the mat. Since the two thoughts share all concepts structured the 
same way, except from the latter containing a negation of one of the nominal concepts in the 
former, the two thoughts are contradictory. Notice that this explanation of the consistency of 
thoughts appeals only to the vehicles of content and how they are structured, and not the 
content expressed by such entities. I return to this feature of Sainsbury and Tye’s theory in 
chapter 5 where I argue that the theory fails to explain rationality. 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
In chapter 1 we saw that there are many problems concerning classic theories of concepts and 
thoughts. Sainsbury and Tye combine what they take to be the best features of these theories 
in order to avoid the problems posed for traditional direct reference theories, descriptivism 
and causal theories of reference. As we have seen in this chapter, originalists adopt a Millian 
framework for the content of concepts, but they agree with Frege that something more than 
classical Millianism is needed in order to explain cognitive significance. They do not agree 
with Frege, however, that what is needed is a second layer of semantics. Instead they hold that 
cognitive significance turns on the syntactic features of concepts; the vehicles of content. 
More specifically, they hold that the origins of concepts is essential for their type 
individuation and that this explains their role in cognition.  
Let me here restate the central claims of originalism, as they will be important in later 
chapters, where I take issue with several of them. The key claim of originalism is that two 
concept tokens are of the same type if and only if they have the same origin. Concepts 
originate when someone uses them intentionally for the first time. There are two sufficient 
conditions for a use being a non-originating one: the use involves deference to earlier uses 
and the use involves information accumulation from other users. A further claim essential to 
originalism is that every concept has only one origin and that the origin of a concept is the 
origin of one concept only. A complication for the theory is that some concepts often are 
taken to have more than one origin and also that more than one concept have the same origin. 
Originalists explain this by appeal to the notion of conceptual fusion and fission. In the case 
of conceptual fusion and fission, new concepts come into being. These concepts bear some 
similarity to the original concepts but are of distinct types. Since conceptual fusion and fission 
involves new concepts originating, they must be due to an intentional introduction and not 
involve any deference to earlier uses. 
Originalism is a compositional theory of thoughts: A thought is a well-formed structure of 
concepts. The contents of the concepts deployed in a thought combine to generate the 
representational content of that thought (but as I noted, they deny an unrestricted 
substitutional principle). The content of thoughts are the set of world in which they are true. 
Thoughts are, however, not to be type individuated in terms of their representational content. 
Instead, the individuation of thoughts is to be by way of it syntactic features; the concepts 
figuring in the thought and how these are structured. Two thought tokens are of the same type 
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if and only if all the concepts figuring in one also figures in the same structure in the other. 
Since concepts are to be individuated by way of their origins, on this view, the individuation 
of thoughts depend directly on the origin of the constitutive concepts. Further, originalists 
hold that the cognitive significance of thoughts depends on the type of concepts figuring in 
thought and not directly on the content expressed by such entities. This is why identity 
statements can be informative; if the concepts figuring in the thoughts have distinct origins, 
the mental processing of these concepts is distinct. 
Sainsbury and Tye subscribe to a causal theory of reference c.f. Kripke, but agree with Evans 
that concepts may change referents while remaining the same concepts. I have pointed out 
that this is problematic, since they do not explain how someone can successfully use a public 
concept through deference, but use it to pick out something else than what is picked out by the 
public concept. If a concept has a certain content in virtue of the mechanism of deference, one 
should expect the content to be stable. In the case of meat, however, the concept remained the 
same but the content changed gradually through time, according to Sainsbury and Tye. If 
deference ensures sameness in use, such change in referent seems implausible. This was the 
problem Evans posed for Kripke, and Sainsbury and Tye do not give any explanation as to 
how this can be the case. The view that concepts may change reference combined with the 
claim that cognitive significance turns on the origins of concepts is what makes the basis for 
my criticism of originalism in chapter 5. I turn now to the main case in favour of originalism: 
its ability to solve central puzzles of thought. 
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Chapter 3 
The Seven Puzzles of Thought and The Originalist Solutions 
 
 
 
In philosophical theorising about thoughts and concepts, several central problem cases or 
puzzles arise against which one can test a given theory. A failure to solve such central 
problems casts doubt on a theory, whilst its ability to solve them counts in its favour. 
Originalism is proposed in order to solve seven central puzzles that have occupied 
philosophers of mind over the past century. Having presented originalism in Chapter 2, I now 
turn to its solutions to these puzzles, which is the main consideration in support of the theory. 
If it can in fact solve the puzzles, we have good reason to believe it to be true. As we have 
seen, Sainsbury and Tye hold that one does not need a sophisticated account of mental content 
in order to solve the puzzles: they take the solutions to the puzzles to depend on the vehicles 
of content rather than the semantic features of thoughts29. We shall now see how this works. I 
present the seven puzzles along with the originalist solutions in turn, along with minor 
comments. Though I shall foreshadow certain criticisms, I leave the main discussion and 
criticism of these solutions to chapter 4, where I seek to demonstrate that the theory fails to 
account for three of the puzzles, and thus cast doubt on the theory. Considering their solutions 
to the puzzles also serves to make clearer certain commitments of the theory: these I shall 
note along the way. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Though	   for	   this	   reason,	   as	   we	   shall	   see	   in	   chapter	   4,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   some	   of	   the	   solutions	   they	  provide	   actually	   engage	   with	   the	   classical	   puzzles,	   as	   the	   latter	   seem	   to	   concern	   content,	   rather	   than	  vehicles.	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3.1 The Puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus 
The first puzzle is the puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus, stemming from Frege (1892).30 
The concepts Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same reference: the planet Venus. On a 
Millian framework – according to which the content of a concept just is its reference - the 
representational content of the two concepts should be the same. If all there is to a thought is 
its reference, it seems that the thought Hesperus is Hesperus should have the same cognitive 
significance as the thought Hesperus is Phosphorus. However, the former is trivial whereas 
the latter is informative; hence the two thoughts do not play the same role in cognition. The 
difference in informativeness cannot be explained by classical Millianism; we seem to be in 
need of something more than reference in order to explain the difference in the two thoughts. 
Frege’s proposal, recall, was that the two thoughts differ in content due to a difference in 
mode of presentation. Sainsbury and Tye, on the other hand, hold that the two concepts do in 
fact have the same content, since originalists agree with Millians that the content of concepts 
just is their reference. Unlike Frege, then, Sainsbury and Tye cannot explain the difference in 
informativeness in terms of content.  
The originalist solution to the puzzle is to appeal to a difference in cognitive significance due 
to a difference in vehicles of content. Originalists hold, as we have noted, that “cognitive 
processing depends not directly on content but on the vehicles of content: concepts and 
thoughts” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 57). This is because thinkers only stand in relation to the 
content of thoughts (sets of worlds) indirectly, via thoughts. Hesperus and Phosphorus are 
distinct concepts, according to originalism, since they originated at numerically distinct 
events, so the two concepts play different roles in cognition. When forming a thought 
containing the concept Hesperus this involves a distinct relation to the planet Venus from a 
thought containing the concept Phosphorus. The thought Hesperus is Hesperus is an identity 
statement between two tokens of the same concept type. In the thought Hesperus is 
Phosphorus the identity statement is between concept tokens of different types, due to the 
concepts having distinct origins. This explains why the first thought is trivial while the latter 
is not, even though they have the same representational content on a Millian framework of 
semantics. The vehicles of content seem to play the role Frege’s modes of presentation did, 
and yet no further layer of semantics has been introduced. Sainsbury and Tye claim that, since 
the thought Hesperus is Hesperus has the same truth conditions as the thought Hesperus is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Recall	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  in	  chapter	  1.	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Phosphorus, the Ancient Babylonians discovered no new fact about the world when they 
learned that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Rather, when the Ancient Babylonians discovered that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus, they made a cognitive discovery: They discovered something new 
about their concepts, namely that Hesperus and Phosphorus are co-referential (Ibid., 125).31  
When discussing the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus, Sainsbury and Tye address a 
corresponding case: How can it be that the thought Greeks are Greeks is trivial, while the 
thought that Greeks are Hellenes is informative, given that Greeks and Hellenes have the 
same reference? Sainsbury and Tye appeal to a difference in cognitive processing effort 
involved in the two thoughts:  
The thought that Greeks are Greeks is typically uninformative, whereas the thought that Greeks 
are Hellenes is potentially informative. In processing the first, only one concept is exercised, 
though on two occasions. Whatever processing effort is required has already been made by the 
time the second occurrence of the concept is encountered; the previous interpretive outcome can 
simply be brought forward (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 54).  
The explanation of the cognitive significance of informative identity statements in terms of 
cognitive processing effort indicates that Sainsbury and Tye have a view on cognition 
resembling that of the computational theories of mind (CTM).32 According to this view, the 
mind is structured the same way as modern computers; mental processes are understood as 
computations involving syntactic symbols. One of the main motivations behind CTM is that 
one of the main instances of a rational process, deductive reasoning, can be “characterized in 
terms of relations among syntactically specified sentences in a formal language that can 
receive a systematic semantic interpretation” (Rey 1997, 212). The rules of first order valid 
arguments can be specified in terms of syntactic features alone. The key claim of CTM is that 
mental processes are computational processes of the syntactic features of thoughts. 33 
According to Sainsbury and Tye, then, the reason why the thought Hesperus is Hesperus is 
trivial whereas the thought Hesperus is Phosphorus is informative, is that the latter thought 
requires more cognitive processing effort than the former, due to the number of concepts 
involved in the thought; that is, due to their syntactic features. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  C.f.	  Frege’s	  initial	  view	  in	  his	  (1879).	  Frege	  later	  rejects	  this	  view	  in	  his	  (1892).	  In	  4.1,	  we	  shall	  see	  that	  Frege’s	  reasons	  for	  rejecting	  this	  view	  is	  also	  a	  reason	  for	  rejecting	  the	  originalist	  solution	  to	  the	  puzzle.	  32	  See	  for	  instance	  Fodor	  (1975,	  1980	  &	  2008)	  and	  Rey	  (1997).	  33	  Note	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  cognitive	  processing	  can	  be	  defined	  without	  appeal	  to	  semantics	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  concepts	  and	  thoughts	  do	  not	  have	  contents.	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According to Sainsbury and Tye, then, the informativeness and triviality of identity 
statements is to be explained in terms of cognitive processing effort. Originalists agree with 
CTM that syntactic features of concepts and thoughts are essential for cognitive processing 
effort. This is because, according to originalism, thinking does not involve standing in a 
relation to any kind of content (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 110).34 The question then, is how 
these syntactic features are to be individuated. Originalists, of course, take such features to be 
individuated by their origins. But why should we believe that the origins of the concepts 
deployed in thought are essential for the way the brain processes thoughts?35 It seems clear 
that most of the time the origins of the concepts we use are inaccessible to our cognitive 
systems (though we may in some cases have knowledge of origins), and, as we’ll see in 3.4, 
originalists are committed to the view that cognitive processing effort sometimes depend on 
the number of concepts a thinker takes a thought to contain rather than the actual number of 
different concepts deployed in thought. In chapter 5 I will argue that, if originalism is true, it 
is possible for someone to use two concept tokens of the same type to express contradictory 
contents. In that case, how are originalists to explain someone being rational in accepting or 
rejecting simple deductions containing syntactically identical concept tokens, but with 
contradictory content?36 
 
3.2 The Puzzle of Twins 
The second puzzle addressed by Sainsbury and Tye is the puzzle of twins. The puzzle of 
twins stems from two different puzzles introduced by Hilary Putnam (1975) and Tyler Burge 
(1979b). Putnam offers the following case: Imagine a distant planet that is completely 
identical to ours, particle by particle. This planet has duplicates of all inhabitants on Earth. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Note	  that	  CTM	  does	  not	   in	   itself	  entail	   the	  view	  that	   thinking	  doesn’t	   involve	  standing	   in	  a	  relation	  to	  any	   kind	   of	   content.	   Fodor	   (2008)	   for	   instance	   takes	   thinking	   to	   involve	   standing	   in	   an	   appropriate	  relation	  to	  propositions.	  35	  Cf.	  Fodor	  1980,	  where	   it	   is	  claimed	  that	  syntactic	  computational	  processes	  take	   into	  account	  only	  the	  
shapes	   of	   symbols.	  The	  point	   I’m	  making	  here	   is	   that	   in	   light	   of	   this	   traditional	   understanding,	   it	   is	   not	  clear	   how	   such	   processing	   can	   take	   into	   account	   origins,	   given	   that	   these	   may	   not	   be	   reflected	   in	   the	  shapes	  of	  symbols	  (Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  do	  not	  offer	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	   this,	  but	  see	  pp.	  86-­‐88	   in	   their	  (2012)).	  I	  shall	  return	  to	  it.	  36	  This	  problem	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  arise	  on	  traditional	  CTM	  accounts,	  for	  on	  such	  a	  view,	  a	  single	  sentence	  in	   the	   language	   of	   thought	   cannot	   potentially	   express	   multiple	   differing	   contents	   (there	   cannot	   be	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  language	  of	  thought)	  (see	  again	  Fodor	  1980,	  though	  see	  Fodor	  1994).	  
	   37	  
Let’s call this planet Twin Earth.37 Twin Earth is identical to Earth, except for one thing; on 
Twin Earth, everything that on Earth has the chemical structure H2O, is made up of 
molecules with chemical structure XYZ. Every individual on Earth has an intrinsic duplicate 
on Twin Earth. For instance, on Earth there is a person Oscar and on Twin Earth there is an 
exact copy of Oscar, namely Twin Oscar. Now, consider Oscar forming the belief water is 
wet. At the same time, on Twin Earth, Twin Oscar also forms the thought water is wet. 
However, while Oscar’s thought picks out H2O, Twin Oscar’s thought refers to XYZ. Hence, 
Oscar and Twin Oscar’s thoughts have different truth conditions; Oscar’s thought is true if 
water (H2O) is wet, whereas Twin Oscar’s thought is true if twin water (XYZ) is wet.38 A 
common view is that a difference in reference indicates a difference in mental content. But 
how can there be a difference in the content of the twins’ thoughts if Oscar and Twin Oscar 
share all intrinsic physical properties? Although the classic debate concerns mental content, 
Sainsbury and Tye take the puzzle to follow from such cases to be how two intrinsic 
duplicates can think different thoughts (vehicles of content): “Mental properties are intrinsic, 
and thoughts are mental, so twins shouldn’t be able to think different thoughts!” (Sainsbury 
and Tye 2012, 9). Their solution to the puzzle is to say that Oscar and Twin Oscar have 
distinct water concepts, since the concepts have distinct origins: Oscar’s concept originated at 
Earth, while Twin Oscar’s concept originated on Twin Earth. Since the concepts are distinct, 
the thoughts as a whole are distinct. The thoughts being distinct due to a difference in syntax 
explains why they play different roles in cognition, according to Sainsbury and Tye.39 
As we’ve seen, originalists hold that thoughts are to be individuated by way of their syntactic 
structure and the origins of the compositional concepts. Thoughts that are semantically or 
epistemically the same may nonetheless be of distinct types if they contain distinct concepts. 
The originalist solution to the puzzle of twins entails that individuals that are intrinsic 
duplicates may differ with respect to their thoughts. Originalism, then, is committed to 
concept externalism. In Seven Puzzles of Thought originalist concept externalism is stated as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  The	  original	  Twin	  Earth	  thought	  experiment	  is	  due	  to	  Putnam	  (1975).	  My	  presentation	  of	  the	  puzzle	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  one	  presented	  by	  Putnam,	  but	  where	  the	  original	  example	  was	  formulated	  to	  be	  about	  language	  I	  will	  transpose	  it	  to	  be	  about	  thoughts.	  	  38	  Note	   that	   it	   is	   not	   important	   whether	   Oscar	   and	   his	   duplicate	   are	   in	   fact	   aware	   of	   the	   molecular	  composition	  of	  water:	  According	  to	  Putnam,	  the	  conclusion	  holds	  even	  though	  we	  imagine	  the	  time	  of	  the	  utterances	   to	   be	   in	   1750	   –	   before	   any	   knowledge	   of	   the	  molecular	   structure	   of	  water.	   Oscar	   and	   Twin	  Oscar	  “understood	  the	  term	  “water”	  differently	  in	  1750	  although	  they	  were	  in	  the	  same	  psychological	  state,	  and	  although,	  given	  the	  state	  of	  science	  at	  the	  time,	  it	  would	  have	  taken	  their	  scientific	  communities	  about	  fifty	  years	  to	  discover	  that	  they	  understood	  the	  term	  “water”	  differently”	  (Putnam	  1975,	  11).	  39	  When	   presenting	   the	   puzzle	   of	   twins,	   Sainsbury	   and	   Tye	   lay	   out	   both	   Putnam’s	   and	   Burge’s	   thought	  experiments.	  When	  giving	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  puzzle,	  however,	  they	  only	  discuss	  Putnam’s	  Twin	  Earth	  case.	  I	  return	  to	  this	  in	  4.3.	  	  
	   38	  
follows: “If an atomic concept C has an origin O, then it is metaphysically necessary that C 
has origin O” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 109). It is metaphysically necessary for a concept to 
have its specific origin since had it had some other origins it would not be the same concept. 
That is to say, in a possible world where quark has a different origin than it actually has, the 
concept would be distinct from the actual concept. This shows that intrinsic duplicates may 
differ with respect to their conceptual repertoires: they may have different vehicles of 
content.40  
Note that originalist concept externalism is not the same as semantic externalism. The latter is 
the view that it is metaphysically possible for intrinsic duplicates to differ with respect to their 
mental content. In contrast, semantic internalism is the view that intrinsic duplicates cannot 
have qualitatively distinct mental contents. Originalist concept externalism is compatible with 
both internalism and externalism about mental content. Consider again Putnam’s Twin Earth 
case. Originalism provides an answer as to how it is possible for the intrinsic duplicates to 
differ with respect to their thoughts (i.e. vehicles of content), but it does not give an answer as 
to how to individuate their mental content. Since the concepts water as we use it on Earth and 
water as used on Twin Earth originated in numerical distinct events – one on Earth and the 
other on Twin Earth – the thought that is water entertained by an individual on Earth is 
distinct from the thought that is water entertained by an individual on Twin Earth, but 
originalism in its simplest form (i.e. without presupposing a Millian understanding of content) 
is neutral on how the content of such thoughts are to be individuated. That is to say, even 
though the twins in the thought experiment have thoughts that are distinct in virtue of their 
concept water having distinct origins, originalist concept externalism is compatible with the 
content of such thoughts being the same; even if the content of the concepts water and twin 
water is to be individuated in terms of associated description (e.g. ‘clear, drinkable liquid’), 
and thus share content, Oscar and Twin Oscar’s thoughts would still be distinct due to their 
concepts having distinct origins. The fact that originalism is compatible with both internalism 
and externalism might seem like a virtue of the theory, but I will show in 4.3 that this actually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  This	  is	  a	  further	  respect	  it	  which	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye’s	  originalism	  differs	  from	  traditional	  theories	  that	  accept	  the	   language	  of	  thought	  hypothesis.	  For	  on	  such	  views,	   if	   two	  persons	  share	  all	   intrinsic	  physical	  properties,	   they	  necessarily	   share	   all	   computational	   properties.	   They	  must	   have	   the	   same	   concepts,	   i.e.	  vehicles	  of	  content.	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  notion	  of	  computational	  properties	  at	  work,	  that	  can	  allow	  for	  intrinsic	  properties	  and	  computational	  properties	  to	  come	  apart.	  This	  is	  related	  to	  the	  points	  in	  footnotes	  35	  and	  36.	  It	  also	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  mind-­‐body	  problem	  and	  mental	  causation	  that	  I	  will	  not	  go	  into.	  See	  again	  Fodor	  1980	  and	  1994.	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renders the originalist solution irrelevant to the classical puzzle of twins; the difference in 
concepts between intrinsic duplicates does not serve any real explanatory purpose.  
Further, although originalist concept externalism does not entail semantic externalism, 
Sainsbury and Tye’s specific version of originalism is committed to semantic externalism. 
This is because they adopt a Millian framework of reference, according to which the 
representational content of atomic concepts just is their reference. Atomic concepts that agree 
in reference agree in content, and atomic concepts that have distinct referents have distinct 
content. Hence, Sainsbury and Tye would say that Oscar and Twin Oscar differ with respect 
to mental content as well as their thoughts, since Oscar’s concept water refers to H2O while 
Twin Oscar’s concept water refers to XYZ. Further, according to Sainsbury and Tye concepts 
are public and the use of a concept involves deference to others in one’s language community. 
The content of concepts is not determined by the user’s own conceptions (i.e. the set of 
significant beliefs concerning the referent), but rather by how the concept is used in one’s 
community. Hence, Sainsbury and Tye’s account as a whole is incompatible with content 
internalism. Let it be clear that Sainsbury and Tye explicitly agree with this: “Originalism 
does not entail semantic externalism. Nonetheless, we ourselves accept semantic externalism 
and many of our remarks in earlier chapters reflect this acceptance or provide reasons for it” 
(Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 90). Their endorsement of semantic externalism will be relevant for 
my criticism of Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the puzzle of twins in 4.3. 
 
3.3 The Puzzle of Cats and Chats 
The third puzzle – the puzzle of cats and chats – is due to Brian Loar (1987). It goes as 
follows: Paul belongs to an English speaking community but is brought up by a French nanny. 
The nanny speaks English with Paul, except when talking about cats; then she uses the French 
word ‘chat’. Paul picks up on his nanny’s words and comes to form thoughts such as all chats 
have tails. It seems plausible to hold that Paul has acquired the concept cat. Intuitively, since 
Paul uses the concept the same way his nanny does, when thinking thoughts such as all chats 
have tails he expresses the belief that all cats have tails. One day Paul’s parents meet up with 
Paul at a hotel room in London. During this meeting, Paul does not encounter any depictions 
of cats or any real cats. However, his parents tell him stories about cats. Paul does not know 
that cats just are chats. From his parents’ stories, Paul comes to know, amongst other things, 
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that cats have tails. But doesn’t Paul already have the belief that all cats have tails? “There are 
powerful reasons to say that the belief that Paul expresses with “All cats have tails” is the 
same as the belief that he expresses with “All chats have tails”” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 
11). One day Paul’s nanny decides to tell Paul that cats and chats are the same. When learning 
this, it seems like Paul makes a discovery, but the thought that cats are chats seems to 
represent just what the thought that cats are cats represents, so how can there be anything to 
discover? This puzzle bears similarity to the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus discussed in 
3.1, but the puzzles differ in that it seems more problematic to give a Fregean explanation of 
the puzzle of cats and chats. In the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus, it seems reasonable that 
the two concepts differ in meaning and thus play different roles in cognition as a result of this. 
In the case of cat and chat, on the other hand, it seems plausible that the concepts have the 
same meaning since the word ‘chat’ translates to ‘cat’ in English.  
Sainsbury and Tye claim that it is plausible that cats and chats have distinct origins and thus 
that they are distinct concepts. The thoughts cats have tails and chats have tail, then, are not 
of the same type. This explains why the thoughts can play distinct cognitive roles in Paul’s 
mental life, and thus why he makes a discovery when he learns that the distinct concepts cats 
and chats have the same representational content. However, Sainsbury and Tye admit that it 
may turn out that cats and chats have the same origin and therefore are the same concept. If 
this is the case, Paul’s beliefs do not only express the same content, they are also of the same 
type. How, then, can there be anything for Paul to discover? For this version of the puzzle, 
Sainsbury and Tye hold that the explanation must be linguistic. Before making the discovery 
the difference in spelling and pronunciation makes Paul believe that cats and chats are distinct 
concepts. When his nanny tells him that cats are chats, Paul “gains only the metalinguistic 
knowledge that “cats” refers to what “chats” refers to” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 129). In this 
way Sainsbury and Tye explain how it can be that Paul makes a discovery when learning that 
cats are chats, even if the concepts have the same origin. I elaborate further on the possibility 
of individuals being mistaken about the number of concept they possess in 3.4.  
 
3.4 The Puzzle of Paderewski 
The fourth puzzle addressed by Sainsbury and Tye is Kripke’s (1979) famous puzzle of 
Paderewski. The puzzle runs as follows: Ignace Paderewski was a popular polish pianist. He 
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was also engaged in politics and after the First World War he became the Polish prime 
minister. Now consider a person, Peter, who independently comes to know about Paderewski 
the piano player and Paderewski the politician without realizing that they are in fact the same 
person. Instead Peter believes that it is a case of two different people sharing the same name. 
Having been to one of Paderewski’s concerts, Peter forms the belief Paderewski has musical 
talent. However, Peter also believes, on good authority, that no politicians have musical talent 
and that no pianists are politicians. Thus it also seems plausible to attribute to Peter the belief 
Paderewski lacks musical talent. Peter is justified in entertaining the latter belief having 
learned from reliable sources that no politician has musical talent. The problem, then, is that it 
seems that Peter cannot have both of his Paderewski-beliefs at the same time. This is because 
the beliefs are inconsistent. Which of these beliefs are we to ascribe to Peter? It seems to be 
the case that Peter really holds both of these beliefs: If asked at a concert whether he thinks 
Paderewski has musical talent he will give a positive answer, but if asked the same question 
when attending one of Paderewski’s political talks, Peter would give a negative answer. But if 
Peter holds this set of contradictory beliefs he would be irrational, and ex hypothesi he is not. 
According to originalism there is just one public concept Paderewski so his thoughts are 
contradictory even on an originalist framework: 
According to originalism, there is just one public concept PADEREWSKI, which Peter 
exercises both when he forms the belief that Paderewski has musical talent, and when he 
forms the belief that Paderewski lacks musical talent. In the originalist framework, Peter 
has contradictory beliefs: apart from negation, the beliefs are made up of just the same 
concepts in the same position. The challenge is to explain how Peter can, nonetheless, be 
rational. If a rational thinker can believe contradictions, do we not lose all grip on what 
makes a thinker rational? (Sainsbury and Tye (forthcoming), 1-2). 
Peter’s beliefs Paderewski has musical talent and Paderewski does not have musical talent 
are contradictory at the level of content vehicles, and the originalists must therefore appeal to 
something else beyond their core framework in order to explain Peter’s being rational.  
Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the puzzle is to say that Peter has a false belief about what he 
believes. That is to say, Peter has a false second order belief: He falsely believes that he does 
not believe that Paderewski has musical talent. In order to illustrate how this can be the case, 
imagine the following. Two weeks after attending Paderewski’s concert Peter goes to see 
Paderewski give a political talk. If, at the talk, someone were to ask Peter whether he thinks 
Paderewski has musical talent or not, he would answer that he does not believe this to be the 
case. Peter is, however, wrong when giving this reply. That is to say, his statement that he 
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does not believe it to be the case that Paderewski has musical talent is false. This is because 
when attending the concert two weeks earlier, Peter formed the belief that Paderewski has 
musical talent, and he has not abandoned that belief by the time of the political talk: “In fact 
he does believe that Paderewski has musical talent, though he does not believe he believes 
this” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 137). Sainsbury and Tye take Peter having a false second order 
belief to account for him being rational in holding contradictory first order beliefs.  
When solving the puzzle, Sainsbury and Tye propose an account of what they take to be a 
correct view about rationality; a view according to which individuals can be wrong about the 
number of concepts they possess. Peter does have the contradictory beliefs Paderewski has 
musical talent and Paderewski does not have musical talent, but since he falsely believes that 
he does not believe that Paderewski has musical talent – he takes himself to have two 
Paderewski concepts, when he in fact has one – he is still to be considered rational. A 
common view is that individuals have privileged access to their own conscious mental states, 
including their thoughts; someone is in a position to know whether his or her own thoughts 
are of the same type or not. Intuitively, one can know which concepts one possesses and 
whether they are of the same type or not. The thesis of introspective knowledge of 
comparative concepts (IKCC) may be stated as follows: 
IKCC: When our faculty of introspection is working normally, we can know apriori via 
introspection with respect to any two present, occurrent thoughts whether they 
exercise the same or different concepts (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 92). 
A consequence of originalism is that IKCC must be abandoned. Since, in most cases, the 
exact point in history at which a given concept was first used intentionally is unknown, 
individuals do not possess the necessary knowledge to decide which concepts are the same 
and which are not. This has consequences for cases of slow switching. In slow switching 
thought experiments (originally introduced by Burge (1988)) someone is, without knowing it, 
teleported from Earth to Twin Earth. For instance, Oscar grows up on Earth and has the 
concept water. One day, unbeknownst to him he is teleported to Twin Earth. Oscar has no 
way of knowing that he has been switched to a different planet, since Twin Earth is 
qualitatively identical to Earth (except from water being made up of XYZ, of course). 
Gradually, by deferring to other people in his new language community on Twin Earth, Peter 
comes to use the Twin Earth concept water when talking about the clear, drinkable liquid in 
his surroundings. Peter, however, is not aware of this change in concepts, since he is unaware 
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that he defers to a different group of people’s use of the concept water than did he as a child. 
However, Sainsbury and Tye hold that when Oscar thinks back on his early childhood and is 
forming such beliefs as I used to drink ten glasses of water a day when I was a child, his old 
concept water that originated on Earth is active in his mind, so his thought is true. Oscar is not 
aware of his using distinct water concepts, and thinks that he is using the same concept when 
talking about his drinking water today and his drinking water as a child. Oscar’s thought the 
water I drank as a child tasted better than the water I get served nowadays contains two 
distinct water concepts, but Oscar is in no position to discover this. Further, in the case of 
Peter in the Paderewski case, Peter does not know that his belief that Paderewski has musical 
talent contains the same concept Paderewski as his belief that Paderewski lacks musical 
talent.41 Hence, abandoning IKCC is essential to Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the puzzle of 
Paderewski. I offer a criticism of Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the Paderewski case in 4.1. 
 
3.5 The Puzzle of the Two Tubes 
The fifth puzzle is the puzzle of pure demonstratives. To present the puzzle, we may use a 
case constructed by David Austin (1990): Jonathan is able to focus his eyes independently of 
each other. One day Jonathan looks through two tubes that are pointed in different directions 
but that come together at the other end. At the point where the tubes meet there is a red dot 
with diameter the same as the tubes. Jonathan does not know how the tubes are oriented, but 
he sees just one red patch. Jonathan believes that he may be subject to a complex medical 
condition, the effect of which is that he cannot tell on the basis of perception where objects 
are located, and further that he cannot know which eye he is using to see which object. When 
seeing the red dot in each of his eyes, he wonders whether that (referring to the red dot he 
actually is seeing with his left eye) is identical to that (referring to the red dot he actually is 
seeing with his right eye). This is not a trivial question: Jonathan genuinely does not know the 
answer. When thinking about this, Jonathan forms the thought that is that, but he does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  If	  one	  agrees	  with	  originalist	  concept	  externalism	  and	  externalism	  about	  mental	  content,	  one	  must	  deny	  that	   one	   can	   know	   via	   introspection	   the	   content	   of	   the	   concepts	   figuring	   in	   thought	   and	   also	   which	  concepts	   one	   entertains	   in	   thought.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Rachel	   in	   chapter	   2,	   she	  was	   not	   only	  wrong	  about	  what	  concept	  she	  was	  using,	  but	  also	  the	  content	  of	  her	  concept	  tokens.	  Likewise,	  switching-­‐Oscar	   does	   not	   know	   that	   his	   concept	  water	   that	   originated	   at	   Earth	   has	   a	   different	   content	   than	   the	  concept	  water	  acquired	  after	  the	  switching.	  Then	  it	  seems	  that	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  must	  make	  a	  stronger	  claim	   than	   it	   first	   seemed:	   In	   addition	   to	   abandoning	   IKCC,	   which	   to	   them	   is	   a	   thesis	   about	   meaning	  vehicles,	   Sainsbury	   and	   Tye	   must	   also	   deny	   that	   individuals	   can	   know	   via	   introspection	   the	  representational	  content	  of	  the	  concepts	  figuring	  in	  thought.	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know whether to endorse the thought or to reject it. The puzzle, then, is how one could fail to 
know whether the statement of identity is true in the thought that is that, when that refers to 
the same object in both cases.  
Sainsbury and Tye give the following solution to the puzzle: The two occurrences of the 
concept that in the thought that is that are of distinct types. Indexical concepts, recall, contrast 
with other concepts in that individuals can introduce them to themselves independent of other 
people. Even though both of Jonathan’s concepts that belong to the same concept template 
(recall that concept templates are not themselves concepts, but rather rules for forming 
concepts), the concepts have distinct origins, and thus they are of distinct types, according to 
originalism. One of the concepts originated when Jonathan intended to refer to what he 
actually saw with his left eye, while the other originated when Jonathan intended to refer to 
what he actually saw with his right eye. Since distinct concepts play distinct cognitive roles, 
this explains how Jonathan can fail to be in a position to know whether the identity statement 
is true or not. 
 
3.6 The Puzzle of Empty Thoughts 
The sixth puzzle, which I have already addressed, is the puzzle of empty thoughts. Concepts 
such as Vulcan and Pegasus do not have any reference since, in the actual world, there is no 
such thing as the planet Vulcan or winged horses. Even so, we can use the concepts in 
thoughts. For instance, one might think that Vulcan does not exist. Hence, thoughts might 
involve concepts such as Vulcan and Pegasus, even if these concepts do not pick out anything 
in the world. How, then, can such concepts be part of genuine thoughts? Explaining how 
empty concepts can play an interesting role in cognition is one of the main motivations behind 
originalism. Since, according to originalism, concepts are not to be individuated in terms of 
their semantic features, two concepts that are both empty may nonetheless be of distinct types. 
As we saw in the solution to the puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus, referentially isomorphic 
thoughts may play different roles in cognition. This explains why it is one thing to think that 
Pegasus is a winged horse and another to think that Vulcan is a winged horse; the concepts 
deployed in the two thoughts have different origins. Further, even if concepts may lack 
content, according to originalism, every thought has a content. A thought is true if and only if 
the actual world is a member of the associated set of possible worlds. A thought consisting of 
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only a nominative concept and a predicate, such as Pegasus is a horse, is false in all cases 
where one (or more) of the constituent concepts lack a reference in the actual world. Negative 
thoughts containing empty concepts, on the other hand, come out as true. For instance, the 
negative thought Pegasus is not a horse is true because it is a negation of the false thought 
Pegasus is a horse, and the negation of a false thought is true. This explains how empty 
concepts can generate genuine thoughts. Here again, the vehicles of content play a similar role 
to the one modes of presentation does on the Fregean account, without necessitating a further 
layer of semantics. 
 
3.7 The Puzzle of Thinking About Oneself 
The last puzzle addressed by Sainsbury and Tye is the puzzle of thinking about oneself. 
Consider the following case: Ernst Mach, not recognizing his own reflection in the mirror as 
himself, thinks that the man he sees is a shabby pedagogue. However, he does not think that 
he, himself, is a shabby pedagogue; he does not have the belief I am a shabby pedagogue 
(Mach 1914, 4n.). This implies that there is a difference between thinking of oneself in third 
person and thinking of oneself in first person. Further, there seems to be two different ways of 
using the concept I (or my): I could be mistaken about whether my arm is broken or whether 
I’ve grown six inches, but it seems that I cannot be wrong about whether I am in pain. That is 
to say, it can make sense for someone to ask if I am sure whether it is really my arm, and not 
someone else’s, that is broken, but to ask whether I am sure that it’s me, and not someone 
else, that experiences the pain seems absurd.42 Does the latter way of thinking about the 
subject engender some special immunity to error? According to originalism, Mach has more 
than one concept that refers to himself: one of them being I another one being that shabby 
pedagogue.43 Both concepts have the same content, according to originalism, since they are 
co-referential. Mach’s failing to recognize reflection in the mirror as himself is, thus, 
“essentially like the failure of early astronomers to recognize Hesperus as Phosphorus” 
(Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 144). This explains why Mach can be rational in thinking that the 
person he sees in the mirror is a shabby pedagogue while doubting that he himself is a shabby 
pedagogue; the relevant thoughts contain distinct concepts. Further, the I-template is 
governed by the rule that the tokened concepts are to be used to think of oneself. Acquiring a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  This	  point	  is	  originally	  due	  to	  Wittgenstein	  (1958).	  43	  Note	  that	  the	  concept	  I	  is	  atomic,	  whereas	  that	  shabby	  pedagogue	  is	  non-­‐atomic.	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certain I-concept involves mastering this rule. Your concept I can never refer to anybody but 
you; hence self-reference is guaranteed to succeed. In contrast, there is no apriori guarantee 
that Ernst Mach refers to the same individual as does Mach’s concept I, so Ernst Mach may 
be mistaken about the reference of his concept Ernst Mach. This explains why there is an 
important difference between thinking about oneself in the first person perspective and 
thinking about oneself in a third person perspective.44  
 
3.8 Chapter Summary 
Originalism is advanced to solve seven of the classical puzzles in philosophy of language and 
philosophy of mind. According to Sainsbury and Tye one is in no need of a sophisticated 
theory of semantics in order to explain these puzzles; instead they make the vehicles of 
content available as a separate source of explanation. In this chapter I’ve presented the 
puzzles with which Sainsbury and Tye are concerned and the originalist solution given to 
these puzzles. A common feature of the originalist solutions is that they explain the cognitive 
role of concepts and thoughts in terms of vehicles of content rather than the content expressed 
by such vehicles. In chapter 4, I will take a critical look at some of these solutions; more 
specifically, I will discuss the solutions given to the puzzle of Paderewski, the puzzle of 
Hesperus and Phosphorus and the puzzle of twins, and argue that Sainsbury and Tye fail to 
solve these puzzles. I will show that the originalist solution to Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle 
gives rise to serious problems and that it does not succeed in accounting for Peter being 
rational in holding seemingly contradictory beliefs. Further, I will argue that Sainsbury and 
Tye fail to explain what was central to Frege’s original puzzle: the issue of how one can make 
empirical discoveries by coming to know informative identity statements. I also argue that the 
originalist solution to the puzzle of twins does not really add anything to the classic debate 
about mental content. If I am right, and Sainsbury and Tye’s originalist account in fact fails to 
solve the specific problems it is advanced to solve, this casts doubt on the theory as a whole. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  give	  a	  more	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  this	  puzzle	  than	  I	  present	  here.	  I	  choose	  not	  to	  go	   into	   too	   much	   detail	   about	   this	   puzzle,	   since	   nothing	   of	   what	   I	   say	   later	   on	   bears	   directly	   on	   the	  originalist	  account	  of	  thinking	  about	  oneself.	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Chapter 4 
Puzzles left Unsolved 
 
 
Sainsbury and Tye suggest originalist solutions to seven classical puzzles in philosophy of 
mind.  If their suggested solutions do not work, we shall have reasons to reject the view. In 
this chapter, I will focus on three specific puzzles and demonstrate that originalism is not 
suited to solve them. First, I criticise the originalist solution to the puzzle of Paderewski and 
show that Peter’s being rational cannot be explained by appealing to his having false second 
order beliefs. I then take a closer look at Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the puzzle of 
Hesperus and Phosphorus and argue that they fail to explain Frege’s initial puzzle, since they 
cannot explain how one can make an empirical discovery through informative identity 
statements. Finally, I argue that the originalist account of the puzzle of twins does not really 
contribute to the classic debate going back to Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979b). Again, if my 
arguments are successful, they pose serious problems for originalism since solving the 
relevant puzzles is the raison d'être of originalism. 
 
4.1 The Puzzle of Paderewski Revisited 
The first puzzle I will take a closer look at is Kripke’s puzzle about Paderewski. The case, 
recall, involves Peter having both the belief Paderewski has musical talent and the belief 
Paderewski does not have musical talent about a single person Paderewski, while taking there 
to be two such individuals: Paderewski (the musician) and Paderewski (the politician). In 
response to this case, Sainsbury and Tye claim that Peter has a false second order belief; he 
falsely believes that he does not believe that Paderewski has musical talent when forming the 
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belief that Paderewski lacks musical talent at the political rally: “Peter is asked if Paderewski 
has musical talent. In responding negatively, he is being sincere; sincerity means he believes 
what he says; what he says is that he does not believe that Paderewski has musical talent; so 
we can infer that he believes that he does not believe that Paderewski has musical talent” 
(Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 137). This in turn explains how he can be rational in holding 
contradictory beliefs. I will show that this solution is untenable; it leads to Peter having more 
sets of contradictory beliefs than in the original puzzle. Consider the following: One day Peter 
is asked the same question – whether Paderewski has musical talent – by one of his music 
loving friends that Peter thinks knows nothing about politics. This time Peter gives a positive 
response. The case just portrayed can be described in the same way as the case addressed by 
Sainsbury and Tye above: When giving the positive response Peter is being sincere; he 
believes what he says; what he says is that he believes that Paderewski has musical talent; so 
we can infer that Peter believes that he believes that Paderewski has musical talent. But we 
have already inferred that Peter believes that he does not believe that Paderewski has musical 
talent. It seems that Peter’s second order beliefs are contradictory: Peter believes that he does 
not believe that Paderewski has musical talent and he also believes that he believes that 
Paderewski has musical talent.45 The appeal to higher order beliefs, then, results in us having 
to attribute to Peter contradictory second order beliefs and thus this route fails at explaining 
Peter’s being rational.  
Let me expand this. It is part of the story that before making the discovery that Paderewski 
(the musician) = Paderewski (the politician), Peter believes both that Paderewski has musical 
talent and also that Paderewski does not have musical talent. We need to explain how Peter 
can be rational in continuing believing that Paderewski has musical talent after having formed 
the belief that Paderewski lacks musical talent. Following Sainsbury and Tye we can appeal 
to Peter having a false second order belief. But consider the following. When attending a new 
concert with Paderewski, Peter is asked by his friend whether he believes that Paderewski 
lacks musical talent. This time Peter gives a negative answer. In responding negatively, he is 
being sincere; he believes that he does not believe that Paderewski lacks musical talent. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  We	  may	  assume	  that	  Peter’s	  second	  order	  beliefs	  are	  occcurrent	  beliefs.	  If	  someone	  was	  to	  object	  that	  this	  seems	  implausible	  due	  to	  the	  long	  timespan	  between	  Peter’s	  forming	  the	  first	  and	  the	  second	  belief,	  we	   could	   just	   adjust	   the	   story:	   Instead	  of	  Peter	  being	  asked	  whether	  he	   thinks	  Paderewski	  has	  musical	  talent	  at	  different	  events,	  two	  of	  Peter’s	   friends	  –	  one	  of	  which	  is	  a	  music	   lover	  and	  who	  knows	  nothing	  about	   politics,	   and	   the	   other	   a	   politician	  who	   knows	   nothing	   about	  music	   –	   could	   ask	   him	  whether	   he	  believes	  that	  Paderewski	  has	  musical	  talent	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  Peter	  would	  still	  give	  one	  positive	  and	  one	  negative	  answer.	  We	  could	  thus	  infer	  that	  Peter	  has	  both	  second	  order	  beliefs	  at	  the	  same	  time.	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Hence, we can infer that Peter has a false second order belief that accounts for him being 
rational in continuing believing that Paderewski has musical talent. Now, an hour later Peter 
is talking to a friend of his that is a politician and that Peter thinks knows nothing about 
music. During their conversation Peter is asked the same question; whether he believes that 
Paderewski lacks musical talent. This time Peter responds positively; he believes that he 
believes that Paderewski lacks musical talent. But, then, again Peter ends up having 
contradictory second order beliefs: Peter believes that he does not believe that Paderewski 
lacks musical talent and he also believes that he believes that Paderewski lacks musical talent. 
It seems that we must ascribe to Peter an additional set of contradictory second order beliefs 
in order to explain why he is rational in continuing believing that Paderewski lacks musical 
talent after having formed the belief that Paderewski has musical talent. But now the situation 
is this: Peter believes (i) that he has the belief that Paderewski has musical talent; (ii) that he 
does not have the belief that Paderewski has musical talent; (iii) that he has the belief that 
Paderewski lacks musical talent, and (iv) that he does not have the belief that Paderewski 
lacks musical talent. Belief (i) and (ii) are contradictory; one asserts what the other denies, 
and the same is the case with (iii) and (iv). We end up with a new puzzle: How can it be that 
Peter, being rational, can have two sets of seemingly contradictory second order beliefs?  
Following the solution given to the Paderewski case in Seven Puzzles of Thought, we could 
try appealing to Peter having false third order beliefs about his second order beliefs. But this 
is no good, since this route just renders the case to be such that Peter has even more 
contradictory beliefs; four sets of contradictory third order beliefs, to be exact – two sets for 
each of the contradictory second order beliefs. This would then turn into an endless regress, 
producing yet more contradictions further up the chain. Hence, trying to explain why Peter is 
rational in having contradictory beliefs at one level by appeal to false higher order beliefs, 
renders us with more sets of contradictory beliefs the further up we go. Hence, Sainsbury and 
Tye’s solution to the Paderewski case fails to explain why Peter is rational in believing (P & 
¬P), since their solution creates more problems that threaten Peter’s being rational. How can 
originalists respond? 
Appealing to a difference in type of the concept tokens used by Peter is not an option for 
Sainsbury and Tye, since they hold that concepts are public and it is only one public concept 
Paderewski. Even if Peter thinks there are two individuals called ‘Paderewski’, Sainsbury and 
Tye must say that he only uses one concept Paderewski, since they are independently 
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committed to saying that Peter being wrong about the reference of Paderewski does not 
prevent him from using the public concept: “Concept possession is consistent with all sorts of 
mistakes and misunderstandings about the concept’s subject matter” (Sainsbury and Tye 
2012, 55). Hence, as noted, originalism must appeal to something else than their core 
assumptions in order to explain the puzzle of Paderewski. As I have shown, appealing to Peter 
having false second order beliefs is misguided, since this route renders it even harder than in 
the original case to explain Peter’s being rational. Hence, Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the 
puzzle of Paderewski fails. I will make a related point in 5.3, where I put forth my own 
thought experiment in order to cast further doubt on originalism as a general theory of 
concepts and thoughts. I will now go on to discuss their solution to the puzzle of Hesperus 
and Phosphorus and argue that Sainsbury and Tye also fail to explain that puzzle.   
 
4.2 The Puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus Revisited 
Before I turn to the main criticism of Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the puzzle of Hesperus 
and Phosphorus, I will make a few comments about their solution. As noted, Sainsbury and 
Tye hold that the difference in informativeness in identity statements is to be explained by a 
difference in cognitive processing due to the number of concepts figuring in thought. 
According to originalists, the number of concepts deployed in thought depends on the origins 
of the relevant concepts and not on the content expressed by such entities. Even if two 
concepts share content, the concepts are processed as distinct concepts if they have distinct 
origins. This supposedly explains why it is one thing to think that Hesperus is Hesperus and 
another to think that Hesperus is Phosphorus. In the first case, the same concept is active 
twice, so that by the time of the second tokening the process effort needed has already been 
made. In the second case, however, there are two distinct concepts so more effort is needed in 
order for the brain to process the thought. Now, Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the classic 
Frege puzzle presupposes that Hesperus and Phosphorus have distinct origins; if the concepts 
had the same origin, they would be of the same type, according to originalism, and then it 
seems that the cognitive processing needed for the thought Hesperus is Phosphorus would be 
the same as in the case of the trivial thought Hesperus is Hesperus. However, there is no 
apriori guarantee that Hesperus and Phosphorus have distinct origins. Even though it seems 
historically unlikely, it may turn out that Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same origin and 
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that their difference in spelling and pronunciation developed gradually through time46. If this 
is the case – if Hesperus and Phosphorus turn out to be the same concept – the originalist 
solution to the puzzle is ineffective; there would be no real difference in the cognitive 
significance of Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus. For the originalist solution 
to be effective, then, it seems that one must stipulate that Hesperus and Phosphorus have 
distinct origins, but this might turn out to be historically incorrect.  
If it should turn out that Hesperus and Phosphorus do in fact have the same origin, the 
thought Hesperus is visible would be the same as the thought Phosphorus is visible, both at 
the level of content and vehicles. However, part of the Fregean data Sainsbury and Tye set out 
to explain is exactly that it is one thing to think that Hesperus is visible and another to think 
that Phosphorus is visible. If the origin of Hesperus and Phosphorus is the same, then, 
Sainsbury cannot explain this data without appealing to something else than vehicles and 
referential content. Further, the ancient Babylonians might have formed the beliefs Hesperus 
is visible and Phosphorus is not visible at the same time. If Hesperus and Phosphorus have 
the same origin, the thoughts would be contradictory even on the originalist framework, since 
the thoughts contain concepts of the same type and one denies what the other asserts. Still, the 
Ancient Babylonians would be rational in forming both beliefs since they do not know that 
the concepts are the same. The situation, then, is similar to the one of Peter in the Paderewski 
case. If someone is rational in forming thoughts that are contradictory at the level of vehicles, 
Sainsbury and Tye must appeal to something else in order to explain them being rational; they 
must appeal to the thinker being wrong about her beliefs due to her being wrong about the 
nature of the concepts involved in thought. However, if my criticism of Sainsbury and Tye’s 
solution to the Paderewski case is correct, they cannot explain cases in which thoughts that 
agree in vehicles and content play distinct roles in cognition. Hence, in order to avoid turning 
the puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus into a case along the lines of the Paderewski case, 
Sainsbury and Tye must stipulate that the concepts have distinct origins. But, as noted, even if 
it seems historically plausible that Hesperus and Phosphorus have distinct origins there is no 
apriori guarantee that they do not have the same origin. I will now turn to my objection to 
Sainsbury and Tye’s solution of the puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus and argue that even if 
they make such stipulations, their solution to Frege’s puzzle still fails. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Note	   that	   originalists	  must	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   symbols	   that	   have	   different	   shapes	  may	   still	  count	  as	  the	  same	  concept.	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The problem I want to raise for the originalist solution to Frege’s puzzle is that it fails to 
explain how informative identity statements can provide us with knowledge about the world, 
and not just knowledge about our concepts. Frege’s, with his initial puzzle (see 1.1), was 
concerned with how such identity statements can provide us with empirical knowledge about 
the world: how they can contain “very valuable extensions of our knowledge” (Frege 1892, 
56). According to originalism, the discovery made by the Ancient Babylonians when learning 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus is a cognitive discovery. They learned something about their 
concepts, namely that they expressed the same content – they did not learn that such and such 
was the case in the external world. The Ancient Babylonians may have formed the thought 
Hesperus is Phosphorus before making the discovery, but they did not believe it, and if they 
did, they did not have the necessary evidence for the belief being justified. What happened 
when they came to know that Hesperus is Phosphorus, according to Sainsbury and Tye, is that 
a new thought came to be knowledge. Since, on this view, the thought Hesperus is Hesperus 
and Hesperus is Phosphorus has the same content (that is, they share sets of possible worlds 
in which they are true), one gets no new information about the world when learning that the 
latter is true: “In some sense, no new “fact” was added to knowledge when the fact that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus was added” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 125). However, it seems 
implausible that the ancient Babylonians did not make a discovery about the world, but 
merely a cognitive discovery, when learning that Hesperus is Phosphorus. This was at the 
centre of Frege’s initial puzzle.  
As noted, Sainsbury and Tye model their theory of concepts on words. If it is the case that a 
theory of concepts really should be understood as corresponding to a theory of words, the 
following case should be analogous to the case of the Ancient Babylonians discovering that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus: First, let’s say I believe that Tyler is fair. ‘Fair’ is synonymous with 
‘impartial’; that is, they have the same meaning (or so I will assume). Now let’s say that, for 
some reason, I have misunderstood the term ‘impartial’; I think that ‘impartial’ means 
‘unfair’. Because of my misunderstanding I might come to form the belief that Tyler is not 
impartial. One day I discover that I have misunderstood the terms, and come to form the 
belief that Tyler is impartial. However, when learning that ‘fair’ and ‘impartial’ have the same 
meaning, I make a discovery about language and not about Tyler. When making the 
discovery, no new fact about Tyler was added to my knowledge, since I already had the belief 
that Tyler is fair (and ‘fair’ and ‘impartial’ are assumed to have the same meaning). My 
discovery in this case consists in learning that two words that I thought had different meaning 
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do in fact have the same meaning. This story is analogous to Sainsbury and Tye’s account of 
the Ancient Babylonians discovering that Hesperus is Phosphorus; the Ancient Babylonians 
made a discovery about their concepts and not about any new empirical fact. But this is 
clearly not analogous to Frege’s case. To see this, consider the following.  
If Lois Lane discovered that Clark Kent is Superman, she would make a discovery about the 
world, and not just about her concepts. In particular, she would learn a new fact about her 
colleague Clark Kent.47 This, unlike the case above, is analogous to Frege’s case. Just like 
Lois Lane makes a discovery about the world when learning that Clark Kent is Superman, so 
did the Ancient Babylonians when learning that Hesperus is Phosphorus. When learning that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus they made a discovery about Hesperus (e.g. that it is also visible in 
the morning). After making the discovery, the Ancient Babylonians were justified in inferring 
that the same heavenly body is visible twice a day, and this is an empirical discovery. How 
can we explain someone learning a new fact about the world from knowledge only about 
meaning vehicles? Frege made this point in the opening paragraph of his (1892), where the 
puzzle is raised. In his (1879), Frege suggested that informative identity statements result only 
in cognitive discoveries, but he abandons this idea in his (1892) when confronted with the 
puzzle. Again, the puzzle concerns how one can gain knowledge about the world from such 
statements. Obviously, responding that only a cognitive discovery is made is no good: it begs 
the question, and offers no explanation of how empirical knowledge can be gained. A solution 
to Frege’s puzzle cannot just be an account of how to distinguish trivial identity statement 
from informative identity statements, but must also provide an explanation as to why thoughts 
such as Hesperus is Phosphorus are informative in the sense that from them we get new 
knowledge about the world. Sainsbury and Tye provide no such explanation and hence the 
theory fails at solving Frege’s puzzle.  
 
4.3 The Puzzle of Twins Revisited 
The final case I want to take a closer look at is Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the Twin 
Earth case of Putnam (1975). Sainsbury and Tye explain the difference in the thoughts of 
Oscar and Twin Oscar by appealing to a difference in concepts; since Oscar’s concept water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Joseph	   Hedger	   (forthcoming)	   makes	   the	   same	   point	   regarding	   originalism	   failing	   to	   explain	   Frege’s	  puzzle.	   I	   borrow	   the	   illustration	  of	   the	   comparison	  between	   true	   synonyms	  and	   co-­‐referential	   concepts	  from	  him.	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is distinct from Twin Oscar’s concept water, their thoughts as a whole are distinct. The 
thought that is water1 entertained by Oscar plays a different cognitive role than Twin Oscar’s 
thought that is water2, since the thoughts contain the distinct concepts water1 and water2 (one 
originating at Earth, the other at Twin Earth) and since cognitive significance is to be 
explained in terms of meaning vehicles.. When laying out the puzzle of twins, Sainsbury and 
Tye present the classic puzzles of Putnam and Burge regarding externalism and internalism 
about mental content, implying that originalism can make a contribution to this debate. 
However, while originalism explains how the twins’ thought vehicles can be distinct, it does 
not really add anything to the standard externalist theories of mental content. This is reflected 
in the key assumptions of originalism being compatible with both externalism and internalism 
about mental content. Historically the relevant debate about internalism and externalism is 
about how intrinsic duplicates can differ with respect to their mental content, and not how 
they can differ with respect to their meaning vehicles. This is what the traditional puzzles are 
concerned with. Let me show the irrelevance of the originalist solution to these puzzles.48 
Traditional externalists hold that Oscar and Twin Oscar have distinct mental contents when 
thinking about water. However, most traditional externalists would want to say that when 
thinking of something that has the exact same intrinsic features on the two planets, Oscar and 
Twin Oscar share mental content. That is to say, the difference in mental content of Oscar and 
Twin Oscar is due to them standing in relations to liquids with distinct chemical structure; had 
the watery stuff on Twin Earth turned out to be made up of H2O, just like water on Earth, 
Oscar and Twin Oscar would have had the same mental content (and, as a result, be in the 
same mental state). According to originalism, however, in this case Oscar and Twin Oscar 
still have distinct water concepts, since one originated at Earth and the other at Twin Earth. 
Their thoughts still play different roles in cognition since they contain distinct concepts. 
Sainsbury and Tye do not state explicitly that they think inhabitants on Earth and Twin Earth 
can share mental content, but there are reasons to believe that they would agree with this. 
According to Sainsbury and Tye, the content of concepts is, in most cases, introduced at the 
origins of a concept and then maintained through time because of the mechanism of 
deference. In most cases, then, the content of concepts depend on the intentions of the person 
who introduced the concept.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  It	  might	   seem	  here	   that	   I	   am	  begging	   the	  question	  against	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye.	  They	  might	   claim	   that	  they	  are	  setting	  out	  to	  solve	  a	  different	  puzzle,	  one	  about	  how	  the	  twins	  can	  differ	  at	  the	  level	  of	  vehicles.	  But	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  their	  presentation	  that	  they	  set	  out	  to	  solve	  the	  traditional	  puzzle.	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For instance, when Gell-Mann introduced the concept quark he intended the concept to pick 
out quarks in the entire universe, and not just on Earth. Since, in Putnam’s thought 
experiment, Twin Earth is stipulated to be a distant planet in our own universe, Gell-Mann’s 
concept also picks out quarks on Twin Earth. The same is the case for Gell-Mann’s intrinsic 
duplicate Twin Gell-Mann; Twin Gell-Mann’s concept quark also refers to all quarks in the 
universe. Hence, when Gell-Mann and Twin Gell-Mann use their distinct concepts quark they 
have the same representational content: When Gell-Mann has a belief containing his concept 
quark and Twin Gell-Mann has an equivalent belief only with his concept quark, their beliefs 
have the same truth conditions. Hence, it seems plausible that Sainsbury and Tye would agree 
that someone on Earth and someone on Twin Earth could share mental content. However, 
their theory does nothing to accommodate the difference between intrinsic duplicates having 
the same or different mental content: Every concept on Earth is distinct from equivalent 
concepts originating on Twin Earth. It seems plausible that Gell-Mann’s thought quark are 
tiny plays the same cognitive role as Twin Gell-Mann’s thought quarks are tiny, but their 
concepts are distinct, according to originalism. Since the concepts figuring in the two 
thoughts are distinct the thoughts should play distinct roles in cognition. In this case, 
however, it seems as though their thoughts do play the same role in cognition, but this cannot 
be explained by appeal to their meaning vehicles individuated in terms of their origins. 
Rather, in this case, it seems like their sameness of representational content is what explains 
them having thoughts with the same cognitive significance. Then it seems that what accounts 
for Oscar and Twin Oscar being in different mental states, whereas Gell-Mann and Twin 
Gell-Mann are in the same mental state is the content of their thoughts, and not the vehicles. 
In this case, a difference in concepts does not suffice to explain what is special about the 
relation between the concepts water1 and water2 as opposed to quark and twin quark. Hence, 
the solution suggested by Sainsbury and Tye does not contribute to the classic puzzle of 
twins, since there is still the question of how intrinsic duplicates can differ with respect to 
their mental content. 
The originalists might want to argue that distinct concepts can play different roles in 
cognition, but that they don’t have to. Could they perhaps say that concepts may play the 
same role in cognition if they have qualitatively identical origins? For instance, they could 
claim that quark and twin quark play the same cognitive role due to the concepts having 
qualitatively identical origins. Water and twin water, on the other hand, do not have 
qualitatively identical origins since the introduction of each concepts involved the people 
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using them for the first time standing in a relation to qualitatively distinct entities (H2O and 
XYZ respectively). This response, however, is not available to originalists. The reason is that, 
according to the view just outlined, features other than the mere point in history at which the 
concept was first introduced and the intention of the person using the concept intentionally for 
the first time, are essential to the role a concept plays in cognition. On this route, the 
difference in cognitive significance of water1 and water2 is to be explained in terms of the 
relation the individual introducing the concept has to her environment. But originalists deny 
that such features are needed to explain the cognitive role of concepts and thoughts. Hence, 
the route just outlined is not available to the originalist. In chapter 7 I present a theory that in 
many respects resembles originalism, but according to which the relation individuals bear to 
objects in their environment is essential for the individuation of their concepts. I will argue 
that this alternative view, Recanati’s theory of mental files, is preferable to originalism in that 
it avoids the problems posed for originalism in this thesis and at the same time preserves 
appealing aspects of originalism. Let me now return to the traditional twin cases, however.  
It is striking that in their presentation of twin puzzles Sainsbury and Tye put forth Tyler 
Burge’s (1979b) thought experiment in favour of externalism about mental content, but when 
giving a solution to the puzzle, they only address the Twin Earth puzzle, stemming from 
Putnam. In his thought experiment, Burge highlights the relevance of the thinker’s relations to 
her social community for the individuation of mental content. Sainsbury and Tye agree with 
Burge that one’s language community is important for the content of concepts and thoughts; 
the content of such entities is determined by the public use of the group to which one defers.49 
Burge puts forth a thought experiment that is supposed to establish that a person can maintain 
his intrinsic properties, but at the same time have different mental content as a result of 
alterations in his environment: Alf has several beliefs about the illness arthritis, many of 
which are true. He does, however, believe that he has arthritis in his thigh, which is false since 
arthritis may only affect the joints. Now, let’s imagine a counterfactual world in which 
‘arthritis’ is a more general term, which also includes the disease in Alf’s thigh. In this world, 
Alf’s belief that he has arthritis in his thigh is true. Burge claims that in the counterfactual 
world Alf has no concept of arthritis, and thus he has no beliefs about arthritis. Instead he has 
the concept tarthritis. Alf’s physical and non-intentional state is identical in the counterfactual 
world and the actual world, but Alf has different intentional content in the actual world and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  do,	  however,	  disagree	  with	  Burge’s	  account	  in	  that	  they	  find	  no	  use	  for	  a	  notion	  of	  
experts	  when	  explaining	  the	  public	  meaning	  of	  concepts.	  
	   57	  
the counterfactual case; arthritis and tarthritis are different concepts (on the traditional 
understanding of ‘concepts’, according to which such entities are constitutively semantic), 
according to Burge. Thus, Burge concludes that a thinker’s intentional state depends on 
certain features of her linguistic environment.  
The puzzle Sainsbury and Tye draws from Burge’s thought experiment is the same as the one 
drawn from the Twin Earth case: How can intrinsic duplicates differ with respect to their 
thoughts (i.e. vehicles of content)? Since Sainsbury and Tye do not address this case directly 
when solving the puzzles, I can only make a guess as to what their solution would be. From 
their formulation of the puzzle, it seems to be the case that Sainsbury and Tye think Alf in the 
actual case has a different thought than Alf in the counterfactual case when thinking I have 
arthritis. According to originalism, in order for the thoughts to be distinct, they must contain 
concepts with different origins since they have the same structure. Hence, arthritis and 
tarthritis must have distinct origins, according to originalism. However, Burge’s thought 
experiment is silent on how arthritis and tarthritis first came into being. Is it necessarily the 
case that the two concepts have distinct origins? One could, of course, stipulate that in the 
counterfactual case, tarthritis has a different origin than arthritis has in the actual case, since 
they have different content. The person first introducing the concepts may have introduced 
them at distinct points in history in the actual and counterfactual case; it might not even have 
been the same person who first introduced the concepts. In this case, the concepts are distinct, 
according to originalism. However, another possibility is that arthritis and tarthritis have the 
same origin in the actual and counterfactual case. Since originalism allows for concepts to 
change their content, it may be the case that the difference in content between arthritis and 
tarthritis developed through time. Initially both concepts may have included only 
inflammation of the joints, but then gradually, tarthritis came to pick a wider range of 
illnesses. In this case, arthritis and tarthritis are the same concept, according to originalism, 
since they have the same origin. If the concepts are the same, the thought I have arthritis 
should be the same for Alf in the actual case and Alf in the counterfactual case. Since Burge 
is silent on how the origins of arthritis and tarthritis and also how they came to have their 
specific content, we have no reason to prefer one of the stories presented to the other. In order 
for the originalists to hold that Alf has distinct thoughts in the actual and counterfactual case, 
then, they must assume that arthritis and tarthritis have distinct origins. But then, once again, 
Sainsbury and Tye explanation rest on assumptions that are not necessarily true. This casts 
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further doubts about Sainsbury and Tye’s account as a general theory of the nature of 
concepts and thoughts.  
One possibility for Sainsbury and Tye might be to allow for Alf having the same thought in 
the actual and counterfactual case. They could say that Alf’s thoughts differ with respect to 
content but not at the level of meaning vehicles. This, however, seems like an unmotivated 
response. In the Twin Earth case, Sainsbury and Tye are clear that Oscar and Twin Oscar 
have distinct concepts – in fact they must say this, since the concepts have distinct origins. 
This is what their contribution to the debate about internalism and externalism in philosophy 
of mind amounts to. For someone endorsing social externalism about mental content, such as 
Sainsbury and Tye, it seems unmotivated to say that Oscar and Twin Oscar have distinct 
thoughts while Alf has the same thought in the actual and counterfactual case. Indeed, the 
puzzle they draw from the traditional cases is: How can it be that the subjects differ with 
respect to their thoughts? Needless to say, claiming without further explanation that they do 
not does nothing to solve the puzzle. Also, if holding that Alf has the same thought in the 
actual and counterfactual situation, the originalist account provides even less of a solution to 
the classical puzzle; we seem to be at the same place we were pre originalism. We still need 
to explain how intrinsic duplicates can differ with respect to their mental content as a result of 
a difference in their linguistic community. Based on the way the puzzle is set up, however, I 
suspect originalists would prefer the first route, saying that arthritis and tarthritis are distinct 
concepts. The first route is better in the sense that it aims at a contribution to the classical 
debate, but the route rests on stipulations that are not apriori guaranteed. Further, even if such 
stipulations are made, the originalist solution does not solve the puzzle of how intrinsic 
duplicates can differ with respect to their mental content, which is what the original puzzle of 
twins is really about. 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
The reason given to believe originalism is that the theory supposedly solves the classical 
puzzles of thought: “Which view is ultimately superior depends on which view offers the best 
account of the various puzzles of thought” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 115). Hence, the 
plausibility of originalism turns on its ability to solve the classical puzzles. In this chapter I 
have argued that the originalist solutions to three of the puzzles are unsatisfactory. I started 
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out by arguing that the solution given to the puzzle of Paderewski fails. The reason is that an 
appeal to false higher order beliefs generates even more sets of contradictory beliefs, 
threatening the account of Peter’s being rational. One cannot explain someone being rational 
in holding contradictory first order beliefs if one then ends up having to attribute even more 
(in fact an infinite number of) sets of contradictory higher order beliefs to the individual. 
I then argued that Sainsbury and Tye’s solution to the puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus 
fails. This is because they cannot explain how identity statements can be informative in the 
sense that they potentially provide new information about the world. They are committed to 
the view that such discoveries only amount to cognitive discoveries. But explaining how 
informative identity statements potentially involve making a discovery about the world is at 
the core of the original puzzle stemming from Frege. Sainsbury and Tye thus fail to explain 
the central feature of the puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus.   
I also argued that the originalist interpretation of the puzzle of twins is misguided. I then 
argued that their solution to the original puzzle is irrelevant, and that their solution to the 
puzzle they draw from the original puzzle depends on serious stipulations and fails to reflect 
the difference between intrinsic duplicates having the same mental states on the one hand and 
their having distinct mental states on the other. Sainsbury and Tye take the puzzle of twins to 
be how intrinsic duplicates can differ with respect to their thoughts (vehicles of content). The 
classic debate, however, is concerned with how intrinsic duplicates can differ with respect to 
their mental content. Also, while originalism might be able to explain the difference in 
thoughts of inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth, they fail to explain the sameness in thought 
in cases where the thoughts have the same content. More precisely; for originalists it is of no 
importance that the watery stuff on Twin Earth is made up of XYZ; Oscar and Twin Oscar 
would have had thoughts of different types even if the watery stuff on Earth and Twin Earth 
had the exact same molecular structure. Hence, the originalist solution to the classic puzzle of 
twins is extremely limited, and the limitation is reflected in the key claims of originalism 
being compatible with both internalism and externalism about mental content. Furthermore, I 
showed that originalism cannot claim that Alf (from Burge’s (1979b) case) in the actual and 
counterfactual case have distinct thoughts without stipulating that arthritis and tarthritis have 
distinct origins. However, since the original thought experiment is silent on how the concepts 
originated, we have no reason to prefer this story to one in which arthritis and tarthritis have 
the same origin. If they have the same origins, Alf’s thoughts would be the same in both 
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cases, but the puzzle they pose based on Burge’s case is precisely how it is that the thoughts 
can differ. The originalist solution thus does not seem to add anything to our theorising. 
Solving the seven puzzles of thought is the raison d'être of originalism. Hence, if I am right 
that originalism fails to solve the puzzles addressed in this chapter, this casts doubt on the 
theory. In the next chapter I will challenge originalism further. I will put forth a thought 
experiment that is supposed to establish that originalism about concepts and thoughts cannot 
give a sufficient explanation of rationality – which is one of the central explanatory roles of 
thoughts. The upshot of the thought experiment is that, if taking concepts to be public and 
individuated by way of their origin, this cannot provide a general account of the cognitive role 
of thoughts. Since in Seven Puzzles of Thought Sainsbury and Tye are mostly concerned with 
the seven puzzles, and give no explicit statement of what a general theory of concepts and 
thoughts would be, I make certain suggestions to this on their behalf. More precisely, I 
propose two different approaches and argue that both fail to explain certain cases of 
rationality. 
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Chapter 5 
Originalism and Rationality 
	  
 
One of the central explanatory roles of thoughts is to explain rational cognition. Any	  general	  theory	  of	   thought	  must	  be	  able	   to	  accommodate	   this.	   In	   this	  chapter	  we	  shall	  see	  how	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye’s	  originalism	  deals	  with	  this	  task;	  it	  appears	  that	  their	  theory	  cannot	  explain	  certain	  cases	  of	  rationality,	  or	  so	  I	  will	  argue. First, let us bring to mind Sainsbury 
and Tye’s central claims: 
Atomic concepts are to be individuated by their historic origins, as opposed to their 
semantic or epistemic properties. Distinct concepts have different origins, and may not 
differ intrinsically. Originalists reject the view that cognitive differences need to be 
explained by semantic differences. […] Individuating concepts in a non-semantic way 
shows that the explanation does not rely on semantic properties of the concepts 
themselves (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 40).  
As they present their account in Seven Puzzles of Thought, it is not clear exactly what view 
Sainsbury and Tye take on cognition in general. Their explanation of cognitive significance in 
terms of cognitive processing effort together with the claim that thinkers only stand in relation 
to syntactic features and not directly to the semantic properties of thoughts, indicates that their 
account resembles that of Fodor in his (1980), where he advocates his version of CTM. There 
are, however, some important differences between the two theories. For instance, Fodor 
argues that proponents of CTM are committed to saying that mental states can only be distinct 
if the syntactic features are distinct: “Fix the subject and the relation, and then mental states 
can be (type) distinct only if the representations which constitutes their objects are formally 
distinct” (Fodor 1980, 652). That is, there cannot be equivocality in the language of thought. 
Applied to the originalist framework, this is the claim that a difference in reference indicates a 
difference in vehicles. Sainsbury and Tye, on the other hand, reject this view when they say 
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that concept tokens of the same type may differ semantically. However, if what accounts for 
cognitive significance are the vehicles of content, it seems plausible that two mental states 
that differ in content must also differ at the level of vehicles. I will show that if the correct 
understanding of their theory is that cognitive significance essentially depends on the vehicles 
rather than content, they fail to account for certain cases of cognitive significance if allowing 
a difference in reference without a difference in vehicles in the mind of a single individual. If 
thinking doesn’t involve standing in a relation to the content of thoughts, we should expect 
that if there are differences between two mental states due to a difference in representational 
content, this difference should be reflected in what thinking does involve standing in a 
relation to; the vehicles of content. In the first part of this chapter I will put forth a thought 
experiment that shows that a result of Sainsbury and Tye’ account is that it is possible for 
concept tokens to express distinct (even contradictory) content within one individual and still 
be of the same type at the level of vehicles, and that this causes severe difficulties for the 
explanation of rational cognition in these cases.50  
It might be objected that Sainsbury and Tye are not committed to the strong claim that every 
instance of cognitive significance must be explained by appeal to vehicles alone. Even though 
they explain the seven puzzles in terms of vehicles, it might be that when giving a general 
theory of cognitive significance they can appeal directly to the reference of thoughts in order 
to explain cognitive significance. If this is the case, they can avoid the criticism I put forth in 
5.2. However, in 5.3 I expand the thought experiment in order to argue that even if Sainsbury 
and Tye can appeal to semantics when accounting for cognitive significance, there are still 
cases that cannot be solved within their framework. They fail at explaining rational cognition. 
First, I present the thought experiment. 
 
5.1 The Thought Experiment 
Consider the following case. At some point in history (1300 AD, say) an individual uses the 
concept ohun for the first time. This individual intends to use the concept to pick out anything 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  The	   thought	   experiment	   is	   developed	   as	   a	   criticism	   of	   originalism	   in	   particular	   and	   is	   in	   no	   way	  intended	  as	  an	  argument	  against	  theories	  holding	  that	  cognitive	  significance	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  syntactic	   features	   in	  general.	  Giving	  a	  general	  argument	  against	  all	  such	  theories	   is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis;	  here	  I	  will	  simply	  explore	  and	  criticise	  the	  consequences	  of	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye’s	  formulation	  of	  originalism.	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that is an object (much like our concept object); for her, if something is an object it is an 
ohun. As the years go by, this use of the concept ohun becomes standardized in the 
individual’s community. Anybody using the concept ohun intends to use it the same way as 
the others in their language community. When someone in the fifteenth century uses the 
concept ohun, she is deferring to earlier uses of the concept and the chain of deference goes 
all the way back to the point in history at which the concept was intentionally used for the 
first time. According to originalism, then, everybody in this language community is using the 
same concept ohun as did the first person to intentionally introduce the concept. 
In 1500 two groups of people decide to emigrate from the ohun-using community. One of the 
groups, call it group A, settles down on the west coast, while the other group, call it group B, 
settles down at the east coast. For five hundred years the two groups have no interaction with 
each other or their old community. As it happens, the two groups’ concept ohun gradually 
change their reference. Group A’s concept gradually comes to pick out only blue objects. The 
shift of reference happens without any intentional refixing of the reference or any mayor 
deviations from standard use being made regarding the concept’s reference. This is analogous 
to the case addressed by Sainsbury and Tye when they account for the change of reference of 
the concept meat (see 2.4). Meat originally picked out anything edible, but as time went by, 
the concept gradually changed its reference as to pick out only animal flesh. According to the 
originalists, this is not an instance of conceptual fission, since the development happened 
gradually and no use qualifying as an originating use. Instead it is an instance of a concept 
staying the same but with a change in reference. When people today use the concept meat to 
pick out animal flesh they use the same concept as did the 1500th century people using the 
concept to pick out anything edible: “our concept meat is the same as the earlier concept 
meat. The basis for this is simply the smooth history, the concept being handed on in ways 
that unquestionably make new users count as users of the concept, even if mistakes were 
made about its referent” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 72). In my thought experiment the change in 
reference of the concept ohun happens in the exact same way: There is a smooth history and 
at no point did anybody not count as users of the concept. As in the case of meat, small 
deviations from standard use of the concept ohun occur along the way, but none of the 
mistakes are noticeable and sufficient for introduction of a new concept (see 2.4 for 
originalism and change in reference). Hence, Sainsbury and Tye must say that group A uses 
the same concept ohun as did the community they emigrated from 500 years earlier; the chain 
of deference goes all the way back to the point in history at which ohun was first used to pick 
	   64	  
out anything edible. 
As it happens, group B also has a change in the reference of the concept ohun: Gradually 
ohun comes to pick out any object that is not blue. This shift in reference is completely 
analogous the change in reference of ohun in group A: The shift happens without any 
intentional refixing of the reference or any mayor error being made about the concept’s 
reference. Hence, following Sainsbury and Tye’s handling of the concept meat, group B is 
using the same concept ohun as did the community they emigrated from. When someone in 
group B is using the concept ohun, the chain of deference goes all the way back to the point in 
history at which ohun was first used to pick out any object.  
Now, the originalists must say that group A and group B are using the same concept ohun 
since their concepts have the same origin; the point in history at which ohun was first used to 
pick out anything that is an object: “Concept C1 = concept C2 iff the originating use of C1 = 
the originating use of C2” (Sainsbury &Tye 2011, 4). One of the key claims of originalism, 
recall, is that the origin of a concept is the origin of one concept only, so there can only be one 
concept ohun that is used both by group A and group B. But remember that the reference of 
the concept is distinct when tokened by individuals in the two groups:51 
Group A: ohun refers only to objects that are blue 
Group B: ohun refers only to object that are not blue 
For simplicity, I will refer to group A and group B’s use of the concept ohun as ohun(A) and 
ohun(B) respectively. It is important to keep in mind that the difference in notation only 
reflects a difference in reference, and not a difference in concepts. At no point do the 
individuals in group A or group B use the notation themselves; they simply use ohun.  
Now, even though ohun(A) and ohun(B) are the same concept, according to originalism, they 
express incompatible content. A rational individual can never knowingly use the concept 
ohun to pick out both only blue objects and only objects that aren’t blue by the same concept 
token: If something is correctly taken to be ohun(A) it cannot also be ohun(B); something 
cannot both be a blue object and an object that isn’t blue at the same time. Hence, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  According	  to	  Frege,	  the	  mode	  of	  presentation	  determines	  the	  reference	  of	  concepts	  and	  thoughts,	  so	  a	  difference	  in	  reference	  implies	  a	  difference	  in	  mode	  of	  presentation.	  In	  contrast,	  originalists	  take	  concepts	  to	  be	   individuated	  by	   their	  origins	  alone,	  so	  according	   to	  originalism,	  a	  difference	   in	  reference	  does	  not	  necessitate	  a	  difference	  in	  concepts	  and	  thought.	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thoughts that is an ohun(A) and that is an ohun(B), where the indexical expression ‘that’ refers 
to the same object, can never both be true at the same time; the sets of worlds in which the 
two thoughts are true are not overlapping. 
I will now take the thought experiment one step further. One day one of the members of group 
A goes on a journey. After a while this individual, let’s call her Indira, settles down on the 
east coast together with group B. Gradually she becomes aware of group B’s different use of 
the concept ohun. Importantly, according to originalism she does not acquire a new concept 
upon her arrival: Group A and group B share the concept ohun since their concepts have the 
same origin. Instead she acquires a new way of using her old concept. In addition to using 
ohun to pick out only blue objects, Indira now comes to use the concept to pick out only 
objects that are not blue. When interacting with people in group B Indira defers to the 
standard use of ohun in this language community, and hence use the concept to pick out only 
objects that are not blue. When talking on the phone or writing letters to people from group A 
she defers to their use of the concept ohun and therefore use the concept to pick out only blue 
objects. When she is not interacting with any other persons, but forming thoughts in her own 
company, she can use either ohun(A) or ohun(B), depending on whom she defers to. Further, 
Indira being an originalist herself and an enthusiastic researcher of the history of concepts, 
discovers the common origin of ohun(A) and ohun(B). Hence, she is well aware that the two 
groups share the same concepts ohun, but with different references. Indira is in a position to 
think such thoughts as that is an ohun(A), that is an ohun(B), that is not an ohun(A) and that is 
not an ohun(B). Of course, if that refers to the same object, all of these thoughts cannot be true 
at the same time, but that does not prevent Indira from having the disposition to form such 
thoughts since thoughts can be false. In 5.2 and 5.3 I will show that the thought experiment 
just outlined gives rise to worries regarding the explanation of rationality. The upshot is that a 
theory that takes cognitive significance to rely directly on vehicles of content individuated by 
way of their origins, cannot explain certain cases of someone being rational or irrational. 
First, in 5.2, I will show that Sainsbury and Tye cannot give a general account of rationality 
without taking cognitive significance to depend directly on semantic features of concepts and 
thoughts if at the same time allowing that concepts of the same type may come to express 
contradictory content. 
 
	   66	  
5.2 Equivocal Concepts and Rationality 
After settling down with group B, Indira’s use of the concept ohun becomes equivocal:52 She 
may use the concept either to refer to blue objects or objects that are not blue, depending on 
the context (i.e. to whom she defers). When asked by someone in group B if she believes that 
sapphires are ohuns, Indira gives a positive response. When asked the same question during a 
phone call with someone from group A, Indira gives a negative answer. It then seems corrects 
that Indira has the belief sapphires are ohuns(A) and also that she has the belief sapphires are 
not ohuns(B). Both of these thoughts are true, since sapphires are in fact blue. The set of 
worlds in which the thoughts are true is the same: In every world where the thought sapphires 
are ohuns(A) is true, necessarily the thought sapphires are not ohuns(B) is also true, and vice 
versa. Hence, intuitively it seems exceedingly plausible that Indira is able to entertain both 
beliefs at the same time and still be rational. If we only appeal to the thought (meaning 
vehicle) and not semantics, we could give the following set of claims regarding Indira’s 
beliefs: 
B1.   Indira believes that sapphires are ohuns 
B2.   Indira believes that sapphires are not ohuns 
Both of these claims are true, but jointly they seem inconsistent. Recall what Sainsbury and 
Tye say about the necessary and sufficient conditions for thoughts being contradictory: 
“inconsistent thoughts are contradictory iff one consists of the other embedded in a concept 
for negation. If one thought contains a nominal concept, a contradiction must contain the 
same nominal concept at the corresponding position in the structure” (Sainsbury & Tye 2012, 
135). In our case Indira’s thought in (B1) is embedded in a concept of negation in (B2), so her 
beliefs must be contradictory on Sainsbury and Tye’s view. Since her thoughts are 
contradictory (and Indira is well aware of this) it seems that she must be counted irrational, 
but intuitively she is not.  
Further, it seems plausible that Indira cannot have both the belief that sapphires are ohuns(A) 
and sapphires are ohuns(B) and still be counted as rational. This is because Indira is well 
aware that the two thoughts could never both be true at the same time: The sets of worlds in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  I	  use	  the	  term	   ’equivocal’	   to	  apply	  to	  concepts	   that	  are	  of	   the	  same	  type	  but	   that	  have	  more	  than	  one	  possible	   content.	   In	   language,	   being	   equivocal	   means	   that	   words	   that	   are	   spelled	   and	   pronounces	   the	  same	  way	  may	  differ	   in	  meaning.	  My	  use	  of	   the	   term	   is	   somewhat	   stronger;	   the	  equivocal	   concepts	   I’m	  concerned	  with	  are	  of	  the	  very	  same	  type	  due	  to	  having	  the	  same	  origin.	  
	   67	  
which the two thoughts are true are not overlapping; something cannot be both a blue object 
and not a blue object at the same time. However, according to originalism the two thought 
tokens are of the same type since they share the same structure and concepts: All of the 
concepts figuring in the first thought have the same origin as the corresponding concepts in 
the other. But then it seems that the two thoughts must play the same cognitive role, according 
to originalism. But if the two thoughts play the same cognitive role, how can Indira be 
irrational if having both beliefs? Further, consider the thought ohuns(A) are ohuns(B). If 
originalism is true, the thought involves an identity statement between two concept tokens of 
the same type.53 Hence, the statement should be trivial, following Sainsbury and Tye. 
However, the statement is not trivial, let alone true. It is not trivial that objects that are blue 
are not blue. Recall how Sainsbury and Tye explain the triviality of identity statements 
between two concept tokens of the same type: “whatever processing effort is required has 
already been made by the time the second occurrence of the concept is encountered; the 
previous interpretive outcome can simply be brought forward” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 54). 
But this seems clearly not to be the case in the scenario just outlined. For Indira to think that 
something is ohun(A) clearly involves other cognitive processes than thinking that something 
is ohun(B), otherwise the thought ohuns(A) are ohuns(B) would be trivial, and it is clearly not. 
According to originalism, the only difference between ohun(A) and ohun(B) is their reference. 
But then it seems clear that the difference in cognitive processing must be directly linked to 
the semantic features of the thought. Since Sainsbury and Tye hold that thinkers only are 
related to content indirectly, via vehicles, it is not clear how they their theory can 
accommodate this observation. 
Further, if Indira wants a blue bike and forms the belief that bike is an ohun(A) she would be 
rational in buying that bike. However, had she instead formed the belief that bike is an ohun(B) 
she would not be rational in buying the bike if what she wants is a blue bike. But according to 
originalism, the thoughts are of the same type, since they contain the same concepts structured 
the same way. Also, since Indira is stipulated to be rational, the two thoughts have different 
causal powers; the thought that bike is an ohun(A) would cause Indira to buy the bike, whereas 
the thought that bike is an ohun(B) would not cause her to buy the bike, given that she only 
wants a bike that is blue. The fact that the two thoughts have different causal powers indicates 
that they must play different roles in cognition. If rationality is explained in terms of vehicles 
individuated by their origins, however, we cannot explain why the two thoughts have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Note	  again	  that	  the	  thoughts	  are	  not	  to	  be	  individuated	  even	  partly	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  contents.	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different causal powers in Indira’s mind, since, on this view, the thoughts must be of the same 
type; and hence they should play the same role in cognition. On this picture, what explains 
Indira being rational – and thus her behaviour – is the semantic properties of the concepts and 
not their origins.  
In the case of Hesperus is Phosphorus, recall, the difference in concept types reflects a 
difference in the thinker’s relation to the referent. In the case of Hesperus is Hesperus the 
sameness in concepts reflects a sameness in relation to the reference. In the case of ohuns(A) 
are ohuns(B), then, the concepts being of the same type indicates a sameness of relation to 
reference. The sameness of relation, however, is directed towards two distinct sets of objects. 
In certain cases it may make sense to say that someone has the same relation to distinct 
referents; these are cases in which someone wrongly takes two objects or individuals to be the 
same (such cases are often labelled inverse Paderewski cases (Recanati 2012, 116)). In the 
case just outlined, however, Indira is not wrong about the nature of the reference of ohun(A) 
and ohun(B), so intuitively Indira does not relate to the two references in the same way. 
Indira’s relation to the references, then, is not in proportion with the number of concepts she 
possesses if one takes concepts to be individuated by their origins. This indicates that 
Sainsbury and Tye cannot give a general account of cognitive significance in terms of 
vehicles alone, since the way a thinker relates to the content of her thought may not be 
reflected in the number of concepts deployed in thought. 
Let me illustrate further. Deductive reasoning involves reaching a conclusion by way of 
premises and logical rules. A deduction is valid only if the rules of deductive logic are 
followed. Now, consider the following. This deduction seems clearly valid: 
(1)     P1: If something is an ohun then it is blue  
P2: The book is an ohun 
C: The book is blue 
From ((Ox→Bx) & Ox) one is entitled to conclude Bx, and hence a person would be rational 
in concluding from the deduction that the book is blue. (Given the sufficient logical abilities) 
it would be irrational for a person to claim that the deduction is not valid. Now, consider the 
following. One day Indira thinks the following deduction to herself:  
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(2)     P1: If something is an ohun(A) then it is blue 
P2: The book is an ohun(B) 
C: The book is blue 
Indira, being a competent logician and a rational individual, thinks that this is not a valid 
deduction54. It does not follow that an object that is not blue is in fact blue, so her thinking 
that the deduction is invalid is rational. However, keep in mind that the label ohun(A) and 
ohun(B) is just my notational tool: it does not reflect a difference in concept, only a difference 
in reference. If cognitive significance turns on the vehicles of content and such entities are 
individuated by their origins, the two concept tokens should play the same cognitive role, 
since they have the same origin: “originalists reject the view that cognitive differences need to 
be explained by semantic differences […] Individuating concepts in a non-semantic way 
shows that the explanation does not rely on semantic properties of the concepts themselves” 
(Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 40). Reporting Indira’s thoughts purely in terms of meaning 
vehicles would give the following deduction: 
P1: If something is an ohun then it is blue  
P2: The book is an ohun 
C: The book is blue 
But this is the same as (1), and this seems clearly valid. If cognitive significance turns on the 
vehicles of content and such entities are individuated by their origins, when entertained in 
thought, (1) and (2) should play the same cognitive role since the arguments share every 
concept and are structured the same way. However, (2) contains important information – 
information about the reference – that (1) does not contain. Hence, if concepts are 
individuated by their origins, Indira being rational in rejecting the deduction as invalid cannot 
be explained in terms of meaning vehicles; rather, the explanation relies directly on the 
content of her thoughts. 
Now, consider a further case. The following deduction seems invalid: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Hence,	  Indira	  only	  considers,	  without	  endorsing,	  this	  deduction.	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(3)     P1: Something is an ohun if and only if it is blue 
P2: The book is not an ohun 
C: The book is blue 
One is not entitled to move from ((Ox↔Bx) & ¬Ox) to Bx. One can only infer one side of a 
biconditional if given the other side. In this case, at the syntactic level, one is not given one of 
the sides in the biconditional, but rather the negation of the left hand side. (Given the 
sufficient logical abilities) it seems that one would be irrational to deem this deduction valid. 
Now consider the following. One day Indira performs the following deduction in thought: 
(4)     P1: Something is an ohun(A) if and only if it is blue 
P2: The book is not an ohun(B) 
C: The book is blue 
We have the implicit premise (P3) ohun(B) = ¬ohun(A), regarding the content of the concept 
tokens. In this case, since we know that the use of ohun(B) is a negation of the use of ohun(A), 
we can use the double negation rule of classical logic and infer from ¬¬ohun(A) that ohun(A). 
Hence, we are given the left hand side of the biconditional of (P1) from (P2) together with the 
rule of double negation. We are then entitled to move from ((Ox↔Bx) & Ox) to Bx. Hence, 
Indira is to be considered rational when thinking that this deduction is valid. However, when 
reporting Indira’s beliefs purely in terms of meaning vehicles the deduction would look like 
this: 
P1: Something is an ohun if and only if it is blue 
P2: The book is not an ohun 
C: The book is blue 
But this is the same as (3), and this seems clearly invalid. Note that we cannot use the rule of 
double negation on (3) because there is no implicit premise that allows us to take this move, 
since the deduction is purely syntactic, and at the level of syntax ohun(A) = ohun(B). If 
cognitive significance turns on the vehicles of content and such entities are individuated by 
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their origins, when entertained in thought, (3) and (4) should play the same cognitive role 
since the arguments share every concept and are structured the same way. However, (4) 
contains important information – information about the reference – that (3) does not contain. 
Hence, Indira being rational in thinking that the argument is valid cannot be explained in 
terms of meaning vehicles. Rather, the explanation depends directly on the semantic features 
of her thought.  
Sainsbury and Tye hold that “both being contradictory and being valid essentially depend on 
how many concepts are involved” (Sainsbury and Tye (forthcoming), 3-4). Whether this 
statement is true depends on what one takes a concept to be. I have shown that if concepts are 
taken to be mere meaning vehicles, individuated in terms of their origins, this statement does 
not hold. (1) and (2) contain the same meaning vehicles structured the same way, but (1) is 
valid whereas (2) is not. Likewise, (3) and (4) contain the same meaning vehicles structured 
the same way, but (3) is invalid and (4) is valid. In deductive reasoning a criterion for validity 
is that whenever there are equivocal terms in the premises, each token of the term must be 
interpreted the same way. The same holds when the deduction is entertained in thought; 
equivocal concepts must be interpreted in the same way in order for the deduction to be 
valid.55  For (1) to be valid the two occurrences of ohun must have the same content. If the 
content of the concepts tokens are distinct, however, someone may be rational in rejecting the 
deduction as invalid. Hence, an individual’s being rational or irrational when accepting (2) 
turns on the content of the concepts involved in the deduction rather than the vehicles of 
content individuated by their origin. If Indira rejects (2) she is rational since the argument is 
invalid. However, there is nothing in the formulation of (1) that accounts for her being 
rational in her rejecting the argument. It is only when we know the second formulation that 
we can explain her being rational in rejecting the deduction, but the only difference between 
(1) and (2) is semantic. Likewise, if Indira were to accept (2) she would be irrational. 
However, this cannot be explained in terms of vehicles since (1) seems valid. The explanation 
of her being rational or irrational, then, depends directly on semantic features rather than on 
the vehicles of content. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  For	   a	   similar	   point	   concerning	   the	   importance	   of	   this	   to	   deductions	   involving	   demonstratives,	   see	  Campbell	  (2002,	  ch.	  5).	  Campbell	  considers	  arguments	  of	  the	  form	  ‘(1)	  That	  is	  F.	  (2)	  That	  is	  G.	  Therefore	  (3)	  That	  is	  F	  and	  G’	  and,	  as	  Mole	  reads	  him,	  claims	  that	  they	  “depend	  for	  their	  validity	  on	  there	  being	  no	  possibility	   of	   equivocating	   on	   the	   meaning	   of	   ‘that’,	   as	   it	   occurs	   in	   the	   two	   separate	   premises.	   Such	  arguments	  can	  only	  figure	  in	  rationally	  entitling	  reasoning	  so	  long	  as	  there	  is	  a	  single	  fixing	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘that’	  in	  both	  premises.”	  Campbell’s	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  reasoner’s	  avoiding	  such	  equivocation	  relies	  on	  her	  attention	  to	  the	  referents,	  and	  that	  in	  this	  way	  the	  role	  of	  attention	  is	  “analogous	  to	  the	  role	  played	  by	  a	  Fregean	  Sense”	  (Mole	  2013).	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Further, Indira would be rational in accepting (4) as valid. However, if we only look at the 
vehicles as in (3), the argument seems invalid and she would have to be counted irrational if 
accepting it. Further, if Indira rejects (4) she would be irrational, but if we only consider the 
vehicles she would be counted rational when rejecting the deduction. If taking ohun(A) and 
ohun(B) to be of the same type, the only difference between (3) and (4) is due to semantics. 
Hence, the explanation of Indira being rational or irrational is semantic rather than syntactic. 
The upshot of this is that if taking cognitive significance to essentially depend on the vehicles 
of content rather than the content expressed, Sainsbury and Tye fail to explain certain cases of 
rationality since they allow for the number of concepts involved in thinking come apart from 
the number of possible contents expressed by such entities. According to originalism, thinkers 
are only related to content via thoughts, but a result of their theory is that thoughts of the same 
type may be related to distinct content. In order to explain the case just outlined it seems that 
one must allow for cognitive significance to rely directly on content rather than vehicles. But 
Sainsbury and Tye deny that thinking involves standing in a relation to any kind of content, 
and hence the theory fails to account for Indira being rational. Since originalism cannot 
explain certain cases of rationality, the theory fails as a general account of the nature of 
concepts and thoughts. 
When setting forth the thought experiment I’ve worked on the assumption that Sainsbury and 
Tye hold that every instance of cognitive significance can be explained by appeal to vehicles 
of content, rather than the content expressed by such entities. It may, however, be objected 
that Sainsbury and Tye are not committed to such a strong claim. Even if they hold that the 
seven puzzles can be explained by appeal to vehicles alone it may be that they hold that other 
cases of cognitive significance can only be explained by taking the reference into account. If 
this is the case, the thought experiment, the way it was just presented, does not serve as a 
criticism of the theory, but rather as a qualification of the view, illustrating that originalists 
must in fact take reference into account when explaining certain cases of cognitive 
significance. However, by making some adjustments to the thought experiment I will, in 5.3, 
show that even if allowing the reference to be part of the explanation, there are still certain 
cases of cognitive significance that cannot be explained within Sainsbury and Tye’s 
framework. Importantly, Sainsbury and Tye’s framework commits them to explaining 
cognitive significance in terms of vehicles and reference alone, both individuated historically. 
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5.3 The Thought Experiment Expanded 
Now, consider the following. After having lived with group B for some years, Indira travels 
on to a new location, and settles down at this location for 40 years. During this time, the 
concepts ohun(A) and ohun(B) have a new change in reference: Gradually, both group A and 
group B come to use the concept to pick out anything that is an object (just like the original 
concept ohun). The concepts are still the same type, since the change in reference is stipulated 
to be gradual and with every use involving deference to earlier uses. The situation, then, is 
this: Unbeknownst to Indira, ohun(A) and ohun(B) now have the same reference, and both uses 
of the concept have a different reference than she thinks.  
After having been away for 40 years, Indira returns to group B. Upon her arrival, nobody 
informs Indira of the change in reference of the concept ohun and for a long time Indira only 
encounters uses of the concept that do not reveal to her that there has been a change in 
reference. She hears people say such things as ‘many ohuns are pretty’ and ‘my ohuns occupy 
all the space in my living room’, but these kinds of sentences make sense to Indira even if she 
takes the utterer to mean only objects that are blue or only objects that are not blue, so she 
never questions the reference of ohun. Importantly, Indira still defers to the other people in 
her language community when using the concept ohun, so Sainsbury and Tye must say that 
Indira uses the same concept as does the others even if she makes a mistake about the 
reference of the public concept: again, “Concept possession is consistent with all sorts of 
mistakes and misunderstandings about the concept’s subject matter” (Sainsbury and Tye 
2012, 55). Furthermore, Sainsbury and Tye, recall, contrast indexical concepts with public 
concepts such as Paderewski, and claim the following about the latter: “It’s not up to 
individual users to settle anything about the nature or semantics of that concept” (Ibid., 52). 
Since Indira uses the public concept ohun, the content of her tokened concept should be the 
same as the public use, on this view.  
After her return, Indira is still able to form beliefs such as sapphires are ohuns(A) and 
sapphires are ohuns(B), and also sapphires are not ohuns(A) and sapphires are not ohun(B). 
This time, however, since the reference of ohun(A) and ohun(B) are the same – anything that is 
an objects – only the first set of beliefs is true. Still, to Indira it seems as though the thoughts 
sapphires are ohuns(A) and sapphires are ohuns(B) are contradictory, since she believes ohun(A) 
to refer to objects that are blue and ohun(B) to refer to objects that are not blue. Hence, if 
Indira were to form both beliefs she would be irrational. Likewise, just like before the second 
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change in reference, Indira would be rational in forming both the beliefs Sapphires are 
ohuns(A) and sapphires are not ohuns(B). However, since after the second change in reference 
the two thoughts share the same concepts with the same reference, except from the negation, 
the latter must be a denial of the first, according to Sainsbury and Tye. Hence, Indira should 
be counted irrational for forming both beliefs, but ex hypothesi she is not. This shows that, 
somehow, Indira’s beliefs about the reference of ohun(A) and ohun(B) must be relevant to the 
cognitive role of her thoughts. The question, then, is in what sense Indira’s beliefs about the 
reference is relevant to the explanation of cognitive significance. There are three possibilities 
available to Sainsbury and Tye: (a) they could say that Indira uses only one concept with the 
same reference. If this is the case, they must appeal to something else than their core 
framework in order to explain Indira being rational; more specifically Indira being wrong 
about the content of her beliefs; (b) they could hold that Indira’s beliefs are the same at the 
level of vehicles but that they differ in content due to Indira’s beliefs about the reference of 
the concept; or (c) they could hold that Indira’s beliefs are essential for the individuation of 
the concept ohun, and thus say that her thoughts contain distinct concepts. I will show that 
none of these routes are viable: Route (a) fails, and route (b) and (c) are not available to 
Sainsbury and Tye’s originalism. 
The first possibility is to explain the difference in cognitive significance of the two thoughts 
in a similar way to how Sainsbury and Tye explain the puzzle of Paderewski. The case just 
outlined bears similarity to the puzzle of Paderewski, but it also differs from Kripke’s puzzle 
in some important respects. First, while everyone who takes concepts to be public should 
agree that Peter only uses one concept Paderewski, not everyone who takes concepts to be 
public have to agree that Indira only uses one concept ohun. The reason why Sainsbury and 
Tye must say that Indira only uses one concept ohun, is that they take concepts to be 
individuated by their origins, and the fact that they hold that a difference in content does not 
necessitate a difference in concepts; theories who reject these claims would have no problem 
explaining Indira being rational. Further, and importantly, unlike Peter, Indira is not wrong 
about the number of concepts she uses. Hence, Indira’s having a false second order belief is 
not due to her being wrong about the number of concepts deployed in thought – the knows the 
relevant concepts to have the same origin. This shows that their solution to the Paderewski 
case is not applicable here. Instead, Sainsbury and Tye may say that Indira having a false 
second order belief about the content of her first order beliefs. This route is available to 
Sainsbury and Tye due to them holding that individuals can be wrong about the content of 
	   75	  
their concepts as well as the vehicles (see footnote 41 on page 43 in this thesis).	  The question 
we wish to explain is this: How can it be that Indira can have contradictory beliefs56 and still 
be counted rational? The suggestion is that one could try appealing to Indira having a false 
belief about the content of her beliefs sapphires are not ohuns(B) and sapphires are ohuns(A), 
in order to explain her being rational. The explanation would then look like this: When 
forming the belief sapphires are not ohuns(B), Indira is rational since she believes that she 
does not already have a belief with contradictory content to the content expressed by her new 
thought (to be sure, let’s say one of Indira’s friends from group B, who has previously heard 
Indira say that she believes that sapphires are ohuns, asks her if she is sure she doesn’t 
already have a belief with contradictory content; Indira would give a negative answer). 
However, if someone from group A was to ask her the same question, she would tell them 
that she has a belief that expresses a contradictory content to the thought sapphires are not 
ohuns(A) (namely the belief sapphires are ohuns(A)). After the second change in reference, 
however, the content of Indira’s belief sapphires are not ohuns(A) and sapphires are not 
ohuns(B), are exactly the same: the set of worlds in which sapphires are not objects. Hence the 
two thoughts share the same structure and express the same content. How can it be then, that 
Indira, being rational, can have both the belief that she does not have a belief with 
contradictory content to the content expressed by the thought sapphires are ohuns and at the 
same time think that she does have a belief with contradictory content to the content 
expressed by the thought sapphires are ohuns? 	  
One could try to appeal to Indira being wrong about the content of these new contradictory 
beliefs. To be clear, Indira’s two new contradictory beliefs are the following: Let (Q1) be the 
belief that she does not have a belief with contradictory content to the content expressed by 
the thought sapphires are not ohuns57. Let (Q2) be the belief that she does have a belief with 
contradictory content to the content expressed by the thought sapphires are not ohuns. Given 
that the two thoughts contain the same public concepts (except for the negation) with the 
same public content, these thoughts seem clearly contradictory. We need to explain how 
Indira could be rational in forming (Q2) after having formed (Q1). One could try appealing to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Note	  that	  since	  on	  this	  version	  of	  the	  thought	  experiment,	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  do	  not	  need	  to	  appeal	  to	  vehicles	  alone	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  cognitive	  significance,	  two	  thoughts	  are	  contradictory	  only	  if	  they	  share	  a	   complete	   tree	   structure	   except	   from	   one	   negating	   the	   other	   and	   if	   they	   also	   express	   contradictory	  content	  (i.e.	  they	  can	  never	  both	  be	  true	  since	  the	  sets	  of	  worlds	  in	  which	  they	  are	  true	  do	  not	  overlap).	  57	  The	   notation	   ’ohun(A)	   ’	   and	   ’ohun(B)’,	   recall,	   was	   intruduced	   as	   a	   notational	   tool	   in	   order	   to	   reflect	   a	  difference	   in	   reference.	   Importantly,	   the	  notations	  do	  not	   reflect	  an	   individual’s	  own	  conception	  of	  –	  or	  beliefs	  about	   the	  reference.	  Since,	  after	   the	  second	  change	   in	  reference	   there	  are	  no	   longer	   two	  distinct	  public	  contents,	  I	  will	  not	  use	  the	  notation	  further	  in	  this	  chapter;	  I	  will	  simply	  use	  ohun.	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Indira having a false belief that she does not already have a belief with contradictory content 
to (Q2). However, if asked by someone from group B if she already has a belief expressing 
contradictory content to (Q2), she would say that she does have such a belief.58 If explaining 
these contradictory beliefs in terms of Indira having false beliefs about the content of these, 
we would end up with even more sets of higher order contradictory beliefs about the content 
of her thoughts. As I have argued, one cannot explain someone being rational in having 
seemingly contradictory first order beliefs by appeal to false higher order beliefs if one ends 
up having to attribute even more sets of contradictory beliefs the further up the chain. Hence, 
this route fails to explain Indira’s being rational. 
The second possibility is for the originalist to say that the content of Indira’s concept tokens 
are not the same as in the public use. Rather, the contents of Indira’s concept tokens are the 
same as before she left the group more than 40 years ago. This case, then, resembles the case 
of Madagascar, addressed in 2.4. Marco Polo, recall, used the same concept Madagascar as 
the locals, but with a different reference despite intending to use the concept the same way as 
the locals. On this picture, Indira uses the concept ohun with a different content than others in 
her community despite of her deferring to the others’ uses. In 2.4, however, I argued that even 
if Sainsbury and Tye allow for these kinds of situations, it is mysterious how they are to be 
explained. Since, according to Sainsbury and Tye, the content of concepts are determined by a 
deference to the public use, and does in no way depend on any such thing as the thinker’s 
cognitive content, it seems that these kinds of scenarios shouldn’t be possible. If Sainsbury 
and Tye wish to explain Indira’s being rational in terms of her concepts having distinct 
reference, then, they must abandon the claim that the content of concepts are to be 
individuated historically. But if they take the reference to be determined by a thinker’s 
cognitive content (in the sense of associated descriptions) we are no longer operating within a 
Kripkean/Millian framework. One of the main motivations behind originalism is to explain 
Fregean data within a Millian framework, so this route is not viable to the originalist. Unless 
originalists can give an account of change in reference without appealing to a thinker’s own 
associated descriptions – and at the present moment it is hard to see how they can provide 
such an account – this route is not available to them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  To	  be	  clear,	  the	  reason	  why	  she	  would	  answer	  differently	  when	  asked	  by	  someone	  in	  group	  A	  and	  group	  B	   is	   because	   she	   has	   a	   false	   belief	   about	   the	   content	   of	   the	   public	   concept	   ohun:	   Just	   like	   Peter	   in	   the	  Paderewski	  case	  was	  assuming	  his	  two	  friends	  to	  be	  asking	  him	  about	  distinct	  individuals	  when	  enquiring	  him	   about	   Paderewski,	   Indira	  wrongly	   takes	   people	   in	   group	   A	   and	   group	   B	   to	   ask	   question	   involving	  concept	  tokens	  with	  contradictory	  content	  when	  asking	  her	  question	  involving	  the	  concept	  ohun.	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The last possibility is to say that Indira’s beliefs about the reference – i.e. her conception of it 
– are essential to the individuation of the vehicles. On this route cognitive content (in the 
sense of associated beliefs) is at least partly essential to the individuation of concepts. One 
could then say that, to Indira, ohun(A) and ohun(B) are distinct concepts due to the difference in 
associated content, and then explain the difference in cognitive significance in terms of a 
difference in vehicles. This, however, violates key assumptions of originalism, according to 
which the vehicles are to be individuated by the origins alone, and also the claim that 
cognitive significance can be explained without appeal to anything beyond vehicles and 
reference; especially without appeal to cognitive content. Hence, this route is not available to 
the originalist.  
Based on the account given in Seven Puzzles of Thought, I see no further explanations 
available to Sainsbury and Tye. This shows that there are cases in which cognitive 
significance cannot be explained by appeal to vehicles of content and reference alone, if 
taking such entities to be public and individuated historically. Hence, Sainsbury and Tye’s 
formulation of originalism fails as a general account of concepts and thoughts since it fails to 
explain certain cases of cognitive significance.  
 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have argued that originalism about concepts and thoughts is insufficient for 
giving a general account of rationality. I started by showing that, if allowing concepts to 
change their reference, it is possible for two concept tokens of the same type to express 
contradictory content. If one holds that cognitive significance is to be explained in terms of 
vehicles alone, two thoughts that share all compositional concepts and syntactic structure 
should play the same cognitive role. However, I have presented a case in which it seems that 
two such thoughts play different roles in cognition. For instance, (in the first formulation of 
the thought experiment) the thought sapphires are ohuns(A) is true while the thought sapphires 
are ohuns(B) is false, so they should play different cognitive roles, but if one, as the originalist 
does, takes cognitive significance to depend solely on public concepts - construed as vehicles 
of content - individuated by their origins, one must say that the thoughts are of the same type 
and thus the thoughts should play the same role in cognition. Someone forming both of the 
beliefs while knowing them to have distinct truth conditions would be irrational, but since the 
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thoughts (meaning vehicles) are the same, according to originalism, originalists would have to 
appeal to something else (plausibly semantic features) in order to explain rationality. Further, 
the thought ohuns(A) are ohuns(B) is an identity statement containing concept tokens of the 
same type, and it should therefor be trivial. However, the thought is not trivial, and the level 
of informativeness can only be explained by appeal to the content of the thought. 
It seems to follow from Sainsbury and Tye’s account that a subject who knowingly 
equivocates when performing a deduction in thought may nonetheless be counted rational.59 If 
someone can use concepts of the same type to express different contents, a deduction 
(involving those concepts) that would be valid at the level of syntax may be invalid when 
taking the content into account. Hence, if taking the cognitive processing involved in the 
deduction to essentially depend on the number of concepts (vehicles of content), this is 
insufficient for explaining why someone is rational or irrational in accepting the deductions 
I’ve presented as valid. The conclusion to draw from the thought experiment is this: If one 
allows the individuation of the vehicles of content to come apart from reference fixing, one 
cannot give a general account of rationality in terms of vehicles of content alone. In certain 
cases originalists must appeal directly to the content of concepts and thoughts rather than the 
vehicles of content.  
In the final part of this chapter, I argued that even if Sainsbury and Tye agree that certain 
cases of cognitive significance cannot be explained without appealing directly to the content 
of thoughts rather than the vehicles, their theory still fails at giving a general account of 
rationality. By making some adjustments to the original thought experiment, I argued that 
Sainsbury and Tye cannot explain how Indira can be rational in forming thoughts that to her 
seem consistent, but that in reality are contradictory due to the public use of the constituent 
concepts. In both 5.2 and 5.3, the problems posed for the theory was due to their claim that a 
change in content does not necessitate a change in vehicles. If Sainsbury and Tye did not 
allow for this, they could explain both versions of the thought experiment by appeal to a 
difference in vehicles. However, since the key originalist claim is that concepts are 
individuated by their origins and not by semantic or epistemic properties, it seems that the 
originalist framework cannot allow them to do this. Hence, if my argumentation is successful, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Note	  that	  some	  hold	  that	  one	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  be	  rational	  in	  engaging	  in	  equivocal	  (and	  hence	  invalid)	  reasoning.	  But	   in	   these	   cases,	   the	   subject	   equivocates	   unknowingly	   (due	   to	   slow	   switching)	   (cf.	   Gerken	  2013,	  Recanati	  2012)	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the thought experiment shows that Sainsbury and Tye’s originalist theory fails as a general 
theory of concepts and thoughts, since it fails to explain certain cases of rationality. 
In the next chapter I will look into possible solutions to my thought experiment on behalf of 
Sainsbury and Tye. More specifically, I will consider the possibility of them denying that 
ohun(A) is the same concept as ohun(B). If the concepts are not of the same type, the thought 
experiment is not effective. I will, however, argue that Sainsbury and Tye’s originalist 
account as stated in Seven Puzzles of Thought is in fact committed to saying that the concepts 
are of the same type. If the originalists cannot solve the puzzle posed for the theory in this 
chapter, the theory is rendered unattractive as a general account of concepts and thoughts. 
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Chapter 6 
Possible Solutions 
 
 
In chapter 4 I showed that Sainsbury and Tye’s originalism fails to solve three of the puzzles 
it is advanced to solve. In chapter 5 I argued, on the basis of a thought experiment, that their 
theory encounters further problems in accounting for certain cases of rationality. If my take 
on Sainsbury and Tye’s account is correct, the theory fails as a general theory of concepts and 
thoughts. In this chapter, I lay out what I take to be the most prominent objections to – and 
possible solutions of my thought experiment from chapter 5 on behalf of originalists.60 In 
particular, I look into the possibility of originalists denying that the concepts involved in the 
thought experiment, ohun(A) and ohun(B), really are concepts of the same type. If originalists 
can avoid claiming that the tokened concepts are of the same type, my thought experiment is 
ineffective. I will, however, argue that Sainsbury and Tye are committed to saying that 
ohun(A) and ohun(B) are of the same type. 
 
6.1 Giving an Alternative Explanation of Meat 
A possible solution to my thought experiment on behalf of Sainsbury and Tye may be to deny 
that ohun(A) and ohun(B) are the same concept. If they are not, the difference in cognitive 
significance of thoughts such as sapphires are ohuns(A) and sapphires are ohuns(B) can be 
explained by appeal to the meaning vehicles. Further, the deductions addressed in 5.2 could 
be explained by appeal to syntax; deduction (1) would be the same as deduction (2), and 
deduction (3) would be the same as (4). If this is the case, Indira’s being rational can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  More	  specifically,	  originalists	  who	  endorse	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye’s	  version	  of	  the	  theory	  (they	  make	  certain	  claims	  that	  not	  all	  originalists	  are	  committed	  to.)	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explained in terms of vehicles of content; also in the second formulation of the thought 
experiment. I will, however, show why this is not an option for proponents of originalism as 
stated in Seven Puzzles of Thought.  
Even though Sainsbury and Tye’s theory of how concepts acquire and maintain their content 
resembles Kripke’s causal theory of reference, they agree with Evans that in some cases, the 
content of concepts may change while the concepts remain the same. In the case of meat 
Sainsbury and Tye hold that the concept has remained the same but with a change in 
representational content; the thought squash is meat tokened by someone in the fifteenth 
century contains the same conceptual structure as when tokened by someone today, but the 
truth conditions of the two thought tokens are distinct. I have argued that the case of ohun is 
analogous to the case of meat. When discussing the case of meat, however, Sainsbury and Tye 
say that “another option is to say that a new concept, expressed by a word spelled and 
pronounced the same way, was introduced at some point, and each of the two concepts have 
retained their original and distinct contents” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 46). This might seem 
like a viable route for the originalists, but I will argue that this is not really an alternative for 
originalists that agree with Sainsbury and Tye’s conditions for being a non-originating use. 
These conditions are the following: 
1) The use involves deference to other uses, by the same subject or other subjects.  
2) The use involves informational accumulation from other uses, by the same subject 
or other subjects. (Sainsbury & Tye 2011, 2) 
The history of the concept meat is stipulated to satisfy both conditions: At no point in history 
did any user of meat not defer to other uses of the concept, and every individual in the chain 
of deference accumulated information about the concept from earlier uses by herself and 
others in her language community. The change in reference was not due to any intentional re-
fixing of the reference, but rather tiny unnoticeable deviations of standard use that are 
stipulated to be too small to make the use count as an originating use.61 However, it might be 
possible for the originalists to say that these unnoticeable deviations did in fact constitute an 
introduction of the concept meat that we use today. If this is the case, our concept meat is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  See	  2.4	  for	  criticism	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  concept	  may	  change	  its	  reference	  despite	  the	  user	  deferring	  to	  other	  uses.	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distinct from the concept meat in the fifteenth century.62 This move, however, is not a good 
option for originalists like Sainsbury and Tye that take concepts to be public. If the error 
regarding the reference of meat happened gradually and with no deviation being more serious 
than others, we are not given the equipment to decide where in the chain a new concept 
originated. If two deviations are equally serious and one of them constitutes the origin of a 
new concept, so should the other. And if we stipulate the total number of equally serious 
deviations in the history of the concept meat to be one thousand, say, it seems like if one of 
these is a deviation serious enough for the use to count as a originating use, so should the 
others. But then, instead of having two concepts meat we would have a thousand and one 
distinct concepts expressed by the same word. If all of these concepts survived through time, 
there is not one concept meat today but one thousand! But this seems implausible. Further, if 
the tiny deviations in the history of meat constitute the introduction of new concepts, the same 
might be the case with several of the public concepts you and I are taken to share on 
Sainsbury and Tye’s originalist framework. For instance, you might make a tiny deviation 
from standard use when using the concept chair, and so might I. If the deviations in the 
history of meat were serious enough to introduce a new concept, so might our deviations. 
Even though I defer to other people in my language community when using the concept chair 
it may be that I’ve made a small unnoticeable error regarding the reference of the concept (for 
instance, I might think that a broad chair is a sofa rather than a chair).  Further, the same 
might be the case with our concepts table, cat, tea and so on. It seems plausible that such tiny 
errors regarding the reference of a concept occur all the time: for instance, you and I could 
both be confused whether broad chairs are chairs or sofas; you might think they are chairs, 
whereas I think they are sofas. But then, if deviation from standard use is sufficient for the 
introduction of new concepts, it seems like you and I use distinct concepts from each other. 
Also, it might be the case that none of us qualifies as users of the public concept. Such cases 
are so common, that it seems to render the notion of public concepts that Sainsbury and Tye 
use with little or no explanatory value. If every tiny deviation were an instance of an 
introduction of a new concept most uses would be an originating use of a concept. Then 
deference would loose its utility, since one would have to grasp the reference of a concept 
completely in order to count as a user of a given public concept. This is too strong a demand, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  To	  be	  clear,	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  would	  not	  want	  to	  say	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  errors	  found	  in	  the	  history	  of	  meat	  are	  sufficient	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  concept;	  the	  sameness	  in	  the	  vehicles	  of	  content	  is	  ensured	  by	  deference	   to	   earlier	   uses,	   and	   concept	   possession	   is	   “consistent	   with	   all	   sorts	   of	   mistakes	   and	  misunderstandings	   about	   the	   concept’s	   subject	   matter”	   (Sainsbury	   and	   Tye	   2012,	   55).	   I	   present	   this	  possibility	  just	  in	  order	  to	  block	  this	  maneuver.	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and Sainsbury and Tye do not think that grasping the content of a concept is necessary for 
acquiring that concept. Hence, as long as originalists take concepts to be public, this is not a 
viable route. 
Another possible route is to deny that every deviation throughout the history of the concept 
meat constituted an introduction of a new concept, but that one did. However, this renders us 
with a situation resembling a sorites paradox: If one unnoticeable deviation does not 
constitute an originating use, neither should the next equally unserious deviation, nor should 
the third deviation, and so on. It then seems like no amount of such deviations can constitute 
an originating use, but on this alternative route suggested (but not taken) by Sainsbury and 
Tye, somewhere along the chain of deference a new concept should come into existence. 
Originalists hold that there is a unique point in history for each concept at which they come 
into existence. Hence, since a concept can only be used intentionally for the first time once, 
the point in history at which a concept come into existence cannot be fuzzy. The problem in 
the case of meat then, is that we are not given the equipment needed to decide at what point in 
the chain of deference a new concept come into existence. Hence, at best, this route leads to a 
paradox; if no single deviation from standard use is sufficient for the introduction of a new 
concept meat (and for the originalist there has to be exactly one such historical point at which 
the new concept was introduced), how can such an introduction take place when there’s a 
gradual drift? Originalism as stated in Seven Puzzles of Thought fails to give an account of 
how this can be the case. Given central claims of their originalist theory, then, it seems that 
Sainsbury and Tye are committed to treating the case of meat as a case of a concept staying 
the same but with a change in reference. In my thought experiment I took the history of ohun 
to be analogous to the history of meat. There is, however, one obvious difference between the 
two cases; in the case of ohun the same concept came to express contradictory contents at the 
same time in history, whereas the reference change in meat was so that the concept only had 
one content at a time. I will go on to discuss whether the originalist can say that the history of 
meat is a case in which a concept changes its content but remain the same type, whereas the 
case of ohun is a case of new concepts coming into being. 
 
	   84	  
6.2 The Case of Meat Being Different from the Case of Ohun 
One possible route might be for the originalist to say that the history of ohun is an instance of 
conceptual fission: at some point in history, the original concept ohun fissioned into two 
concepts; ohun(A) and ohun(B)63. If this is the case, neither group (A) nor group (B) use the 
same concept as the original concept ohun that originated in 1300. Ohun(A) originated when 
someone intentionally used the concept to pick out only objects that are blue for the first time, 
while ohun(B) originated when someone first used that concept to pick out only objects that 
are not blue. If this is the case, ohun(A) and ohun(B) are distinct concepts since they have 
distinct origins. This scenario, however, is blocked by the stipulations made in the thought 
experiment. I stipulated that every use of the concept ohun through the history involved 
deference to earlier uses and information accumulation from others in one’s language 
community, which is completely in line with originalism. Earlier in this chapter we saw that 
Sainsbury and Tye take this to be sufficient for the use to count as a non-originating use. But 
in 2.3 we saw that conceptual fission is a matter of new concepts originating. An originating 
use does not involve any deference to earlier uses, but rather the intention to introduce a not 
already existing concept. At no point during the history of ohun did anybody intend to 
introduce a new concept lexically identical to the already existing concept. Hence, since the 
people in group A and group B all intended to use the same concept ohun as others in their 
language community, it cannot be an instance of conceptual fission, since fission involves an 
intention to introduce a new concept.   
I will now look into a further suggestion as to how originalists can deny that ohun(A) and 
ohun(B) are the same concept, and argue that this route also fails. In Seven Puzzles of Thought 
Sainsbury and Tye describe the structure of the chains of deference having the same origin as 
a tree structure where all concept tokens belonging to one of the branches are of the same 
type: “For originalists, what makes two uses uses of the same concepts is their belonging to a 
single use-tree” (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, 88). Maybe it is possible for Sainsbury and Tye to 
reject the view that ohun(A) and ohun(B) are the same concept if modifying this claim. Perhaps 
they could say that concepts are of the same type if and only if they belong to the same branch 
of such a tree of deference.  That is to say, concepts are of the same type if and only if they 
have the same origin and belong to the same chain of deference. I will explore this possibility 
and show why it is an unattractive choice for originalists.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Where	  this	  time	  the	  notation	  (A)	  and	  (B)	  signals	  a	  difference	  in	  type	  of	  concept	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If one takes concepts to be of the same type only if they belong to the same chain of deference 
we could draw the following picture of Indira’s use of ohun. When using ohun(A), Indira 
defers to people in group A. When using ohun(B), she defers to people in group B. Since the 
chain of deference is distinct the concepts are distinct. In the case of meat, one could then 
argue that there is only one chain of deference, and this assures a conservation of the original 
concept. While this has the welcomed consequence that ohun(A) and ohun(B) are distinct 
concepts, it also follows that all concepts used by group A are distinct from the concepts used 
by group B, since the two groups always defer to different groups of people. Sainsbury and 
Tye cannot say this since they hold that concepts are public and sharable. If group A and 
group B do not count as users of the same concepts, as a result of them deferring to different 
groups of people, then it would seem as thought people in the US and people in the UK also 
use distinct concepts from each other. On this picture people in the US defer to other speakers 
in their community when using a concept, while people in the UK defer to the use of their 
locals when using a concept, and since they defer to different groups of people they do not 
count as users of the same concepts.64 Further, small children having just acquired a certain 
public concept may defer only to their parents when using that concept. Since small children 
defer to different uses (different sets of parents) it seems that they are using distinct concepts, 
on this picture. But even so, they are using the same concept as their parents, and the parents 
may defer to a larger group of people. If the parents in one community use the same concept, 
then, so should their children; identity is transitive, so if use (a) = use (b) and use (b) = use (c) 
then use (a) = use (c). However, if one must share a complete deferential chain in order to use 
the same concept, it seems as though the children cannot use the same concepts as each other. 
The same point holds for the case of ohun: Everyone in group A defers to earlier uses of the 
concept all the way back to the point in history at which ohun was first used to pick out 
anything that is an object. Hence the originalist must say that people in group A use the same 
concept as did people in the 14th century. The same holds for group B: Everyone in group B 
defers to earlier uses all the way back to the point in history at which ohun was first 
introduced. Hence, the originalist must say that they also use the same concept as did people 
in the 14th century. If group A uses the same concept as the original concept and group B also 
uses the same concept as the original concept, transitivity has it that the two groups must use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  A	  further	  problem	  with	  this	  route	  is	  how	  to	  determine	  where	  to	  draw	  the	  line	  between	  different	  groups.	  What	   are	   the	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   for	   someone	   being	   part	   of	   one	   group	   rather	   than	  another?	   And	  what	   should	   be	   said	   about	   individuals	   who	   seem	   to	   belong	   to	   two	   different	   groups,	   e.g.	  individuals	  who	  commute	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK?	  It	  seems	  strange	  to	  say	  that	  such	  individuals	  use	  different	  sets	  of	  concepts	  depending	  on	  their	  current	  location.	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the same concept as each other. But if holding that concepts must share a complete chain of 
deference in order to be of the same type, the concepts cannot be of the same type. Hence, this 
view leads to paradoxes, and it is unlikely that the originalists would want to say that two 
concept tokens are of the same kind only if they share a complete chain of deference.    
It seems, then, that Sainsbury and Tye must agree that ohun(A) and ohun(B) are the same 
concept. At least, we are given no resources in Seven Puzzles of Thought to argue otherwise.65 
If they must agree that the concepts are of the same type, thoughts such as sapphires are 
ohuns(A) and sapphires are not ohuns(B) are in fact contradictory on their view. Further, the 
thoughts sapphires are ohuns(A) and sapphires are ohuns(B) must be of the same type, since 
they share an entire conceptual structure, and hence they should play the same role in 
cognition, according to originalism. Hence my argument in chapter 5 is effective.  
 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have presented what I take to be the most prominent answers and objections 
to my thought experiment on behalf of the originalists, and argued that these replies fail. More 
specifically, I have argued that Sainsbury and Tye cannot deny that ohun(A) and ohun(B) are 
distinct concepts. In chapter 5 I stipulated the history of ohun(A) and ohun(B) to be analogous to 
the history of meat. In this chapter I looked into the possibility of originalists saying that, in 
the case of meat, a new concept originated somewhere in the history. I showed that Sainsbury 
and Tye are in fact committed to saying that the history of meat is a case of a concept staying 
the same but with a change in reference. Since the history of ohun is stipulated to be 
analogous to the history of meat, originalists must say that ohun(A) and ohun(B) are of the same 
type. One might, however, argue that the case outlined in chapter 5 is not really analogous to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  If,	  nonetheless,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  originalist	  could	  deny	  that	  ohun(A)	  and	  ohun(B)	  are	  of	  the	  same	  type	  due	   to	   them	   expressing	   contradictory	   content	   at	   the	   same	   time	   in	   history,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   construct	   a	  thought	  experiment	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  I	  laid	  out	  in	  chapter	  5,	  but	  in	  which	  there	  are	  not	  two	  public	  uses	  of	  the	  same	  concept	  at	   the	  same	   time	   in	  history.	  Consider	  a	   time-­‐traveller	  who	   travels	  back	   in	   time	   to	   the	  15th	  century.	  When	  using	   the	  concept	  meat,	  deferring	   to	   the	  people	  he	  meets	  back	   in	   time,	  he	  uses	   the	  same	  concept	  as	  he	  did	  while	  still	   in	  the	  21st	  century.	  However,	  he	  intends	  to	  use	  the	  concept	  the	  same	  way	   as	   others	   in	   his	   new	   community,	   so	   for	   him	   the	   content	   of	  meat	   includes	   anything	   edible,	   not	   just	  animal	  flesh.	  When	  deferring	  to	  people	  in	  the	  15th	  century,	  then,	  his	  thought	  squash	  is	  meat	  is	  true.	  When	  talking	   with	   his	   family	   in	   the	   21st	   century	   on	   his	   time-­‐travel	   phone,	   however,	   he	   intends	   to	   use	   the	  concept	  the	  way	  they	  use	  it.	  Hence,	  when	  deferring	  to	  his	  family	  the	  thought	  squash	  is	  meat	  is	  false.	  Since	  one	  of	  the	  thought	  tokens	  are	  true	  and	  the	  other	  false,	  they	  should	  play	  distinct	  roles	  in	  cognition.	  They	  do	  however	  share	  a	  complete	  tree-­‐structure,	  according	  to	  originalists.	  Hence,	  the	  thoughts	  playing	  different	  roles	  in	  cognition	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  appeal	  to	  the	  vehicles	  of	  content.	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the case of meat since the result is the same concept having distinct content at the same time 
in history. One might, then, take the case of ohun to be a case of conceptual fission. This 
cannot be the case, however, since conceptual fission requires someone intending to introduce 
a new concept and not defer to earlier uses. The final possibility addressed was for the 
originalist to hold that concepts must share the exact same chain of deference in order to be of 
the same type. I argued that this route leads to paradoxes; if each token in every branch of a 
deference tree are the same as the original concept, by transitivity, they should be the same as 
each other, but if concepts must share a complete chain of deference in order to be the same 
concept, transitivity fails. Hence, this route is rendered nonviable.  
Since all of the replies to my thought experiment addressed in this chapter fails, my criticism 
of originalism stands non-refuted. In chapter 4 I argued that originalism fails to explain three 
of the puzzles of thought – puzzles the solutions of which are the raison d'être of the theory. 
The fact that originalism fails to solve these puzzles, together with the problems the theory 
encounters with my thought experiment, renders originalism unattractive as a general theory 
of cognitive significance and rationality. In the next chapter I will suggest an alternative to 
originalism. The theory I will take a look at is François Recanati’s theory of mental files, 
presented in his (2012). Recanati’s theory is in many respects similar to originalism; for 
instance, Recanati agrees with Sainsbury and Tye that one can employ a non-semantic 
understanding of vehicles of content in order to explain cognitive significance. But, as will 
become clear in the next chapter, the two theories also differ in important respects. I will 
show that Recanati’s account of mental files is the better alternative, since it is better suited to 
solve the classic puzzles; in particular the puzzles addressed in chapter 4 of this thesis. I also 
show that Recanati avoids the kind of problems posed by my thought experiment. Note that 
the chapter is not intended as a general argument in favour of Recanati’s theory – giving such 
an argument is beyond the scope of this thesis. The purpose of presenting Recanati’s theory 
is, rather, to show that there are theories of cognitive significance that are better suited than 
originalism to handle the problems discussed in this thesis (and one might get a suggestion as 
to what is missing on the originalist account). 
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Chapter 7 
Mental Files: An Alternative to Originalism 
 
 
 
In his Mental Files (2012) François Recanati puts forth a theory of singular thoughts 
according to which the constituents of thoughts are to be understood as mental files, a notion 
with which he claims to be able to solve some of the traditional problems in the theory of 
thoughts and concepts. The theory bears similarity to originalism: His notion of a mental file 
is analogous to Sainsbury and Tye’s notion of a concept: mental files are singular terms in the 
language of thought. These files are, like Sainsbury and Tye’s concepts, non-semantic 
vehicles of content.  However, an important difference between the two theories is that while 
Sainsbury and Tye take the constituents of thoughts to be public, Recanati takes these to be 
individual. Further, Recanati does not hold, as do the originalists, that vehicles of content are 
to be individuated by their origins. In this chapter I will give a brief overview of Recanati’s 
account and investigate whether this theory faces the same problems as originalism. If 
Recanati’s theory of mental files can explain the different puzzles of thought and avoid the 
problems posed by my thought experiment, we have reasons to prefer Recanati’s theory to 
originalism. As noted, I do not intend this to be a general defence of Recanati’s theory; there 
might be problems with Recanati’s theory that I do not address in this thesis. Here the focus 
will be on the seven puzzles and my own thought experiment, and whether or not Recanati’s 
theory provides a better explanation of these than originalism. First, I give a very brief 
introduction to Recanati’s theory, and compare it with the originalist view. I then show how 
the mental file framework can solve the seven puzzles of thought. Finally I, show that my 
thought experiment poses no problems for Recanati. 
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7.1 Recanati’s Theory of Mental Files 
Recanati offers a novel theory concerning thoughts and what it is to think about objects. At all 
times, individuals stand in relations to objects in their environment. Some of these relations – 
the acquaintance relations – provide us with knowledge about the objects we are related to: 
“In general there is acquaintance with an object whenever we are so related to that object that 
we can gain information from it, on the basis of that relation” (Recanati 2012, 20). Recanati 
calls these relations epistemically rewarding (ER) relations. According to Recanati the 
information gained from such relations are stored within mental files. The mental files are 
vehicles of content; they are not themselves semantic, but express semantic content.66 All 
mental files correspond to an acquaintance relation and the function of the files is to store 
information about the object to which one is related. Recanati takes these relations to be 
essential to the type of the files and he takes the files to be individuated by their function to 
store information gained from the ER relations. For instance, when I’m perceptually 
acquainted with Big Ben, a mental file is created in my mind and the information gained 
about Big Ben is stored in this specific file. On Recanati’s view, the mental file created when 
perceiving Big Ben is to be individuated in terms of the file’s function to store information 
about Big Ben (which it has in virtue of standing in an appropriate ER relation to it).  
There are different kinds of mental files; there are proto-files, which can “only host 
information gained in virtue of the ER relation to the referent” (Recanati 2012, 64). Such 
proto-files can only gather information from one unique ER relation. The paradigmatic case 
of an ER relation is perceptual acquaintance. There are, of course, other ways to gain 
information about objects than by standing in a direct relation to the referent itself; a large 
part of our knowledge and beliefs is based upon information gained from others. Files capable 
of containing both kinds of information are what Recanati calls conceptual files. These files 
contain both “information gained in the special way that goes with that relation […] and 
information not gained in this way but concerning the same individual as information gained 
in that way” (Ibid., 65-66). Such files can gather information from more than just one ER 
relation. I will return to this distinction in 7.2, where I show that Recanati’s mental file 
framework is better suited than originalism to solve the seven puzzles of thought.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  In	  this	  respect	  they	  correspond	  to	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye’s	  notion	  of	  concepts.	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We saw that Recanati takes the individuation of the mental files to depend on ER relations. 
He also takes the references of the mental files to be determined relationally: Mental files 
refer to whatever they gain information from through ER relations. The reference of a mental 
file  
is not determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have (i.e. by information 
– or misinformation – in the file), but through the relations to on which the files are based. The 
reference is the entity we are acquainted with (in the appropriate way), not the entity which best 
‘fits’ information in the file (Recanati 2012, 35). 
 Recanati’s account, then, provides an answer to question (1) what is the content of concepts, 
and question (2) in virtue of what does a concept have its reference, discussed in chapter 1, 
without appeal to two levelled semantics. Importantly, since the ER relation both determine 
the type of the vehicles (mental files) and also the reference of such entities, the individuation 
of concepts and the fixing of reference does not come apart on this framework. This will be 
important for the discussion in 7.3, where I show that Recanati does not face any problems 
with my thought experiment.  
Recanati agrees with Frege that cognitive significance cannot be explained within a classic 
Millian framework. He does not agree, however, that what is needed to explain this 
phenomenon is a further layer of semantics67. Recanati uses the term cognitive content, but 
importantly, to him, cognitive content is non-semantic. Cognitive content, according to 
Recanati, is characterized by the functional role of the files deployed in our thoughts. Hence, 
he rejects the descriptivist view that cognitive content (mode of presentation) is a set of 
associated descriptions. In contrast, Recanati takes singular thoughts to be directly about 
individual objects as much as they are about properties (Recanati 2012, 3-14). Originalists 
agree with Recanati that one does not need a semantic notion of mode of presentation in order 
to explain cognitive significance. Originalists do, however, hold that cognitive significance 
can be explained without having to attribute any notion of cognitive content (be it semantic or 
functional) to concepts and thoughts. An important difference between Recanati and 
Sainsbury and Tye, then, is that Recanati thinks that there is a distinction between cognitive 
content and referential content and that the cognitive content determines both the mental files 
and their reference, whereas originalists reject that there is any such thing as cognitive 
content. According to originalists there is no such single mechanism that account for the 
individuation of concepts and their reference; even though both depend on deference, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  This	  is	  a	  further	  respect	  in	  which	  Recanati’s	  approach	  is	  similar	  to	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye’s.	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have a two levelled understanding of deference, allowing for individuation and fixing of 
reference to come apart. 
To sum up; Recanati takes the vehicles of content (mental files) to be individuated by their 
cognitive contents, i.e. their function to store information about the objects to which they 
stand in ER relations. The ER relation also determines the reference of the files; mental files 
refer to the object they stand in an ER relation to. In the next section, I will apply Recanati’s 
theory of mental files to the seven puzzles of thought addressed by Sainsbury and Tye. If 
Recanati can provide better solutions to the puzzles, and in particular avoid the objections I 
raised for the originalist account in chapter 4, we have reasons to prefer Recanati’s view to 
originalism. Note that in Mental Files Recanati discusses explicitly only the case of Hesperus 
and Phosphorus, the case of thinking about oneself and the puzzle of empty thoughts. The 
solutions to the other puzzles are my proposals on behalf of Recanati.  
 
7.2 The Puzzles 
The first puzzle is Frege’s puzzle of informative identity statements; how can it be that the 
thought Hesperus is Hesperus is trivial, whereas Hesperus is Phosphorus is informative, 
when Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same reference? Recanati gives the following 
explanation of the puzzle: It is not unusual that someone has multiple files regarding the same 
object. For instance, I might see someone cutting grass and fail to recognize him as Noam 
Chomsky. I then have one (perceptual) file referring to Chomsky and also one (conceptual) 
file referring to Chomsky. Likewise, for the Ancient Babylonian Hesperus and Phosphorus 
were distinct mental files. That is to say, all information associated with Hesperus is located 
within one file, whereas all information associated with Phosphorus is stored in another file. 
Before making the discovery, the information contained within each file is isolated from that 
in the other. In the case of someone thinking Hesperus is Hesperus, both terms are associated 
with the same mental file, Hesperus, and so the statement is trivial. Since the mental files 
Hesperus and Phosphorus are isolated, one is not rationally allowed to infer from this 
information that the same heavenly body is visible twice a day, since there is no information 
in the Hesperus file that predicates of Hesperus that it is visible any other time than during the 
evening. According to Recanati, what happens when one makes the discovery that Hesperus 
is Phosphorus is that information between the two files Hesperus and Phosphorus can flow 
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freely from one file to the other. This he calls linking: “When two files are linked, information 
can flow freely from one file to the other” (Recanati 2012, 43). When learning that Hesperus 
is Phosphorus, the Ancient Babylonians were able to use information from both files, and 
infer that the same heavenly body is visible twice a day.68  
In 4.1 I argued that Sainsbury and Tye fail to explain this puzzle. The reason given was that 
they say that the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus is only a cognitive discovery. Frege 
rejects this view when he lays out the puzzle in his (1892). The puzzle posed by Frege is how 
identity statements such as Hesperus is Phosphorus can be an empirical discovery if the 
meaning of the concepts (terms) is exhausted by their reference. Sainsbury and Tye thus fail 
to explain the puzzle posed by Frege since they hold that coming to know that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus involves only a cognitive discovery. Recanati’s solution to Frege’s puzzle, on the 
other hand, does not face the same worries that the originalist solution did. Recanati agrees 
with Sainsbury and Tye that the thoughts Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus 
have the same truth conditions. However, Recanati can allow for the discovery in question to 
involve new knowledge about the world. The mental files contain information about the 
object to which they stand in ER relations; the information in the mental files is information 
about objects in the world. On this picture, when the Ancient Babylonians learned that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus there was a linking between their files Hesperus and Phosphorus: 
After the discovery, all information regarding the reference within one of the files becomes 
accessible through the other. Since the information that Hesperus is visible in the evening 
now becomes available through the Phosphorus-file, and this file already contains the 
information that Phosphorus is visible in the morning, this explains how the Ancient 
Babylonians learned something new about the world; namely that the same heavenly body is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  On	  this	  view,	  linking	  is	  also	  what	  explains	  recognition:	  When	  I	  succeed	  to	  recognize	  the	  man	  cutting	  the	  grass	  as	  Chomsky,	  information	  flows	  freely	  from	  the	  perceptual	  file	  to	  my	  conceptual	  file	  associated	  with	  Chomsky.	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visible twice a day.69 Hence, Recanati succeeds in explaining how one can make an empirical 
discovery through informative identity statements. Furthermore, in 4.2 I argued that Sainsbury 
and Tye must stipulate that Hesperus and Phosphorus have distinct origins in order to explain 
the case of informative identity statements; if it had turned out that the concepts had the same 
origin, Sainsbury and Tye would encounter analogous problems to those posed for their 
solution to the puzzle of Paderewski in 4.1. Recanati, on the other hand, is in no need of any 
such stipulations; an appeal to the mental files being distant is sufficient for the explanation of 
the puzzle. Recanati takes mental files to be transparent to a thinker; one cannot be wrong 
about the number of vehicles involved in a thought. Hence, there is no room within his theory 
for the Ancient Babylonians’ concepts Hesperus and Phosphorus being of the same type. It is 
clear then that Recanati does not face the problems posed for originalism in accounting for 
informative identity statements.  
I now turn to the puzzle of twins; how can it be that qualitatively identical duplicates can be in 
qualitatively distinct mental states? I argued that Sainsbury and Tye’s account does not really 
add anything to the classical puzzle they purport to solve. Their solution to the puzzle does 
nothing to accommodate the externalist intuition that even if Oscar and Twin Oscar have 
different mental content when thinking water is wet, Gell-Mann and Twin Gell-Mann have 
the same mental content when thinking quarks are tiny.  I will now show that the mental file 
framework of Recanati can better accommodate this intuition and make a contribution to the 
classic debate. Unlike Sainsbury and Tye, Recanati takes meaning vehicles to be individual. 
That is to say, Oscar and Twin Oscar do not share haecceitistically identical mental files, 
since the files are located within individual minds. What is important is not that the twins 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  could	  explain	  the	  Ancient	  Babylonians	  making	  an	  empirical	  discovery	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  Recanati.	  Since	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  two	  theories	  are	  so	  similar,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  Recanati’s	  explanation	  is	  also	  available	  to	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye.	  However,	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  are	  clear	  that	  identity	  statements	  can	  only	  involve	  cognitive	  discoveries.	  In	  fact,	  they	  must	  say	  this	  in	  order	  to	  give	  their	   specific	  explanation	  of	   the	  knowledge	  argument	  stemming	   from	   Jackson	  (1982).	  Here	   they	  defend	  physicalism	  by	  saying	  that	  Mary	  only	  makes	  a	  cognitive	  discovery	  when	  leaving	  her	  black	  and	  white	  room.	  In	  short:	  When	  still	  in	  the	  black	  and	  white	  room	  Mary	  knows	  one	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  as	  to	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  see	  red.	  She	  knows	  that	  this	  (referring	  to	  what	  she	  has	  come	  to	  know	  about	  the	  experience	  of	  seeing	  red	   through	  her	  books)	   is	  what	   it’s	   like	   to	   see	   red.	  After	  having	   seen	  a	   red	   rose	   for	   the	   first	   time	  Mary	  comes	  to	  know	  a	  new	  answer	  to	  the	  question:	  she	  knows	  that	  this	  (referring	  to	  her	  current	  experience)	  is	  what	  it’s	  like	  to	  see	  red.	  When	  Mary	  forms	  the	  thought	  this	  is	  this	  (where	  both	  tokens	  refer	  to	  what	  it’s	  like	  to	  see	  red,	  and	  the	  first	  concept	  token	  is	  the	  concept	  she	  used	  before	  her	  release	  and	  the	  latter	  token	  is	  the	  one	  she	  acquired	  after	  her	  release),	  both	  concepts	  refer	   to	   the	  experience	  of	   seeing	  red,	  but	  since	  Mary	  introduced	   the	   indexical	   concepts	   at	   distinct	   events,	   they	   are	   of	   different	   types.	   This	   explains	  why	   her	  thought	  is	  informative.	  Her	  thought	  being	  informative,	  however,	  does	  not	  involve	  her	  making	  an	  empirical	  discovery:	  ”Mary	  makes	  a	  discovery	  when	  she	  leaves	  the	  room.	  But	  if	  physicalism	  is	  true,	  her	  discovery	  is	  a	  cognitive	  discovery	  […]	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  like	  the	  discovery	  that	  Hesperus	  is	  Phosphorus	  or	  that	  Cicero	  is	  Tully”	  (Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  2012,	  166).	  Hence,	  it	  seems	  that	  Sainsbury	  and	  Tye	  must	  say	  that	  coming	  to	  know	  informative	  identity	  statements	  only	  involves	  a	  cognitive	  discovery.	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share the same meaning vehicles, but that their meaning vehicles are qualitatively identical, or 
– in the case of water and twin water – qualitatively distinct. Oscar and Twin Oscar’s 
concepts water are qualitatively distinct, since one refers to H2O while the other refers to 
XYZ. The other concepts used by the twins, however, should turn out to be qualitatively 
identical, since they refer to qualitatively identical objects (the only difference between Earth 
and Twin Earth, recall, is the chemical structure of water). Mental files, recall, are typed by 
their function to store information about certain objects. Consider first the case of quarks and 
twin quarks, discussed in 4.3: Gell-Mann and Twin Gell-Mann stand in relations to 
qualitatively identical objects, namely quarks, so their quark files function to store 
information about qualitatively identical objects. Since Gell-Mann and Twin Gell-Mann are 
qualitatively identical duplicates and their quark files were created in qualitatively identical 
contexts, the ER-relations between the files and the objects must be qualitatively identical as 
well. This explains why their thoughts quarks are tiny are qualitatively identical, since mental 
files are constituents of thoughts and Gell-Mann and Twin Gell-Mann have qualitatively 
identical files.  
Now, consider the case of Oscar and Twin Oscar: The twins stand in relations to qualitatively 
distinct objects; H2O and XYZ. Since their files function to store information about 
qualitatively distinct objects, the ER-relations are qualitatively distinct. Hence, when thinking 
water is wet Oscar and Twin Oscar activate qualitatively distinct mental files. A similar 
explanation may be given to Burge’s thought experiment regarding actual and counterfactual 
Alf: In the actual case, Alf stands in an ER relation to arthritis whereas, in the counterfactual 
case, he stands in an ER relation to tarthritis. Since the contexts are qualitatively distinct, so 
are the mental files associated with each scenario. Further, since Recanati takes the reference 
to be determined by the ER relation, this account also explains what originalism failed to 
explain; how intrinsic duplicates can differ with respect to their mental content. Gell-Mann 
and Twin Gell-Mann stand in qualitatively identical relations to quarks, so the references of 
their quark files are qualitatively identical. Oscar and Twin Oscar, on the other hand, stand in 
qualitatively distinct ER relations to H2O and XYZ respectively, and hence the reference of 
the two files are also qualitatively distinct. Hence, Recanati avoids the criticism put forth 
against the originalist solution to the puzzle of twins in 4.3. 
The third puzzle is the puzzle of cats and chats. In solving the puzzle of Paul making a 
discovery when learning that cat and chat have the same reference, the originalists must yet 
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again stipulate that the concepts have distinct origins. In case of the concepts having the same 
origins, the originalists had to appeal to Paul being mistaken about the number of concepts 
deployed in thought. Recanati does not need to stipulate that the concepts have distinct origins 
or Paul being mistaken about the number of concepts involved. As mentioned, Recanati 
denies that one can be wrong about the number of files one has; he takes modes of 
presentation (non-semantic cognitive content) to be transparent to the thinker. This is one of 
Recanati’s main reasons for making a distinction between mode of presentation and reference: 
“If modes of presentation are not transparent, there is no reason to move from pure referential 
talk to mode of presentation talk in the explanation of rational behaviour” (Recanati 2012, 
116-117). Paul’s believing that cats and chats are distinct concepts, then, shows that he has 
distinct mental files associated with cats. When learning that cats and chats have the same 
reference, there is a linking between Paul two files, allowing information to flow freely 
between the two files. This explains why Paul makes a discovery when learning that the 
concept cat has the same reference as the concept chat.  
The fourth puzzle is the Puzzle of Paderewski. In 4.2 I showed that the originalist solution 
involved attributing an indefinite amount of contradictory n-order beliefs, and thus that 
originalists fail to explain Peter being rational. Unlike Sainsbury and Tye, Recanati takes 
meaning vehicles to be individual. In the case of Peter having inconsistent thoughts about 
Paderewski, the mental file framework can account for Peter’s being rational by saying that 
he has distinct files that both refer to Paderewski. One of Peter’s Paderewski files contains the 
information gathered about Paderewski at the concert, while the other contains the 
information gathered about Paderewski at the rally. These files are not linked, since Peter 
does not know that the information is about the same individual. When forming the belief 
Paderewski has musical talent, Peter uses only information from the file containing the 
information from the concert. When forming the belief Paderewski does not have musical 
talent, Peter only uses information from the file containing the information from the rally. 
This explains why Peter is rational in holding contradictory beliefs. When Peter makes the 
discovery Paderewski (the musician) = Paderewski (the politician) there is a linking between 
the two files which account for him learning a new fact. While originalists must say that Peter 
only has one Paderewski concept, Recanati can allow for Peter’s thoughts containing distinct 
meaning vehicles, and thus Recanati need not appeal to any such thing as Peter having false 
second order beliefs in order to explain his being rational. Recanati thus avoids the problems 
posed for originalism in 4.2. 
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I now turn to the puzzle about pure demonstratives. This is the puzzle of how it is possible to 
fail to know whether identity statements on the form that is that are true, when both tokens of 
that have the same reference. In this case, Recanati can say that the individual has two 
indexical mental files that, both referring to the same object. Before actually believing that the 
two tokens of that refer to the same thing, the files are not linked, and thus information cannot 
flow freely between the two files. When wondering whether that is that, two distinct files are 
active, and this explains why learning that the thought that is that is true, is informative. The 
solution to this puzzle based on Recanati’s framework bears similarity to the originalist 
solution to the same puzzle. This is because originalists agree with Recanati that indexical 
concepts are individual. Both the originalist solution to the puzzle and the solution just 
presented appeal to the thinker having distinct meaning vehicles when wondering if the 
thought that is that is true. I consider the originalist solution and the solution based on 
Recanati’s framework to the puzzle of pure demonstratives to be on equal footing. 
The next puzzle is the puzzle of empty thoughts. Since, according to Recanati, thought 
vehicles are typed by their function, and this involves acquaintance, it seems that thoughts 
deploying empty concepts cannot have the same status as thoughts having a reference. 
Recanati says that one can open a file without actually being acquainted with the relevant 
object, but “opening a mental file itself is not sufficient to entertain a singular thought (in the 
sense of thought-content)” (Recanati 2012, 164). Further, he says that mental file tokening “is 
sufficient to entertain a singular thought only in the sense of thought-vehicle” (Ibid., 164). 
That is, even though singular thought vehicles are typed by their function, Recanati holds that 
such entities can be tokened even if this function is not fulfilled. The function to store 
information about the referent is not a de facto function of the files, but rather it is a de jure 
function. This means that the mental files can exist even if they fail to fulfill their function. 
However, if there is no object to be acquainted with, one cannot think a thought in the 
ordinary sense, but instead one can entertain a thought vehicle.70 This solution resembles the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  In	  a	  forthcoming	  article,	  Carsten	  Hansen	  and	  George	  Rey	  argue	  that	  Recanati’s	  theory	  commits	  him	  to	  a	  form	  of	  actualism.	  This	  is	  the	  view	  that	  thought	  about	  individual	  objects	  “is	  thought	  about	  actual	  objects	  virtually	   all	   external	   to	   the	   cognitive	   system”	   (Hansen	   and	   Rey	   (forthcoming),	   1).	   They	   argue	   that	   by	  taking	   singular	   thought	   to	  depend	  on	   acquaintance,	  Recanati’s	   theory	   fails	   to	   give	   an	   account	   involving	  various	  thoughts	  about	  objects	  we	  can	  never	  be	  acquainted	  with.	  They	  suggest	  that	  the	  mental	  framework	  can	  be	  maintained	  without	  appealing	  to	  acquaintance:	  	  ”we	  see	  Recanati’s	  very	  own	  postulation	  of	  mental	  files	  as	  “senses”	  of	  tokens	  in	  contexts	  as	  an	  excellent	  suggestion	  for	  the	  content	  of	  empty	  terms	  –	  provided	  of	   course	   it’s	   freed	   of	   the	   commitment	   to	   acquaintance	   with	   real	   objects!”	   (Hansen	   and	   Rey,	   11).	   For	  present	  purpose	  I	  will	  grant	  Recanati’s	  explanation	  of	  empty	  thoughts.	  It	  may,	  however,	  be	  that	  we	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  we	  adopt	  a	  view	  similar	  to	  Recanati’s	  but	  that	  is	  not	  committed	  to	  acquaintance	  relations	  to	  actual	  objects.	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one given by Sainsbury and Tye in that both theories appeal to the vehicles of content when 
explaining empty concepts playing an interesting role in cognition.  
The final puzzle addressed by Sainsbury and Tye is the puzzle of thinking about oneself. 
Recanati holds that mental files possess the essential features of indexicals in that mental files 
are context sensitive. Regardless of context, however, one is always in an ER relation to 
oneself. For instance, when you leave a room you no longer think of the room as ‘here’, but 
you always think of yourself as ‘I’. For Recanati, then, the self file is a stable file, meaning 
that it is not temporal in the way that most other mental files are (Recanati 2012, 68). Further, 
as noted, Recanati holds that (conceptual) mental files contain two sorts of information: 
“information gained in the special way that goes with that relation (first person information in 
the case of the self file), and information not gained in this way but concerning the same 
individual as information gained in that way” (Ibid., 65-66). For instance, knowledge of one’s 
birthday is not information gained through the relation to oneself, but rather it is learned from 
the testimony of others. Since one thinks this information gained from others regards oneself, 
the information is stored in one’s self file. Information gained in this way might be false; 
someone might have lied when informing you of your birthday. The other kind of 
information, the one you have in virtue of standing in a stable acquaintance relation to 
yourself, on the other hand, is immune to error (for instance, you cannot be wrong about 
whether you are in pain or not). Further, in the case of Mach thinking that the man in the 
mirror is a shabby pedagogue while failing to recognize that the man in the mirror is himself, 
the information gained when thinking about himself in third person does not go into the self 
file, since Mach does not think the information gained is about himself. When learning that 
the man in the mirror is himself, there is a linking between Mach’s self file and the file 
containing the information about his own reflection. Recanati’s solution to this puzzle is 
similar to the one proposed by Sainsbury and Tye in that they both claim that Ernst Mach uses 
distinct vehicles when thinking about himself in third- and first person perspective. I 
problematize neither solution in this thesis. 
I have shown, very briefly, that Recanati’s theory of mental files provides easy and 
straightforward solutions to the puzzles addressed by Sainsbury and Tye. The theory also 
succeeds in accounting for the problems I raised in chapter 4 for Sainsbury and Tye’s 
originalist solutions to the puzzles. Hence, the mental file framework is preferable to 
Sainsbury and Tye’s originalism when it comes to solving the puzzles. I will now show that 
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Recanati also avoids the problems raised for Sainsbury and Tye’s account by my thought 
experiment in chapter 5. 
 
7.3 The Thought Experiment Revisited 
The problem posed for originalism in chapter 5 was that the theory allows for individuals 
using concept tokens of the same type to express contradictory contents. If the correct 
understanding of Sainsbury and Tye’s account is that cognitive significance is to be explained 
in terms of vehicles rather than content, the theory fails to explain the cognitive significance 
of thoughts that are the same at the level of vehicles but contradictory at the level of 
semantics, and vice versa. A further consequence is that the theory fails to explain why 
someone is rational in accepting or rejecting deductions that are valid at the level of syntax 
but invalid at the level of semantics, and vice versa. This implies that the individuation of 
concepts and thoughts should not come apart from reference fixing if one takes cognitive 
processing to depend directly on the vehicles of content. As noted, it may be that even if 
Sainsbury and Tye explain the puzzles in terms of vehicles they are not committed to saying 
that every instance of cognitive significance is to be explained in terms of vehicles alone. By 
making some adjustments to my thought experiment I showed that their account fails to give a 
general account of rationality, even if their framework allows them to appeal directly to the 
content of thoughts. I will now show that Recanati does not face any such problems with the 
thought experiment put forth in chapter 5. 
The reason why originalists must claim that ohun(A) and ohun(B) are of the same type is that 
the concepts have the same origin. Recanati, however, who does not take concepts to be 
individuated by their origin, would not have to claim that the concepts are of the same type.71 
For Indira to acquire the concept ohun(A) involves her standing in ER relations to blue objects. 
Her acquiring the concept ohun(B), on the other hand, involves her standing in ER relations to 
objects that are not blue. The information gained through these ER relations is stored in 
distinct mental files. In this case, ohun(A) and ohun(B) are not equivocal (as they must be on the 
originalist account). To Recanati, they are simply distinct concepts which names are spelled 
and pronounced the same way (like ‘bank’ in the sense of river bank and ‘bank’ in the sense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Note	  that	  Recanati’s	  theory	  concerns	  singular	  thoughts.	  Some	  of	  the	  thoughts	  I	  discuss	  here	  are	  general	  thoughts,	   however	   (they	   are	   not	   about	   particular	   objects).	   I	   propose	   a	   simple	   extension	   of	   Recanati’s	  framework	  in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  general	  thoughts.	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of money bank). When thinking the thoughts an ohun(A) is blue and an ohun(B) is not blue, 
distinct mental files are active in Indira’s mind. Hence, the two thoughts are not contradictory 
at the level of vehicles, since they do not deploy the same concepts. Further, in the case of 
Indira wanting a blue bike and forming the thought that bike is an ohun(A) she would be 
rational in buying the bike, whereas had she instead formed the thought that bike is an ohun(B) 
she would not be rational in buying the bike. Hence, if Indira is rational, the two thoughts 
would have different causal powers. Sainsbury and Tye, recall, could not explain the 
difference in causal powers of the two thoughts, since they must say that the thoughts are of 
the same type. Recanati, on the other hand, has no problem explaining the cognitive 
difference of the two thoughts. Since, on this view ohun(A) and ohun(B) are distinct concepts, 
the thoughts are of different types. The thoughts’ being of different types explains why they 
play different roles in cognition. The thoughts playing different roles in cognition explains 
why the two thoughts have different causal powers. Hence, Recanati’s theory provides a 
straightforward explanation of the difference in the two thoughts in terms of vehicles of 
content. 
Further, in the case of Indira performing deductions in her head, the difference in reference is 
reflected in a difference in vehicles, on the mental file framework. Recanati says that “unicity 
of reference is a built-in presupposition of the file” (Recanati 2012, 132).  That is to say, 
someone cannot knowingly use one file to refer to distinct objects.72 Consider for instance the 
case of Indira performing the following deduction in thought, addressed in chapter 5: 
(2)     P1: If something is an ohun(A) then it is blue 
P2: The book is an ohun(B) 
C: The book is blue 
To Recanati the deduction would look the same regardless of whether it is formulated with 
respect to vehicles or reference. If considering only the vehicles, the deduction is invalid - so 
Indira is rational in rejecting the deduction. This is the desired result. The problem with the 
deduction only rises if one takes ohun(A) and ohun(B) to be of the same type. Sainsbury and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72 	  In	   the	   case	   of	   someone	   unknowingly	   storing	   information	   about	   distinct	   objects	   (as	   in	   inverse	  Paderewski	  cases)	  Recanati	  says	  that	  the	  file	  fails	  to	  refer:	  “If	  there	  is	  no	  object,	  or	  more	  than	  one,	  the	  file	  does	  not	   refer”	   (Recanati	   2012,	   132).	  Hence,	   one	   and	   the	   same	  mental	   file	   can	  never	  have	   two	  distinct	  references,	  on	  Recanati’s	  view.	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Tye hold that “both being contradictory and being valid essentially depend on how many 
concepts are involved” (Sainsbury and Tye CC, 3-4). In chapter 5 I showed that if allowing 
for concepts of the same type to express distinct content, this statement fails. However, if one 
holds that a difference in reference entails a difference in concepts, this statement holds.  
Further, Recanati holds that concepts are individual rather than public. If confronted with the 
thought experiment as formulated in 5.3, he would encounter no problems in accounting for 
Indira being rational. On Recanati’s framework, the reference of the vehicles is whatever they 
stand in ER relations to. Even though the other people in both group A and group B have 
started to use the concept ohun to pick out anything that is an object, the reference of Indira’s 
files ohun(A) and ohun(B) still have the same reference as before she left, since the files stand in 
ER relations to objects that are blue and objects that are not blue, respectively. When Indira 
forms the thought an ohun(A) is blue this thought is true since the predicate ‘is blue’ is stored 
within a file referring to blue objects. Likewise, her thought an ohun(B) is not blue is also true, 
since the predicate ‘is not blue’ is stored within a file referring to objects that are not blue. 
Since Indira’s concepts ohun(A) and ohun(B) differ both at the level of vehicles and reference, 
the two thoughts are not contradictory. Since the two thoughts are not contradictory there is 
nothing threatening Indira being rational on this view. Hence, Recanati’s theory is apt to 
explain both versions of the thought experiment put forth in chapter 5. On the basis of the 
cases discussed in this thesis, then, we have reasons to prefer Recanati’s theory of mental files 
to Sainsbury and Tye’s originalist account.  
 
7.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I’ve presented an alternative to originalism: Recanati’s theory of mental files. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to show that one can agree with originalism that the 
explanation of cognitive significance does not depend on a semantic notion of mode of 
presentation but rather on the vehicles of content, and at the same time avoid the problems 
posed for originalism in this thesis. In particular, I showed that Recanati’s framework 
provides solutions to the seven puzzles of thought – also those that I argued originalism fails 
to solve. In particular, Recanati can account for informative identity statements in terms of 
vehicles without making any stipulations about the origins of such vehicles. When the 
Ancient Babylonian discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus the two files were linked and 
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information could then flow freely between the two files. This explains why the Ancient 
Babylonians made an important empirical discovery when learning that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus; after the discovery, all information regarding the referent of one file could be 
accessed through the other. Recanati’s framework also provides an unproblematic explanation 
of the puzzle of Paderewski; Peter has two distant files, that unbeknownst to him refer to the 
same individual. Since he uses one file when thinking that Paderewski has musical talent and 
another when thinking that Paderewski lacks musical talent, this explains him being rational. 
Thus, Recanati does not need to appeal to Peter having false higher order beliefs, as did 
Sainsbury and Tye. Finally, Recanati’s framework also explains the difference in thought of 
Oscar and Twin Oscar; since Oscar stands in an ER relation to H2O and Twin Oscar stands in 
a relation to XYZ, their mental files are qualitatively distinct. Gell-Mann and Twin Gell-
Mann, on the other hand, stand in ER relations to qualitatively identical objects, so their 
mental files are qualitatively identical. Since the ER relation also determines the reference of 
the files, this explanation also contributes to the classic debate about mental content. Hence, 
Recanati’s framework succeeds in explaining the puzzles originalism fails to solve. 
Furthermore, I argued that Recanati avoids the problems posed for originalism by the thought 
experiment presented in chapter 5. This is because, unlike originalism, Recanati’s framework 
does not allow for one vehicle to have more than one reference; a difference in reference 
indicates a difference in files. As I have stressed, this is not intended as a general argument in 
favour of Recanati’s theory – there might be other problems with his theory. Rather, what this 
shows is that, on the basis of the cases discussed in this thesis, we have reasons to prefer 
Recanati’s theory of mental files to originalism as stated in Seven Puzzles of Thought.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
I have argued that originalism, as stated in Seven Puzzles of Thought, fails as a general theory 
of concepts and thoughts. In chapter 4 I showed that originalism fails to solve certain of the 
puzzles the theory is advanced to solve. In particular, I argued that their solution to the puzzle 
of Paderewski fails, since the appeal to Peter having false second order beliefs leads to an 
infinite regress of more sets of contradictory beliefs at increasing metalevels. If anything, 
then, Peter’s being rational is rendered even harder to explain after making the appeal to false 
higher order beliefs, since we end up stipulating him having more sets of contradictory beliefs 
than he had in Kripke’s original puzzle. I then argued that the originalist solution to the puzzle 
of Hesperus and Phosphorus fails to explain how identity statements can potentially provide 
new knowledge about the world. The reason for this is that, according to originalism, when 
learning that Hesperus is Phosphorus, the Ancient Babylonians made only a cognitive 
discovery and not an empirical discovery. Originalism thus fails to explain what was at the 
centre of Frege’s original puzzle. My final criticism of the originalist solution to the puzzles 
concerned the solution to the puzzle of twins. I argued that Sainsbury and Tye do not 
correctly represent the puzzle rising from the classical debate about mental content stemming 
from Putnam and Burge. Their solution to the original puzzle is irrelevant, and their solution 
to the puzzle they draw from the original puzzle (how intrinsic duplicates may differ with 
respect to their thoughts (vehicles of content)) depends on serious stipulations and fails to 
reflect the difference between intrinsic duplicates having the same mental states on the one 
hand and their having distinct mental states on the other. The fact that Sainsbury and Tye’s 
account offers no new contribution to the questions that puzzled Putnam and Burge, is 
reflected in their claim that the core assumptions of originalism are consistent with both 
internalism and externalism about mental content. Oscar and Twin Oscar’s concepts water 
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would be distinct, and thus play different roles in cognition, even if the watery stuff on Twin 
Earth had the same chemical structure as the watery stuff on Earth. In Seven Puzzles of 
Thought the reason given for preferring originalism to competing theories is that the theory 
solves the classical puzzles. Since originalism fails to solve three of the classical puzzles it 
sets out to solve we are given little reason to prefer originalism to competitive theories.  
Since Sainsbury and Tye’s main focus is on the seven puzzles of thought, they give no 
explicit statement of what a general theory of cognitive significance would be on their 
account. What is certain is that their only explanatory tools are vehicles of content and 
reference; in particular, their explanatory framework does not appeal to any notion of 
cognitive content. What is unclear is whether Sainsbury and Tye can appeal directly to the 
reference in cases where the cognitive significance cannot be explained in terms of vehicles. 
In order to show that their theory fails as a general theory regardless of their take on the 
explanatory role of reference, I have proposed two versions of a thought experiment. In the 
first version of the thought experiment, I argued that if Sainsbury and Tye take cognitive 
significance to be explained purely in terms of vehicle of content rather than the content 
expressed by such entities, they fail to explain how someone can be rational in holding beliefs 
that are contradictory at the level of syntax, but not at the level of content. Also, since they 
allow for concepts to be equivocal, they cannot explain how someone can be rational in 
accepting deductions that are invalid at the level of syntax but valid at the level of semantics, 
if taking cognitive significance to depend solely on the vehicles of content. In the second 
version of the thought experiment, I argued that even if Sainsbury and Tye are not committed 
to saying that every instance of cognitive significance is to be explained by appeal to vehicles 
alone (i.e. if they can allow the explanation to depend directly on the semantic features of 
thoughts), they still fail to explain certain cases of someone being rational in holding 
seemingly contradictory beliefs. In both formulations of the thought experiment, the problems 
posed for Sainsbury and Tye are due to their commitment that a change in reference does not 
necessitate a change in vehicles. However, since one of the key claims of originalism is that 
concepts are to be individuated by their origins and not by their semantic properties, 
Sainsbury and Tye must allow for concepts expressing contradictory content on their current 
framework. Since their theory fails to explain certain cases of rationality, then, Sainsbury and 
Tye’s originalist account fails as a general theory of concepts and thoughts. 
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I have argued that there are other theories, such as Recanati’s theory of mental files, that are 
better suited to solve the puzzles than originalism, and also that such theories also avoid the 
problems posed for originalism by my thought experiment. Recanati’s theory takes concepts 
to be individuated in terms of their function, and their function is to store information about 
the objects to which they stand in epistemically rewarding relations. Hence, the individuation 
of concepts depends on their relation to their specific referents. Therefore, this theory cannot 
allow for a change in reference without a change in vehicles. I have indicated that this last 
commitment is one that we should endorse in giving a general theory of concepts and 
thoughts, if we are to explain certain cases of rationality. There might be other problems the 
originalist account may avoid which confront theories that have this commitment, but on the 
basis of the cases discussed in this thesis, we have reasons to reject Sainsbury and Tye’s 
originalism in favour of competing theories of concepts and thoughts.  
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